California Government History Documentation Project

The Reagan Era

THE "KITCHEN CABINET"

FOUR CALIFORNIA CITIZEN ADVISERS OF RONALD REAGAN

Interviews Conducted By

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This is a slightly edited transcription of an interview conducted for the Center for Oral and Public History, sponsored by California State University, Fullerton. The reader should be aware that an oral history document portrays information as recalled by the interviewee. Because of the spontaneous nature of this kind of document, it may contain statements and impressions which are not factual.

PREFACE

California government and politics from 1966 through 1974 are the focus of the Reagan Gubernatorial Era Series of the state Government History Documentation project, conducted by the Regional Oral History Office of The Bancroft Library, with the participation of the oral history programs at the Davis and Los Angeles campuses of the University of California, Claremont Graduate School, and California State University, Fullerton. This series of interviews carries forward studies of significant issues and processes in public administration begun by the Regional Oral History Office in 1969. In previous series, interviews with over 220 legislators, elected and appointed officials and others active in public life during the governorships of Earl Warren, Goodwin Knight, and Edmund Brown, Sr., were completed and are now available to scholars.

The first unit in the Government History Documentation Project, the Earl Warren Series, produced interviews with Warren himself and others centered on key developments in politics and government administration at the state and county level, innovations in criminal justice, public health, and social welfare from 1928-1953. Interviews in the Knight-Brown Era continued the earlier inquiries into the nature of the governor's office and its relations with executive departments and the legislature, and explored the rapid social and economic changes in the years 1953-1966, as well as preserving Brown's own account of his extensive political career. Among the issues documented are the rise and fall of the Democratic party; establishment of the California Water Plan; election law changes, reapportionment and new political techniques; education and various social programs.

During Ronald Reagan's years as governor, important changes became evident in California government and politics. His administration marked an end to the progressive period which had provided the determining outlines of government organization and political strategy since 1910 and the beginning of a period of limits in state policy and programs, the extent of which is not yet clear. Interviews in this series deal with the efforts of the administration to increase government efficiency and economy and with organizational innovations designed to expand the management capability of the governor's office, as well as critical aspects of state health, education, welfare, conservation, and criminal justice programs. Legislative and executive department narrators provide their perspectives on these efforts and their impact on the continuing process of legislative and elective politics.

Work began on the Reagan Gubernatorial Era Series in 1979. Planning and research for this phase of the project were augmented by participation of the oral history programs at California State University, Fullerton; University of California, Los Angeles; Claremont Graduate School; and University of California, Davis. Additional advisers were selected to provide relevant background for identifying persons to be interviewed and understanding of issues to be documented. Project research files, developed by the Regional Oral History Office staff to provide a systematic background for questions, were updated to add personal, topical, and chronological data for the Reagan period to the existing base of information for 1925 through 1966, and to supplement research by participating programs as needed. Valuable, continuing assistance in preparing for interviews was provided by the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, which houses the Ronald Reagan Papers, and by the State Archives in Sacramento.

An effort was made to select a range of interviewees that would reflect the increase in government responsibilities and that would represent diverse points of view. In general, participating programs were contracted to conduct interviews on topics with which they have particular expertise, with persons presently located nearby. Each interview is identified as to the originating institution. Most interviewees have been queried on a limited number of topics with which they were personally connected; a few narrators with unusual breadth of experience have been asked to discuss a multiplicity of subjects. When possible, the interviews have traced the course of specific issues leading up to and resulting from events during the Reagan administration in order to develop a sense of the continuity and interrelationships that are a significant aspect of the government process.

Throughout Reagan's years as governor, there was considerable interest and speculation concerning his potential for the presidency; by the time interviewing for this project began in early 1980, he was indeed president. Project interviewers have attempted, where appropriate, to retrieve recollections of that contemporary concern as it operated in the governor's office. The intent of the present interviews, however, is to document the course of California government from 1967 to 1974, and Reagan's impact on it. While many interviewees frame their narratives of the Sacramento years in relation to goals and performance of Reagan's national administration, their comments often clarify aspects of the gubernatorial period that were not clear at the time. Like other historical documentation, these oral histories do not in themselves provide the complete record of the past. It is hoped that they offer firsthand experience of passions and personalities that have influenced significant events past and present.

The Reagan Gubernatorial Era Series has been funded by the California Legislature through the office of the Secretary of State. In addition, several of the memoirs have been funded in part by additional grants from private or public foundations or by work or funds contributed by the participating oral history programs. Copies of all interviews in the series are available for research use in The Bancroft Library, UCLA Department of Special Collections, and the State Archives in Sacramento. Selected interviews are also available at other manuscript depositories. This compilation of interviews is available from The Oral History Program, California State University, Fullerton. A complete list of all interviews in the Reagan Project can be obtained from the Regional Oral History Office, University of California, Berkeley.

March 1983

Gabrielle Morris
Project Director

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

A crucial element in political history is the citizen who, without formal office, plays an important role in winning elections and often in shaping the personnel and policies of an administration. Such people were particularly significant in the rise of Ronald Reagan in politics, and some of them have continued to be key advisers through his governorship and presidency. It was a few California businessmen, impressed with Reagan's public speaking during the 1964 presidential campaign who prevailed upon him to become a candidate for governor. They provided much of the early solicitation of funds and supporters. Gradually expanding during 1966, they composed part of the transition team that advised Reagan on appointments and helped organize his first months in office. By early 1967 the name "kitchen cabinet" was given to these men, and their reputation as a behind-the-scenes influence on the governor increased even as, in most cases, their actual contact with him declined. It is thus appropriate that the interviews of the California Government History Documentation Project: Reagan Era, include four members of this "kitchen cabinet": Henry Salvatori, Justin Dart, Edward Mills and Holmes Tuttle.

These interviewees have generated considerable speculation and debate as to their background, motives for political activity, and their impact on government. Therefore, this introduction will endeavor both to supply background information that will make the interviews more meaningful and to summarize differing points of view on a few key questions surrounding the "kitchen cabinet." One of the most common assumptions which writers on the Reagan governorship have made is that these "millionaire advisers" represent a homogenous segment of American society, differing little in their origins, careers, or viewpoints. In some characteristics, this seems true. All four men are staunch, lifelong Republicans; all have attained considerable wealth largely through their own efforts. These traits have contributed to their unreserved belief in private enterprise as superior to any government program for attaining progress and hence their unquestioning support of a person like Ronald Reagan who professed that faith. Beyond these characteristics, however, the reader will find significant differences in their backgrounds, their routes to success, and the experiences and values which attracted them to political activity.

Henry Salvatori was born in Italy but came to the United States at the age of two with his parents. He was reared in a Republican household. Living first in New Jersey and later in Pennsylvania, he chose engineering and science as his career and obtained a master's degree in physics from Columbia University in 1923. He moved to Oklahoma where he worked for a geophysical research corporation and helped develop the reflector seismograph, a technique of surveying for oil. In 1931 he came to California; two years later he formed the Western Geophysical Company, and subsequently played a role in the discovery of Wilmington and Central Valley oil fields.

At the end of World War II he became concerned about the threat of Communism, and shortly thereafter he became active in the organization and campaigns of the Republican Party and of several conservative issues.

Sharing immigrant parentage is Edward Mills, one of eight children of Dutch parents who had met and married in the United States and established a bakery in Holland, Michigan. They long supported the Democratic Party. At the end of World War I, the family moved to California. In the early 1920s, Edward, still a schoolboy, began a long career with Van de Kamp's bakery. Graduating from the University of Southern California, he assumed various administrative positions with that company. His political involvement began in 1935 when he helped organize a successful referendum campaign against a progressive chain store tax. He subsequently became active in Republican fund raising at the county and state level as well as in state right-to-work issues.

Holmes Tuttle was born and raised in Oklahoma, the son of a cattle rancher who was a Bull Moose Progressive Republican. When his family fell on hard times, Holmes went to work in an auto plant and in 1926 moved to California. He took up automobile retailing and in 1930 opened a Ford Motor Company agency in Los Angeles. Over the years this agency grew to a company with dealerships in several cities in California and Arizona. Long active in local campaigns, he became a major contributor to Republican candidates during the Eisenhower elections. His acquaintance with Ronald Reagan predated this political activity, as the Tuttles began meeting socially with the Reagans shortly after World War II.

It was these three men--Henry Salvatori, Edward Mills, and Holmes Tuttle--together with the late A. C. "Cy" Rubel, the former president of Union Oil Company, who early in 1965 formed the Friends of Ronald Reagan. This small group convinced Reagan to consider becoming a candidate for governor and did much of the early fund raising and exploring for political support which made his candidacy possible.

There are varying accounts of the growth and composition of the "kitchen cabinet" beyond this nucleus. The Friends of Ronald Reagan expanded their ranks statewide and Jacquelin Hume, president of the San Francisco based Basic Vegetable Products, and Leland Kaiser, a San Francisco investment banker, are usually included among its members. From a prestigious Los Angeles law firm, the "Friends" recruited William French Smith who subsequently became Reagan's personal attorney and alone among this group eventually held public office. These persons share the essential characteristics of the original group: men of wealth with careers in the private sector contributing their time and funds to the Reagan campaign. These criteria would not include the political consultants Stuart Spencer and William Roberts, although their firm was hired by the "Friends" in 1965 and was instrumental in Reagan's primary election victory over San Francisco mayor George Christopher. During this campaign, the Friends of Ronald Reagan maintained close contact with their counterparts in the Christopher camp, and several of the latter subsequently became members of the "kitchen cabinet." Prominent among these were Arch Monson, Jr., who had been Christopher's campaign chairman, tire industrialist Leonard Firestone, and the late Taft Schreiber who had been Reagan's film agent since 1938. Some writers have gone beyond this

group and included in the "kitchen cabinet" such longtime personal friends of the Reagans as movie executive Jack Wrather, Jr., rancher William Wilson, steel executive Earle Jorgensen, and the late Alfred Bloomingdale. These persons, however, were not as involved with Reagan's political career but met with them mostly on a social basis.[1] Therefore, the editors of this volume have chosen as representative of the later members of the "kitchen cabinet" a person who has remained a prominent adviser to Reagan into his presidency, Justin Dart.

Justin Dart was born in Illinois and attended Mercersberg Academy and Northwestern University, making him the third of our four "kitchen cabinet" interviewees to receive at least a bachelor's degree at a time when only a small percentage of the population attended college. Marrying Ruth Walgreen of the Walgreen Drug chain family, he joined that firm in 1929 and became its director in 1934, serving in that capacity until 1941. That year he joined Rexall Drug, which he built into Dart Industries, Incorporated in 1946. He has served as president, chair, or chief executive officer of that firm since its inception. Dart did little in the way of political activity until the Eisenhower campaigns, particularly that of 1956.

Once this group became widely recognized and identified as the "kitchen cabinet," political observers began debating the extent to which its members influenced Ronald Reagan after he assumed the office of governor. The very name "kitchen cabinet" has invited such speculation. It was initially a term of derision applied to personal advisers of Andrew Jackson who held no formal position in his administration. The term has become generally applied to "any informal group of presidential advisors or confidants," particularly ones "distinguished more for their personal relationship with the president than for any official position."[2] Substituting "governor" for "president," this definition seems appropriate for these advisers to Reagan. However, the common definition often also credits these informal advisers "with exercising more influence on the president than his regular cabinet."[3] On this point there is some debate.

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[1]An example of an expanded use of "kitchen cabinet" is Jody Jacobs's article, "Wives of 'Kitchen Cabinet' Speak Out," *Los Angeles Times*, November 14, 1980, Pt. V, pp. 1, 24, 26. The composition of "kitchen cabinet" in this introduction essentially follows that of the earliest writing to so identify Reagan's informal advisers. See Carl Greenberg, "Ronald Reagan's 'Kitchen Cabinet,'" *Los Angeles Times West* magazine, April 23, 1967, p. 24.

[2]*Encyclopedia Americana*, 1981 ed., s.v. "Kitchen Cabinet."

[3]*Dictionary of American History*, s.v. "Kitchen Cabinet," by Erik McKinley Eriksson.

Some writers have accepted the latter definition as befitting Reagan's advisers and portrayed them as "playing a central role in screening Reagan's appointments and policy options."[4] Noting several cases in which their personal interests or those of business in general seemed to benefit from decisions by the Reagan administration or appointees allegedly selected by members of the "kitchen cabinet," these writers have concluded that these advisers essentially rejected the concept of public interest and fashioned a government primarily committed to corporate priorities.[5]

This image of the "kitchen cabinet" has been disputed by other writers. They contend that most of Reagan's informal advisers had little knowledge of or interest in specific government programs. Several advisers did play an important role in the selection of early appointees as members of the Major Appointment Task Force during the transition period between the election and Reagan's inauguration. Shortly thereafter these writers see the role of the "kitchen cabinet" diminishing chiefly because "these millionaires had little genuine concern about the workings of government."[6]

The interviews may only partially resolve this debate. None of the interviewees goes into much detail about the operations of the Reagan government, and some admit having little interest in legislation other than taxation and spending policies. All insist they did not make substantive decisions for the governor; he made his own policies. Thus an initial reading will essentially substantiate the Cannon view. However, one can also read into these interviews the conclusion that these advisers may have had more influence on behalf of corporate interests and conservative policies than they acknowledge. In commenting on appointments, for example, Holmes Tuttle recalls that the transition team went to executive "head hunters" and told them to look for potential appointees in California corporations. Henry Salvatori acknowledges that a primary function of the "kitchen cabinet" was to insure that key Reagan officials were "conservative minded people." Hiring administrative personnel within those criteria must have resulted in the Reagan administration making or administering policy in a manner favorable to corporate interests or conservative policies.

To the interviewees in this volume, much of this speculation about influence over Reagan or state policies is a misreading of their reasons for political activity. Their primary concern was to give California

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[4]Joel Kothin and Paul Grabowicz, *California Inc.* (New York: Rawson, Wade, 1982), p. 64.

[5]See especially, Ibid., chapter III for examples of this alleged probusiness influence.

[6]Lou Cannon, *Reagan* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1982), p. 121. The author is the chief proponent of this view of the "kitchen cabinet's" influence.

good government, and the people they suggested for office and the economic policies they supported were all directed to this end. They reflect a boosterish pride in their energy and a belief that they may be unique in California history as a group of citizens who worked on behalf of government without remuneration or thought of personal reward. As successful businessmen who had built and run private enterprises efficiently they could only benefit the state by bringing that efficiency into government. This view is best reflected in the accounts of Edward Mills and Holmes Tuttle of their raising private funds to set up the Task Force on Efficiency and Economy in Government. Again, readers may draw differing conclusions from these comments. Some may see a remarkable innocence about their impact, reminiscent of Defense Secretary Charles Wilson's comment about the interests of General Motors being the same as those of the United States. But all readers should recall that historians long accepted self-appraisals from Progressive and liberal reformers as to their motives for political activity as well as their contention that social problems required an expansion of the public sector. At a time when the rising cost of government has convinced many Americans that efficiency and economy may well be the reforms of the late twentieth century, it is appropriate that similar self-appraisals by conservatives be set forth.

A third area in which the recollections of members of the "kitchen cabinet" should prove interesting is their detailing of the manner in which such wealthy citizens exercised their influence. In this case, the comments in these interviews do not call forth conflicting views or interpretations. Rather they confront a popular image of political fund raising which portrays the donation of large sums of money as automatically having a significant impact on an election without any further effort on the part of the donor. These accounts should correct that myth for most of the interviewees have spent many hours as well as dollars on political campaigns. Some have occupied various positions in Republican Party organizations over an extended period of time. This volume should show the importance of party organization and fund raising activities and lead scholars of political history to give this often overlooked area and the people within it greater recognition.

These interviews were conducted during the spring and summer of 1981. Those with Henry Salvatori and Justin Dart took place at their offices in Century City and Los Angeles. Holmes Tuttle was interviewed at his Montecito home. Both interviews with Edward Mills were conducted in the Oral History Archives reading room at California State University, Fullerton. The extensive background research and liaison with the interviewees were conducted by Steven Edgington. Transcribing was done by Dana Manta, ELois Lovell, Deborah Gill, and Susan Green. All interviews were edited by Steven Edgington, after which they were retyped and returned to the interviewees. Each interviewee gave generously of his time in reading and correcting the transcript and offering some additional information. Final typing has been executed by Dana Manta, Kathleen Frazee, and Shirley Stephenson; indexing by Debra Hansen. All pages have been carefully proofread by Shirley Stephenson. Some photographs were provided by the interviewees; the remainder were secured from the Editorial Library of the *Los Angeles Times* with financial assistance from Edward Mills.

This volume should be of interest to a variety of readers. Students of California government and history will gain insight into a few of the private citizens who often play roles as important as those of many officeholders in shaping the state's political history. Persons interested in the life or political career of Ronald Reagan will find detailed accounts of one of the most crucial steps in his rise to office as well as the thinking and background of some of his key advisers. The study of private influences on government in general and their place in recent American politics should be enhanced by these interviews.

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California Government History Documentation Project

Ronald Reagan Era

HENRY SALVATORI

An Interview Conducted By

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OH 1674

Oral History Program

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HENRY SALVATORI

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This interview with Henry Salvatori (S) was conducted by Steven D. Edgington (E), Researcher-Editor for the California State University, Fullerton branch of the California Government History Documentation Project at Mr. Salvatori's office at 1901 Avenue of the Stars, Century City, California on April 24, 1981.

E: Mr. Salvatori, first of all, we would like to start with some biography. I understand that you were born in Italy.

S: Yes.

E: And could you tell a little bit about your family?

S: Well, I was born in Italy in 1901. My father came to this country in 1903 and settled in Pittsburgh where he had Italian friends who had immigrated a few years before. After he had established a small but successful wholesale grocery business in Philadelphia, he brought the family to the United States in 1906. Since my mother spoke no English, he bought a farm near Mount Holly, New Jersey. He felt she would be more comfortable there since some family relatives lived nearby. Shortly thereafter he brought two Italian families from Italy to do the farming for him as he was fully occupied with his business in Philadelphia. Apparently, train service was quite good and he commuted every day to Philadelphia, which was only about an hour's train ride from a train stop about a half mile from our farm. I attended school at a one-room schoolhouse, eight grades in one room, about one-half mile from our farm. I can't give you the name of the town because it's really out in the country. In fact, I visited the location many years later and it was still out in the country. I attended school there for the first two or three years. After that we moved to Florence, New Jersey, a small town about twenty-five miles from our farm. I graduated from grammar school in Florence. Then we moved to Martins Ferry, Ohio where I attended high school for one year, after which time we moved to Philadelphia. In Philadelphia, I attended the South Philadelphia High School and graduated in 1919. In the fall I entered the University of Pennsylvania and graduated from the university in 1923 with a Bachelor of Science Degree in Electrical Engineering. During my senior year at the university I received several offers of employment, but accepted a position with Bell Telephone Laboratories which is a research arm of the Bell System. At that time the Bell Labs were located in New York City, and I reported for work there in July 1923. Upon completion of my first year of work with the company, I was given the opportunity to pursue post-graduate studies at Columbia University on a part-time basis at company time and expense. I attended Columbia on a part-time basis for two years and I received a Master of Science Degree in Physics in 1926. During my last day of attendance at Columbia, while leaving the Physics building, I saw a notice on the bulletin board

which changed the entire course of my career. The notice read: "Men wanted with Graduate work in Physics to do research work in Oklahoma. If interested, see Professor Wills." I must point out that I was extremely happy with my position at Bell Labs and especially pleased with the consideration and treatment I had received. Seeking a position with another company was the last thing that entered my mind. Nevertheless, out of curiousity or whatever, I did contact Professor Wills, and to make the story short I finally accepted a position with Geophysical Research Corporation. It was a small, newly formed subsidiary of Amerada Petroleum Corporation which was organized for the purpose of developing geophysical methods of exploration for oil. I was placed in charge of a field crew which conducted some of the very first experimental work which led to the development of the reflection seismic method of exploration, a method which is today universally employed to explore for oil and gas.

E: Could you explain that in layman's terms?

S: Well, the reflection seismic method is a method to determine the depth and attitude of the various subsurface strata, and from these data one can determine the existence of traps or structures in which oil is found. In the early days we set charges of dynamite near the surface creating elastic waves that bounced off of the various layers of the substrata. By measuring the time of the arrival and return of the waves we could determine the depth of formations beneath the surface and make contour maps of the subsurface strata. To this day we still have no reliable method of finding oil or gas directly. What one looks for are subsurface structures or traps that are necessary to permit oil and gas accumulations. Today, as it has been for many years, the reflection seismographic method is widely employed all over the world as the most effective method to locate oil and gas fields.

E: The development of the reflection seismograph, did that lead you on to your own company?

S: Yes.

E: How did that develop?

S: During the first two years or so, my work with Geophysical Research Corporation was essentially experimental in nature. By the beginning of the third year the method was fairly well proven and the company placed several crews in the field on a regular production basis. The successful development of the reflection seismograph method was an important achievement, and Dr. John C. Kercher, the president of Geophysical Corporation, merits much of the credit for its success. As head of the company he never faltered in his belief that the

method could be successfully developed. In 1930 he left Geophysical Research Corporation to form his own company called Geophysical Service which, eventually, became Texas Instruments. As the first contracting company offering geophysical services to the oil industry, it had a phenomenal success. I, too, left Geophysical Research Corporation to join Dr. Kercher in his new company, and in 1933 I left Geophysical Service to form my own company here in California called Western Geophysical Company. We also had great success because of the great need for our services. As founder and principal owner, I was its chief executive officer until 1967 at which time I retired, having merged, in the meantime, with Litton Industries. Western Geophysical Company is now one of the largest companies in the world.

E: Is that when you first came to California?

S: No, I first came to California in 1931 to head up the operations of the company in California. I remained with Geophysical Service until 1933 when I resigned to form my company.

E: Were you interested or involved in politics in your early career?

S: Not at all.

E: Not at all?

S: Not at all. It was only in the late 1940s when I became concerned with the communist threat to the free world that I began to take an interest in politics. I was in San Francisco during the formation of the United Nations. I believed then that it was a mistake, and I thought that the Democratic Party was totally unaware of the future threat of Communist Russia. I really became very active in the first Eisenhower Campaign in 1952, although I had commenced my participation in Republican politics as early as 1949 when I became the Los Angeles County Finance Chairman. In 1951--about that time--I became state finance chairman for the Republican Party. Since that time I have become more and more actively involved in political campaigns and activities. As I have said, my primary concern was communism and, in fact, in the 1950s I even formed an organization called the Anti-Communism Voters League.

E: Yes.

S: This was a nonpartisan organization whose purpose was the evaluation of all candidates for all offices on the basis of how well they were aware of the communist threat. I am a Republican. I grew up a Republican. Republicans were always more aware of the communist threat than Democrats. They have always been. Also, I still believe in the Republican philosophy. I have remained active in the Republican party and have financially supported many Republican activites and conservative groups in general.

E: Who were some of the political figures that you might have admired, say, before Eisenhower's period?

S: Well, I admired Howard Taft, whom I didn't know very well. I'd only met him a few times. He was a man of high integrity, great intellectual depth, and not so narrow in his conservatism to cloud his reasoning and his good sense. He was a great man. I also admired Bill Knowland, Senator Knowland, for his complete integrity. He was the most honest politician I have ever known. He wasn't the smartest man in the world, but he had complete integrity. Even on small things, he would be very finicky.

E: When you were speaking of Taft, did you mean Senator Robert Taft?

S: Yes, Robert Taft. I didn't mean Howard, I meant Robert. My brother, who was born during William Howard Taft's term of office was named William Howard, because my father was a Republican and he called his son, my brother, William Howard.

E: A good Republican name.

S: Yes. So I had Republican family ties, but my concern with communism was what got me started and, naturally, all the other issues on socialism versus capitalism that go with it. So I was, as I have said, state finance chairman, and I've been involved in numerous political campaigns since that time.

E: When and under what circumstances did you first meet Ronald Reagan?

S: When I first met Ronald Reagan, of course, neither he nor I had the slightest idea that one day he would be a candidate. I don't remember the date. I had met him several times, but only socially here and there. But I didn't become well-acquainted with him until he joined the Goldwater campaign. I was the state chairman for Goldwater in California.

E: Finance chairman?

S: Yes, and Knowland was the political chairman. Pete Pitchess was also cochairman with Knowland for the Goldwater campaign in 1964, and Pete Pitchess knew Reagan very well. In fact, he invited Reagan to join forces and come on the Goldwater campaign, which he did. It was then that I got to know him, since I was the finance chairman. In the primary, he was simply a volunteer for Goldwater. In the general election, he became cochairman with Phil Davis. After the primary, Knowland dropped out for some reason. But I still remained the finance chairman, and I controlled the purse for the whole campaign. At that time I got to know Reagan very well. I saw him many times on the campaign. Then after the defeat of Goldwater . . . Well, first of all, before the election, the National Goldwater

Committee in Washington sponsored a series of fund raising dinners here in Los Angeles. There were television hookups between these various cities, and as we were raising more money than anybody else, we were entitled to have Goldwater to speak in Los Angeles. I told the national chairman, whom I knew well, Gainey[1]--I've forgotten his first name, he passed away--I said, "Look, we will have a very successful dinner in Los Angeles; we don't need Goldwater. We'd like to have him, but we don't need him. Maybe you can use him where he can make more money." So Goldwater didn't come and we had our own speaker, Ronald Reagan, speak at our dinner. And, of course, his speech electrified the nation. After the campaign was over, a few months afterward, Holmes Tuttle and I got together and wondered if we should consider running Reagan for governor in 1966. I think [A. C.] "Cy" Rubel came on board a few days later, or a week later. We went to see Reagan and talked to him about it. Well, he said he would like to consider it. After a day or two, he reported he'd like to go up and down the state and see how people reacted to his speaking. At this time "Cy" Rubel came on the original team, so to speak, and the three of us raised a few thousand dollars, just enough money to permit Reagan to travel up and down the state and deliver some speeches. As expected, he was well-received and so consented to run. At that time we formed--we didn't call it the "kitchen cabinet" at the time--a group of people to more or less sponsor the Reagan campaign in various parts of the state: Jacquelin Hume in San Francisco; Leland Kaiser, also in San Francisco; [Edward] Ed Mills who was associated with Holmes Tuttle here, so the two worked together; "Cy" Rubel who, of course, was an original fellow; and Taft Schreiber. We formed this group and we met frequently to make plans for the campaign. Later, we expanded this group to probably ten or more, including men like Gordon Luce from San Diego and others whose names I cannot immediately recall.

E: So you knew people like Holmes Tuttle and Leland Kaiser long before you met Reagan?

S: No, I didn't know Kaiser until the campaign. He was a strong supporter of Reagan from the very beginning and we enlisted his support early on. We actively recruited leading citizens to support the Reagan campaign, and that's how I first met him and others such as Jacquelin Hume. It was just the fact that we were looking for somebody in San Francisco and he came along, a very enthusiastic supporter. Schreiber I'd known before, but not too well, and he came on the team very early. Arch Monson, same way. Actually, he had been a Christopher man. He supported Christopher, and when Christopher was defeated he came on the team.

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[1]Daniel C. Gainey of Minnesota was a national finance chairman for the Goldwater campaign.

E: How did you meet Holmes Tuttle, and can you remember when?

S: During the Goldwater campaign. We had a lot of volunteers, a tremendous number of people that would just come in and want to work. Sometime during the early part of the campaign he came in and helped out. Then I made him chairman of the big dinner and he did a fabulous job. Of course, he brought Reagan, whom we both knew.

E: How about "Cy" Rubel, did you know him previously?

S: Oh, yes, I knew him very well for years. I'm in the oil business, and in my geophysical business we did work with Union, among other companies. So I knew him very well. He was the first member of our group after Holmes Tuttle and myself.

E: So, perhaps, Rubel was the only one of those that you knew previously?

S: Well, Leonard Firestone was not involved in the very, very first meetings, but he came later, and I knew him before that. [William French] Bill Smith, I first met him when he came over during the Reagan campaign. I knew Herb Sturdy who was then the head of Smith's law firm, who suggested that maybe we could use some of his people to help out. Smith came over to the campaign office, and shortly thereafter became the secretary of our group. Arch Monson I'd known off and on, and he just came along. There were several others. Gordon Luce, particularly, was one of them; although you do not have him on your "kitchen cabinet" list.

E: Justin Dart was kind of a latecomer?

S: He was a latecomer. Yes, he was a latecomer.

E: About what time?

S: Well, for the first Reagan campaign, I don't recall that he was around. He may have been in some minor role, but he was not right in the middle of it. See, during the Goldwater campaign he was a Rockefeller man, and it was the Goldwater people that started Reagan. He wasn't around for that reason, not for any other reason. He came on board somewhat later. When I was [Los Angeles] County Chairman during the Eisenhower campaign, Dart was the state chairman, so I worked with him very closely. But due to the fact that he was with Rockefeller during the Goldwater campaign, he wasn't around when Reagan came along. At least I don't remember him in those days as being active in the early part of the Reagan campaign for governor.

E: That was going to be my next question, whether you had worked with any of those people previously?

S: I had worked with Justin Dart. He was the only one. When he was state chairman, I was county chairman so, naturally, I worked with him very closely. Strictly speaking, I reported to him.

E: None of the others, on any other political campaigns?

S: No. Well, "Cy" Rubel, I knew him. We talked about politics, we supported the same people but not in any official way.

E: Would you consider yourself to be more of a recruiter when you were putting together the group, bringing people in, or more of one of the people that was recruited to be in that group of backers?

S: Well, I was recruited to be finance chairman the first time in URFC. I was a member of the URFC. URFC is the United Republic Finance Committee, and one day they asked me to be chairman. That was in the early fifties. After that I became pretty prominent in my own sphere of activities. So, perhaps, I might be considered one of the leaders. Remember, California politics is not strictly organized in the sense that somebody is boss. There is no one boss in this state, never has been and never will be. All we have is a little more influence than others but, otherwise, it's very loosely drawn with both Republicans and Democrats, actually. So, I was one of those fellows who was at the top of the game after the Goldwater election. The conservatives were strong in California. They were the leaders of the Republican party, even though they may have been in the minority. Nevertheless, they were the leaders, and I was recognized as one of the leaders simply because I had been very active in Southern California and had been county and state Republican finance chairman.

E: Did you participate in any of the subgroups, for instance, the United Republicans of California?

S: Yes, I belonged to the UROC. I belonged to that group. I wasn't actively involved in the organization but I supported them. But it's a kind of loosely knit sort of thing. Nobody says this guy gives the orders. It doesn't happen in California.

E: You weren't involved in, say, Young Republicans or California Republican Assembly?

S: Well, I supported them--I'd been to a few of their meetings in the early days--and still do. But I support every Republican group financially. They knew me, and sometimes they would come for my advice and help.

E: Did that include the League, the California Republican League?

S: Oh, yes, the Young Republicans. Well, that also includes one of the groups to which I still belong. I'm an honorary chairman of Young Republicans, I believe. (begins to look in desk files) Then, of course, there is a state chartered committee whose members change from year to year. I worked closely with the state and county committees when I was finance chairman. See, the state committee, when there is a national election, really drops out of the picture. It doesn't drop out, but the presidential candidates or senatorial and congressional candidates have their own teams, and while the central committees provide some aid to the campaign, they do not guide the affairs of these various individual campaigns. (long pause) Also, there is the National Republican Committee in Washington, a senatorial committee and congressional committee and other groups who help finance the campaigns of the various candidates.

E: So you were involved in both national and state politics?

S: Yes.

E: And local, also?

S: Yes, to some extent. Not as much as the national, but I, in fact, helped Yorty very much in 1969. I was the chairman of his campaign committee. Of course, I belong to and support various other groups such as the National Conservative Political Action Committee, National Security Council, American Security Council, California Republican Party, and on and on. The Golden Circle of California, the Assembly Republican Caucus, Conservative Caucus, the Republican Associates. The Republican Associates is an old Republican organization that still exists and primarily provides information and advice to candidates. I have been a member for many years, and I'm honorary chairman. I'm not very active anymore.

E: So you were probably involved in the campaign for Senator Knowland in 1958.

S: Oh, yes. Oh, sure, I've been involved in every senatorial campaign in some fashion.

E: And in 1962 the gubernatorial campaign?

S: In 1962? 1966 . . . and 1970 was the next campaign for Reagan. In 1974 that was . . .

E: That was Flournoy and Brown.

S: Yes, that was Flournoy and Brown. Yes, I was involved in that campaign, not to the extent I was before. Brown won, of course. Then in 1978, Younger; I was active in his campaign. And 1980 was the recent campaign. It was the presidential campaign. I



Donald Jackson of the Anti-Communist Voters League with Henry Salvatori, 1962

supported Ford in 1976 and, of course, you know he won the nomination and lost the election. In 1980 I supported Reagan and was part of the "kitchen cabinet."

E: In the 1962 election, the governor's election, Richard Nixon and Joe Shell were in the Republican primary . . .

S: In 1962. Yes, that's right. I remember. Reagan wasn't in the picture then.

E: Right.

S: It was Nixon. Nixon lost in 1960. He moved to California. I was very close to him, and I recommended he not run for governor in 1962 for many reasons. Not that I didn't think he could win. I felt that he could win. But I told him he shouldn't run because you just don't step down. He did run and I supported him. I knew Shell. In fact, I arranged a meeting with Nixon and Shell in my home. But Nixon lost, and I will say this: after he lost, I was in touch with him. He asked for my advice on various law firms he was considering joining, and one day he phoned me and said, "Henry, I want to take you out to lunch and buy your lunch. I want to tell you that you were absolutely right, and I'm not going to ever run again, and that's the end of that." That's when I told him, "You never say never to anything. You're going to learn you don't say never to anything, regardless of how improbable an event may be." It turned out, as you know, that in 1964 he worked hard for Goldwater, speaking across the nation. So in 1968 he was the logical candidate for president.

E: How did you usually decide whether to support a candidate? What were the most important things to you?

S: First of all was his attitude on foreign policy. Number one. And two, his economic policy. Believe me, foreign policy was more important to me than economic policy. And usually they go hand in hand. The liberal on economics, chances are, is liberal on foreign policy. By liberal I mean the fellow who feels that Russia is no threat, that we should have no armaments, that a strong defense is not necessary. Those are the things I have opposed all of my life since I became involved in politics.

E: And in the economic sphere?

S: Economics is important, too, because they go hand in hand to some extent. We have to have a strong nation in order to survive, but believe me, my first concern was the preservation of this nation from the threat of subversion and Communist control, and everything else was secondary.

E: All right.

S: That's true, I think, of all the conservative groups that have been dominant in the Republican party in the last thirty years.

E: Did you know F. Clifton White before the Goldwater campaign?

S: Yes, I knew him. I met him in the Goldwater campaign. When we made an attempt at running Reagan in 1968, when Nixon won, I was the one that more or less unofficially hired Clifton White. Unofficially, because we had no campaign. Reagan refused to really approve a full-fledged political campaign. He felt that he had only just been [elected governor]. I called him one day. It was April of 1968, and we still were going through the motions with some activity, and I said, "It's too late. It's already too late, but if you don't give us permission to open up an office and officially authorize the campaign for Reagan, we haven't got a chance." Well, he said, "Look, Henry, I've only been here less than two years, and I don't have the courage or immodesty to tell the American public to vote for me. If they should want me, in Miami, I'll be ready." Clifton White came along, and he was more pushy, of course, and I think he may have over-promised what he could do. By that time I felt that we had no chance because it was too late. In fact, as soon as we arrived in Miami, members of the California delegation began seeking votes from the various delegations. I arranged a meeting with the Florida delegation, which consisted of twenty-four or twenty-five members at the meeting. I asked what they all thought about the Reagan candidacy and would they support it. Several women were there, and they liked Reagan very much, and they expressed their wishes to support Reagan. Congressman [William] Cramer from Florida was the leader of the delegation, and he hadn't spoken. So I asked him, "Congressman, how do you feel about it?" He said, "Look, Mr. Salvatori, here you are asking for support of a candidate that hasn't even announced." He hadn't even announced that he was a candidate. He said, "Now, we're not that stupid or silly. How can you have the effrontery to come here and ask us to vote for your candidate when he hasn't even announced." Well, it was that sort of thing. Finally, as you know, at the last minute he announced, and so he did not have much of a chance. Because you don't go to a convention today and try to sweep them off their feet after a rousing speech at the last moment. Delegates today are more sophisticated. They are not party hacks, and especially in the Republican party you can't buy one out of a thousand for money or anything else. They're all there because they want to nominate the man who espouses their own philosophy and principles. So you can't move them. A candidate can make the greatest speech in the world; but they are already committed to Goldwater, or Nixon, or Reagan, or whomever it may be. And I knew that. So you couldn't switch them. A few might. Obviously, if it had been a close election, half a dozen votes had gone by, and no one had a majority, it would be possible to switch some votes. But Goldwater proved that you could go out and get your delegates

committed. You select the delegates. By that I mean that representatives of the candidate go to the various states and make sure that people who will be on the delegation will be for your candidate and then you don't have to worry about it. It's all over when you get there.

E: When Ronald Reagan first got involved in the 1964 Goldwater campaign, was he used primarily as a celebrity at first?

S: No, no. He was a speaker, a good speaker. He was used to speaking. And he spoke very well, and he had a very good speech, which generally people thought was "The Speech." It wasn't "The Speech." It was a series of paragraphs which he could use in such a manner that it would fit any occasion, and he would write his own speeches. He still does, I'm sure.

E: Did you attend the GOP convention in San Francisco that year, in 1964?

S: Oh, yes, absolutely.

E: What do you remember about that convention that stands out to you?

S: Well, of course, conservatives had been so discouraged by prior elections, we felt we needed a candidate who was conservative. Goldwater was, and we had just won the primary in California. So here we were, and every one of those delegates in our delegation as well as all the other delegations, felt very strongly that this was an opportunity to turn the country around. It was so exhilarating when he made his great speech at the convention. His famous words, "Extremism in defense of liberty is no vice, and moderation in pursuit of justice is no virtue," immediately evoked a furious barrage of criticism in the media. I don't understand to this day what's wrong with that statement. And, incidentally, that was the statement that Professor Harry Jaffa wrote in his speech, which is a statement made by Cicero way back 2,000 years ago. The press distorted it to the point that it emphasized only the words extremism, but he said, "Extremism in the defense of liberty." Why shouldn't there be extremism in defense of liberty? Anyway, we were exhilarated, and the Rockefeller forces were dismayed. They still believed that they could switch some Goldwater votes with high rhetoric. But the delegates had already made up their minds, or they wouldn't have been there in the first place. In the "good" old days the party bosses selected the delegates, and if the party boss wasn't in charge, I suppose that a speech might sway their votes. But today they are already committed to their candidates and their principles. So you don't move them. And it was a very exhilarating time for me as I look back on my life. The volunteers that came up during that campaign . . . I'll never forget. Our office was on La Brea. We had a building of our own

with a reception room downstairs. One day a fellow came in, and the girl called upstairs and said, "There is a man here who is shabbily dressed and we can't identify him, but he wants to give us some money." Anyway, I went downstairs, and this fellow gave us a check for fourteen or fifteen dollars he had just collected for some part-time work. That kind of a fellow really made for an emotion-packed campaign. One couldn't help being exhilarated. I remember at that time, 1964, we had had liberalism dominating the country for a long time. We felt then, as we now know, that we were losing our strength vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Nothing was being done. So there was more concern about the defense of our country than even today. Today we know we are behind so we're working, but in those days there were many of us who felt that we could avoid the critical defense situation that exists today. Yes, there were a lot of people like that. They weren't the majority, obviously. The press was against us, and the Democrats were strong and, of course, [there was] the bomb threat that Johnson carried on about: "This man will have his finger on the bomb." All of that insured the defeat of Goldwater. But one thing Goldwater accomplished was to set the basis for a conservative revival. After all was said and done, the press finally realized that even though Goldwater was defeated decisively, he still got 38 percent of the vote. So these conservatives were not just a "kooky" small fringe. They were important. And Reagan followed up from there with a victory in California which stunned the nation and stunned the press. I was very active in that campaign. They just couldn't believe how this fellow Reagan, the actor, the novice in politics, could have won such a sweeping victory. During the campaign, all of the major eastern newspapers covered the campaign on a daily basis, and I was in constant touch with press people of such newspapers as *The New York Times*, the Baltimore *Sun*, *The Washington Post*, Boston *Herald American*, and *St. Louis Post Dispatch*. All of them, without exception, were critical of Reagan and predicted his defeat. After the election victory a fellow with the *Christian Science Monitor* came in to see me and said, "You know, I'm very impressed with Reagan. I would like to have--there's ten of us in this group--I would like to have you arrange a five minute private interview with each of the ten eastern reporters. If you do that, I promise to accurately report to you the results of their evaluations." So we arranged it, and he met each one of them five minutes at a time, man to man. The following day they met together, and they concluded this was one hell of a candidate, even though they opposed him from the beginning. In other words, they realized that he wasn't just reading a speech. They had been saying, throughout the campaign that Reagan could only read a prepared speech, and after their private interviews they realized that he could answer all the questions and that they were wrong in their original assessment.

E: Did Ronald Reagan go to the 1964 convention, are you aware?

S: Yes, he was an alternate delegate. He didn't play that much of an important part, as I recall. Now, he may have done some things I'm not aware of. It was a big convention, and he could have been instrumental in working here and there, because everybody was working on someone. But he didn't play a big part.

E: You've been commended in several books for the success of your fund raising efforts from that campaign. How did you do it?

S: Actually, it was easy. When you get an enthusiastic group of people who felt that they'd been unrepresented and disregarded for many years, and they see the opportunity that this is the man who's going to turn things around, they just come out of the woodwork. We didn't have to do anything, actually. We just sat there in the office and we'd get calls, and they'd come in and say, "What can we do?" They'd give checks, and we appointed committees left and right. We had no control. Usually you try to control your campaign officers. We found women who would fund their own offices with their own stationery, and they would go out and set up Goldwater headquarters. It was easy. We wrote some letters, obviously, and this and that, but it wasn't hard to do. We had a real boiling up of resentment that had been building up for a long time, and here was one chance where they saw the possibility of turning things around. Perhaps they weren't over 30 percent of the people, I don't know, maybe 35 [percent] but, nevertheless, they were very dedicated people.

E: You did have some fund raising dinners and so forth?

S: Oh, yes, those were, again, no problem. It was a sellout. I think we had one at Dodger Stadium that was fantastic.

E: What were your feelings, both personally and the group that worked with you for Goldwater, after his defeat? Did you have trouble rebounding from that?

S: Well, yes, we all were, naturally, defeated and discouraged, but not for too long. After all, we noted that 38 percent of the voters voted for Goldwater in spite of the barrage of adverse propaganda from the almost universally hostile news media. We felt that this was a strong base on which to build our future campaigns for conservative candidates. Nixon might have firmly established a conservative trend in Washington if it had not been for Watergate. However, Nixon wasn't as well organized in Washington as Reagan is today. He was prepared, and it is probably the first time in the history of our country that a president has openly and unabashedly stated that he would seek only conservatives for appointed officers in his administration. If such a statement had been made by any previous president, the press would have probably called for a revolution. Reagan campaigned on conservative principles. He didn't back down. When he said that the Vietnam War was a noble cause, he said what other politicians would have never said. He had nothing to gain, and a lot

to lose, but he felt that way. So, there is no question where he stood, and the press finally understood it, and he won. The media had to recognize that people wanted that kind of a president, and the media had to accept it. So we feel that the "kitchen cabinet's" primary function has been to insure that the top people in the government were conservative minded people.

E: It was toward the end of the Goldwater campaign that Reagan made the famous televised speech that was so successful. How soon after that did you begin to think of him as a candidate?

S: That speech electrified the nation. I had calls at my home and office from all over the country, from Bangor, Maine to Salem, Oregon, asking, "How can we get a copy of the tape, because we want to have it replayed on our local television stations?" So I quickly called the small outfit that had taped Reagan delivering the speech and asked them to make copies so that they could fill the many requests that we were receiving. I said to the man, whose name I can't recall, "You charge whatever is fair but start immediately making copies as we have many requests." I believe he agreed to charge $40 or $50 per copy. I am not certain, but I believe he sent out around 300 of the tapes to various individuals and groups that had requested them and they must have run on at least 300 stations. So with that great enthusiasm we realized that this man had something going for him. After the Goldwater defeat, and it wasn't long afterward--a month or two afterward--we began to think about the governorship. Holmes Tuttle was the first to suggest that we should ask Reagan to run for governor. Holmes and I visited him at his home and urged him to run for governor. Shortly after, what I have already mentioned ensued; the speeches that he made up and down the state were very well-received, and he finally decided to run.

E: So that group that formed to have him go up and down the state was . . .

S: Well, yes, generally the same group. Yes, in fact the same. Firestone wasn't initially in the group, but Jacquelin Hume, Lee Kaiser, and Ed Mills joined us at the very beginning. The rest of the group consisted of "Cy" Rubel, Taft Schreiber, Holmes Tuttle, myself, and a few more.

E: And that was the Friends of Ronald Reagan; was that the name?

S: Yes, that's right, and it just grew naturally. As soon as we mentioned Reagan everybody rallied around. Then we formed a campaign committee, and we met frequently here in town and occasionally in San Francisco. After the election we continued to meet to select the top people for the new administration.

E: Soon after, I guess 1966, right after the turn of the year, Spencer-Roberts was hired to run the Reagan campaign, I believe.

S: Yes.

E: Who decided, or how was that decided, to go with that particular firm?

S: Well, let's see. Spencer-Roberts was well-known. While in the Goldwater campaign, they were on the Rockefeller side. They had always directed Republican candidates. Spencer-Roberts was very professional, competent, and highly respected. I don't remember who made the decision to employ them but I'm sure we were all in on the decision.

E: Kind of a consensus among you?

S: Yes.

E: Did you feel that your role, having a hand in the campaign, diminished when Spencer-Roberts came on?

S: Well, no, because we respected their professional abilities; although, we had some run-ins with them. An incident occurred which demonstrated Reagan's ability to handle people. I'll never forget, Spencer-Roberts was running the political side. Every professional campaign manager, I don't care who he is, Democrat or Republican, automatically places some man on the payroll who works in the office of the other campaign. You don't see this man. You don't know him. You never will see him. And Roberts had such a man in the office of the opposition. One day Bill Roberts came in and said, "Say, my man tells me they are going to run a series of ads against Reagan besmirching his character involving some sexual misconduct, some female or whatever. I don't know exactly what it is, but they're going to do it." So then we had a meeting. Roberts said he thought we ought to have some ads, right now, full page ads showing that these people were going to besmirch us. The public should be warned to look out for this kind of thing. Holmes and I argued against that for two reasons. First, because it may not happen, and if it does happen we don't know how it's going to happen and, secondly, one does not deny a smear before it actually occurs. As it turned out, it did not happen. As finance chairman I felt it was my duty to prevent this unwise expenditure of money, and I so advised Roberts. Holmes and I discussed the matter further and we decided to call a meeting with Reagan to find out if he might give us a clue as to what information or rumor the opposition people might have in mind. Five or six members of our group met with him at his home and we commenced the conversation: "Now, Ronnie, you understand that in politics you must tell us everything that has happened in your life, otherwise, you know . . ." Then we told him what Roberts's inside spy had reported, and it was at this point in the conversation when Nancy crossed the room to go out the front door. The instant we saw her, we became apprehensive and stopped talking. Reagan quickly

sensed that we had come to bring up some sensitive matters, and he said, "Fellows, I can tell from the way you stopped talking when Nancy appeared that you have something on your mind. Now, what exactly do you have in mind?" We replied by saying that we wanted to know if he ever had had any affairs with women, or something like that, that might be exploited by the opposition. He replied: "Look, since I have known Nancy I can assure you that there is nothing to any rumor of any kind of misbehavior on my part. You can be assured that there is nothing to worry about."

E: That was the Democrats, or the opposition in the Republican primary?

S: This was during the primary campaign.

E: The primary campaign?

S: No, I am sorry. This was during the general election campaign. Convinced that the smear ads would soon appear in the newspaper, Roberts was insistent on running his ads immediately in order to blunt any effect that the ads might have on the voters. The next day Roberts spoke to Reagan in his campaign office and apparently indicated that as the director of the campaign decisions on such matters rested with him, and he expected Reagan to instruct us accordingly. After Roberts left Reagan's office, Reagan phoned us downstairs and asked that Holmes and I come to see him. He received us in his usual affable and friendly manner, and after we had presented our position he said that he understood our viewpoint but also recognized that Roberts's recommendation was not without some merit. He then suggested a compromise by changing the ad in such a way that would be acceptable to us. As we walked down the stairs to our office Holmes said, "Well, we certainly won our point." I said, "Holmes, that was the most brilliant performance in how to reconcile differences between individuals. He pleased Roberts, who wasn't overruled, and he pleased us by agreeing to change the text of the ad." The most important point is that he displayed an acute understanding of human relationships. He did not want to antagonize us and he certainly could not afford to antagonize Roberts. He resolved the conflict in such a way that both parties were satisfied. I understood what he did, and I was very delighted.

E: Can you remember some other differences that you might have had with Spencer-Roberts?

S: No, there wasn't, because actually Reagan did his own thing. I remember early in the election campaign . . . At that time you remember that Brown was considered "father" of the aqueduct which brought the water south, and it was a complex project. So I thought, perhaps, Reagan ought to be furnished with some kind of a paper on this subject so he would have all of the essential details. Reagan indicated that this was not necessary. I felt sure that questions

might be asked which would be complex and difficult to answer. I felt that he should have a paper on most of the major issues. There were only half a dozen or so and water was one of them. It wasn't really an issue, but it was a subject that people talked about. Brown bragged about it. Neither Reagan nor Roberts agreed with me, but I said, "Look, he ought to have the information. He can read it if he wants to but he doesn't have to." The next time I went to his house those sons of guns had brought in a stack of books on the floor this high, (about four feet off the floor) no exaggeration. (laughter) So I said, "This isn't the sort of thing I had in mind. Obviously, he can't read all those books." So we had a little discussion and they acquiesed. But Reagan was able to handle everything that came up during the campaign, and he handled every question exceedingly well. Even when he didn't know the answer, it worked out. I'll never forget, in San Diego at a meeting, somebody asked him a question about water, just as I had expected. He said, "You know, Brown thinks he invented water." (laughter) He didn't have the answer, so he worked around it that way. Another time I went with him to the Rotary Club in downtown [Los Angeles]. There were about 1,000 people present. I was with Reagan on the dais, and the first question was, "Mr. Reagan, I'd like to have you give three of your weakest points and three of Governor Brown's strongest points." Now, this is a pretty tough question. You can't say Brown doesn't have a single strong point, and he can't say he doesn't have one weakness. So he started out, hesitated a little bit, and he said, "Now, this is a two part question. I'll answer the second part first. Number one, Brown has a beautiful family, a beautiful wife, and is very devoted to his family. We know this to be a fact because he has every one of his relatives on the state payroll." With that he stopped there. Everybody began laughing and he never answered the question. Now, this is the sort of thing he was very good at. How can anyone be expected to answer that kind of question? Reagan's facetious answer was a masterpiece. He was never tripped up because he was always able to come up with a joke on the spur of the moment that was relevant to the question. One day he was speaking practically a stone's throw from the Eel River when someone asked the question concerning the Eel River. He said, "Where in the hell is the Eel River?" Anyone else would have been devastated, but Reagan was able to extricate himself by an appropriate jocular remark. Do you know a fellow on television by the name of Stout?

E: Yes, Bill Stout.

S: During the first Reagan campaign for the Presidency, I knew Bill Stout quite well as I had often met with him during the Goldwater campaign. In the early part of 1968 I had an appointment with him to meet me at 5:00 p.m. at my office, but as I had to attend a meeting at the Los Angeles Club I asked my secretary to phone him and suggest that he meet me at the club. Stout arrived as our meeting was being concluded, and we sat at a table in the bar

together with two of my friends whom I had asked to join me for a drink. We immediately began discussing Reagan. Stout thought that Reagan would beat Nixon at the forthcoming Republican Convention. He said, "This is the greatest political figure of our time. I remember Roosevelt, Truman . . ." and on and on. One of the fellows that was with me said, "Do you mean that you believe that he is a stronger man than Roosevelt." "Absolutely, he has more political appeal and quality than Roosevelt ever had. Now, mind you, I am against this man because he is a conservative and I am a liberal Democrat, but I can tell you that he is fantastic." While Stout opposed him on philosophical grounds he thought he was the greatest guy on his beat that he had ever seen. Reagan had tremendous appeal to a lot of people. Reagan, of course, did not win the nomination because we weren't prepared the first time around.

E: You're talking about the Goldwater . . .

S: This was in 1968.

E: Oh, I see.

S: In 1968, Reagan was running against Nixon in the primary, and Stout felt that with Reagan's personality he would win over the majority of the delegates as soon as he appeared on the convention floor. He felt certain that Nixon would not win the nomination. Of course, there was also another contender and that was Rockefeller. In fact, the race was really between Nixon and Rockefeller and Nixon won the nomination on the first ballot.

E: Are there some things that stand out in your mind in the primary campaign against George Christopher, mayor of San Francisco?

S: Well, Christopher was never much of a threat to Reagan. He had got mixed up in a dairy incident of some kind. He wasn't known down here. He had a slight liberal image. People perceived him as slightly liberal, because people from San Francisco are always liberal. He really didn't have a chance, and was easily defeated in the primary. He supported Reagan in the general election.

E: I understand from some of the things I've read that you were prominent, or even the leader in bringing together some of the Christopher and Reagan people after the primary.

S: Well, no question about it. I mean I knew Christopher quite well. I certainly didn't dislike him, and it wasn't a hateful campaign. So the people I knew who were for Christopher came along to support Reagan.

E: Yes, and Firestone was one of them?

S: Probably Firestone, yes. I don't remember specifically now, but there was no great difficulty in getting most of the important leaders to support Reagan in the general election.

E: There weren't really any obstacles then?

S: No. Nothing. It happened.

E: Are there things that stand out further than what you have already said in the general election campaign against Pat Brown?

S: No, except that . . . our polls showed that he was going to win by a big majority.

E: That Brown was, or Reagan?

S: Reagan. And nobody gave him a chance for that. So (laughter) we wondered if our polls were right. One fellow in San Diego ran or had six supermarkets, and as people came in he had somebody outside asking, "Reagan or Brown?" He came in with about an 80 percent for Reagan. We just couldn't believe it, but our polls were right, because he won by over a million [votes] and nobody, especially the press, predicted it. Well, the same thing happened this time around you know. It was supposed to be nip and tuck, and now the pollsters say, "Well, the debate changed it." But, no, they don't change things that much, I don't think.

E: The Democratic party pursued what they called an extremism strategy, where their chairman, Robert Coate, gave out a document that tried to link Reagan with extremism. Did that really bother the Reagan people, or you?

S: No. Well, I'll tell you, it did for awhile. What they tried to do, of course, was this. Nixon, you know, had a problem with the John Birch Society in 1962 and he denounced it, and that probably caused his defeat. But Reagan, again the superior type guy that he is, was able to defuse the issue at the very beginning of the campaign. He was often asked: "Reagan, do you denounce and refuse the Birch Society votes?" And in a room in a hotel down in San Diego he said, "Look, I'm not going to refuse to accept anybody's vote. If they vote for me, they're voting for my philosophy, I'm not accepting theirs." And we said, "Gee, that's a hell of a statement. Go ahead and make it right away." I suggested that we immediately print that statement. At every damn press conference the first two or three questions were always along these lines. "Well, how do you stand on the Birch Society? Well, now, are you going to refuse those votes? Well, are you going to condemn them?" He had to decide a couple of times that he couldn't condemn everybody, but he did condemn the man Welch, you

know, who had written things about Eisenhower and Marshall.[2] I said, "Look, just write this up. Here's the answer, and at any press conference at the first question concerning the Birch Society just say, "I knew you were going to ask that question. We've already given the answer. A young man will pass my answer around." After he did that about three or four times the John Birch question just disappeared from the scene, and then they went on to other issues.

E: I think in that document, too, that your name was even mentioned. Did that bother you personally?

S: Well, of course, not only my name was mentioned but the names of other people, too. You mean the John Birch thing?

E: Well, the document that the Democrats gave to the *Los Angeles Times* and the press in general.

S: Yes, they accused us of being John Birchers. I never was a member, and neither was anybody else as far as I know on the Reagan team. There was one man whom we advised to stay away from our campaign, but we weren't condemning them and we didn't want to antagonize them.

E: So you were pretty much surprised, though, that Reagan won, not that he won, but that he won by such a large margin?

S: No, we weren't. Our polls showed that he would win by a large margin, but since the press polls indicated that it was a close race, you couldn't help but feel the influence. We were sure we were going to win. I bet one of the fellows ten to one. I said I was sure he was going to win, but I wasn't sure he was going to win by such a large margin. The *Los Angeles Times* poll didn't agree with our poll at all. We felt sure he was going to win. We had tremendous support. Both Democrats and Republicans liked Reagan, and that has continued. Ron was governor for two terms, but after two terms in California it's pretty tough to win a third term. But the conservative sentiment kept building up after the Goldwater campaign.

E: Is that the principal way you account for the difference between the loss in 1964 and the win in 1966? Or how do you account for it?

S: No. No, 1966 was the first time the liberals saw a conservative who wasn't a demon, and whom they couldn't depict as a demon who was going to drop the bomb and destroy humanity. It was that sort of

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[2]Robert H. W. Welch founded the John Birch Society in 1958. The accusations that George Marshall and President Dwight Eisenhower were agents of the Communist conspiracy were written in his book, *The Politician* (Belmont, Mass.: Belmont Publishing Company, 1964).

description that was portrayed by the press. During the campaign, the people saw that Reagan did not fit this description. They saw him as he really is, a warm, gentle, and fine man who spoke in a moderate and convincing way. Now, Goldwater was a little abrasive and the press was much more strongly against him. With Reagan the situation was somewhat different. First of all, since it was a state campaign the "big guns" of the media did not focus sharply on Reagan as they did on Goldwater in a national campaign. Secondly, it was clear to everyone that Reagan was a warm, gentle man who expressed conservative ideas in a moderate tone. So Reagan won a sweeping victory at the polls and the conservative revival was on its way.

E: You mentioned a little bit earlier about the transition period, when the major appointments were made and the administration was put together.

S: You mean with Reagan.

E: Yes.

S: Yes, he gave our group the assignment of picking the top twelve or thirteen people in his new administration. Number one, of course, was the finance director. We wasted so much time in trying to find a very highly qualified man for this number one spot until one day Reagan called and said, "Hey, fellows, you better get to work as I have to have somebody up here soon." So, finally, and somewhat reluctantly, we selected a fellow by the name of Smith whom Reagan had interviewed previously but who apparently did not satisfy him completely. After Reagan finally agreed to accept him as finance director, we soon made our other recommendations for all the other cabinet posts which Reagan found quite acceptable.

E: Are there any that you can remember that he didn't accept?

S: Actually, the only one that he seemed to have some doubt about was Smith, whose first name I now can't recall. Smith came to our attention for the position of finance director quite accidentally. Our group had succeeded in obtaining the help and cooperation of several accounting firms to help us in identifying qualified prospects for the various posts which we were trying to fill. The heads of these various firms, such as Price-Waterhouse and Booz, Allen and Hamilton, provided us with a list of potential prospects from their libraries and files. So we selected various names, but we weren't getting anywhere because we had set our sights entirely too high. Our group was a little unsophisticated to think that a fellow like Walt Disney would quit his job to accept the position of finance director simply because he was a strong Reagan supporter. This took a lot of time. We called on many top people on the lists and they said, "No." So one day, I'll never forget, Bill Smith, an important member of our group, called on this fellow named Smith. I can't recall his first name.

E: Gordon?

S: Yes, Gordon Smith, who was in charge of the Los Angeles office of Booz, Allen and Hamilton. He had been working closely with Bill Smith in attempting to identify persons who would qualify for the post of finance director. One day Bill Smith called on Gordon Smith at his downtown office to see whether he could get some new leads which we might pursue. He informed Gordon Smith that we weren't getting anywhere and we needed to find a finance director quickly as Reagan was getting impatient with us. During the course of the conversation, he casually asked about Gordon Smith's qualifications. Gordon Smith told him that he was a graduate of Massachusetts University in Political Science and that he had always liked politics but had taken a course in accounting because he needed a job to earn a living. He had done very well with his firm and was making about $120,000 a year, which was an excellent salary in those days. He also added that as he looked back, he always had had a yen to get into politics someday. So Bill said, "How about now?" He had all the qualifications and experience that one would seek in a finance director and after checking several firms with whom he had worked on important projects, all of us decided that he was the man for the job and we would try our best to convince Reagan. I remember having Bill Smith ask Gordon Smith to stop by my house and talk. I asked him what I consider to be key questions in determining a man's philosophy. I asked him about capital punishment, for example, and some other things that aren't really Democratic or Republican party issues, but tell you about an individual's philosophy. He was smart, and he told me later that he knew damn well what I was doing. When we got to know each other better, he told me, "I knew what you wanted when you asked those questions so I answered them correctly." So a group of us called on Reagan and told him that we had investigated this man Gordon Smith thoroughly, and we all agreed that he will make a great finance director. Reagan then asked about Dotson whom we had mentioned at a prior meeting. We said that Dotson had refused the job since he had just been made the head of a major savings and loan association. He said he would like to consider at least two or three more names before making the final decision. Finally, one day several of us again met with Reagan, and Holmes Tuttle said, "Ronnie, Smith is highly qualified, the best qualified man in the world, and you must accept this man as there is no one better." So going against his own instincts, Reagan appointed Gordon Smith as the finance director. As it turned out Reagan's perception was right. Gordon Smith had all the necessary qualifications but he did not know how to handle people and he had no political know-how. Obviously, Reagan's perception of this man was correct, because after three or four months in office he had to resign.[3]

E: Was Caspar Weinberger considered in the beginning?

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[3]Gordon Paul Smith resigned as Director of the Department of Finance, effective March 1, 1968.

S: No. At that time he was perceived as being liberal by a lot of people, I suppose because he was in the northern part of the state. We didn't know him that well then and he wasn't considered. After Smith resigned, Reagan appointed Weinberger as finance director. The "kitchen cabinet" continued to meet from time to time, but after Reagan had settled down in Sacramento the group gradually disbanded, although each of us individually kept in contact with him on a personal basis. But appointments are a good example of how the "kitchen cabinet" worked. Reagan would consider recommendations from many different people and then make his decision. I think he trusted us because we had no ulterior motives. We didn't want jobs or other rewards.

E: In the early part of 1967, I think in the [*Los Angeles Times*] *West* Magazine article, Greenberg mentions that you had pretty frequent access to the governor. How often would you say you got to talk to him or his staff?

S: Well, quite frequently at the beginning. But as time went on I had less occasion to talk to him. In other words, once he got settled, I felt he didn't need my advice except on special occasions. Others probably talked to him more frequently than I did, expecially Holmes Tuttle and Bill Smith. Some of the fellows such as Holmes went up to Sacramento a lot, and would talk to Reagan quite frequently. Occasionally, he'd call me. I remember one time he called me about a question concerning the oil business, because I was in the oil business. He would call Taft Schreiber about matters pertaining to the movie business. And I am sure he called others on matters pertaining to their field of experience.

E: Did you have occasions when you felt like the governor needed your advice on policy areas rather than appointments?

S: Certainly. I did not feel that he needed my advice on a day-to-day basis. Occasionally, I would call to make a suggestion but only on matters of a specific nature where I felt I might offer another viewpoint.

E: Were there instances where he may have taken your advice in which you may have felt really gratified because it turned out very well?

S: No, I can't remember a specific instance.

E: I think the Greenberg article--the only one I'm aware of anyway--is about the first to mention your group as a "kitchen cabinet."

S: Well, I think it was mentioned in the *Los Angeles Times* several times.

E: Before that?

S: I think so. I don't remember now. This is 1967, I gather here.

E: Right, April of 1967.

S: Well, it's probably right. We had many meetings during the campaign and our group was essentially a campaign committee. We would talk about strategies: what to do in San Jose, when to have Reagan come to Fresno, and things like that. So it really wasn't a "kitchen cabinet." It turned into a "kitchen cabinet" immediately after the election when we had to select some people for the various offices.

E: What do you think of that term, by the way. Does that bother you at all?

S: Well, for some reason or another, because of the term that was applied here, it was also used in Washington. They changed the official name of the "kitchen cabinet" in Washington to the Presidential Advisory Committee, but most people still referred to us as the "kitchen cabinet." For example, we meet in Washington now at various offices, whether at the Department of Education or Department of Interior or whatever. But people don't recognize us and they don't recognize the Presidential Advisory Committee. They weren't going to let me in for one meeting until I told them I was with the "kitchen cabinet."

E: So that term really doesn't bother you at all?

S: No, I don't think so. It's not an official body, you know. We never were official in California, and certainly not in Washington.

E: Ronald Reagan often said that your group, or the "kitchen cabinet," never asked anything of him but good government.

S: That's all, absolutely.

E: What would you consider to be good government? What are the components?

S: Well, first of all high integrity and honesty, which he, Reagan, has without question. No one has ever questioned it. Even his worst opponent has never accused Reagan, or suggested that Reagan wasn't anything but completely honest in everything he says and does. So that was one of the qualifications. The other is that good government means fiscal responsibility and conservative principles of governing. What are the conservative principles of governing? Well, you know what that means. We don't believe in certain things like pornography, for example. It has nothing to do with government directly, but nevertheless those are the ideas. People believe in American patriotic values, American traditional values, the Constitution, and things like that.

E: Was there a consensus among the "kitchen cabinet" on what good government was?

S: Oh, yes. We didn't have to define it. We knew what good government was.

E: The reason I asked that question was it seems that a lot of people think of the "kitchen cabinet" as a kind of monolith, and it seems to me that there are a wide variety of political opinions.

S: Well, yes, but in general we all agreed that we should have fiscal responsibility to avoid inflation, recession, and unemployment. We should think of the consequences of these programs which the liberals foisted on the American people. They have created more problems than they solved and have added to inflationary pressures. Someone said that conservatives are born with knowledge that liberals can only acquire after dire experiences. In other words, these programs that were intended to benefit poor people often benefited no one but the administrators and a few of the leaders. They don't perform the function that they were intended to perform. We are more realistic than liberals are. We don't think that human nature is that pure and that simple; therefore, we don't want to give in to the temptation to help those who are not truly needy and thus destroy the incentive to go to work. That's a problem that is generally recognized now. Even some black leaders now are saying that by giving the poor these handouts we have created an underclass who have lost their initiative and incentive to seek work. Now, you say, "You would make them all starve?" No, of course not. As Reagan has said, we must help the handicapped and the truly needy at all costs. We must provide jobs for all those who are able and willing to work. In order to accomplish this we must maintain a healthy economy to provide the jobs. However, we must not provide social benefits so freely as to discourage the incentive to work.

E: "Cy" Rubel died in June 1967, and I thought maybe you could describe him and maybe summarize some of your associations with him.

S: I had known "Cy" Rubel for many years before his death and I considered him a very close friend. As you know he was president of Union Oil Company for many years and he was highly respected and admired in the oil industry and in our community. He was a great American and great patriot who was greatly devoted to our American values and principles. He was a man of great integrity and a good family man, and I was privileged to be one of his friends.

E: Was it a sudden, unexpected death, or had he been in poor health?

S: It was a tragedy, because the minor operation which he had should not have been fatal. Something happened in the hospital which should not have happened. It was the same way with Taft. You know what happened to Taft?

E: No, I don't.

S: Oh, God. He went in for a simple operation at Jules Stein Clinic at UCLA, and they gave the wrong type of blood, and that caused his death. Apparently, the bottles containing the blood were mislabeled.

E: What year was that?

S: That was about 1972 or 1973, somewhere around that time.

E: Were you on the Governor's Task Force on Efficiency and Economy in Government?

S: No.

E: No? Holmes Tuttle and some others were; I thought maybe you were, too.

S: Well, Holmes Tuttle was more in recruiting businessmen for the Task Force, as I remember, but I don't think he participated directly in the Task Force's decisions.

E: One other question I wanted to ask you, were you considered for an appointment at anytime by Governor Reagan?

S: Never at anytime. I made it clear I didn't want any kind of an appointment.

E: Could you explain the reason for that?

S: I felt I didn't want anyone to think that I was active in these things because of personal interest. I was occupied by my own affairs and did not have too much time to devote to other matters.

E: I noticed that several of the other "kitchen cabinet" members were appointed to the Board of Regents and . Board of Regents and . . .

S: Well, the Board of Regents was just about the only case. Bill Smith was appointed to the Board of Regents. But Bill Smith, of course, was Reagan's lawyer, so he had contact with him on legal matters, tax matters, and everything else which he handled for him. I don't think Holmes Tuttle was appointed to anything.

E: I think Earle Jorgensen was on the State College Board of Trustees.

S: No, I don't think so. He may have been, but I don't think so.

E: You talked a little about the 1968 campaign already and the convention in Miami. What kind of strategy was involved? Obviously, if Reagan were to make it, he had to go to a second ballot at the convention. What kind of strategy did he have?

S: Well, Cliff White believed that maybe Nixon and Rockefeller would have about the same number of votes and neither one would have a majority of votes on the first ballot. It was clear to me, at least, from the very beginning that Nixon had a majority before he arrived at the convention. California didn't vote in turn, but as soon as the balloting indicated that Nixon had reached a majority, California voted for Nixon. Nixon had the votes before he arrived at the convention and he won on the first ballot.

E: Was there a section of the country where it seemed to you that some of the delegates might have been pried loose somehow?

S: No. No, they stayed put. I knew a fellow in the Nixon campaign that had worked with me on the Goldwater campaign. I knew him very well. He lived in Pasadena. I can't think of his name. I talked to him the day before balloting commenced, and he was convinced that Nixon had more than a majority of the votes. I quizzed him on two or three delegations that I knew that we had a few votes. He said, "Yes, in the Alabama delegation." He mentioned that they didn't have two votes in the Alabama delegation which confirmed our own information; therefore, I knew that his figures were correct. There was no question that Nixon was going to win. He had the votes to start with.

E: Did you take a prominent role in the Senate primary campaign between Rafferty and Kuchel?

S: Yes, I was quite involved in that. And Rafferty lost, that's all. Of course, you know, he first defeated Kuchel in the primary. I was involved in that. However, he was defeated in the general election.

E: There are some suggestions in written sources that some of Reagan's backers frowned on the Rafferty candidacy because they thought it might drain some funds away.

S: Oh, I don't think that would reduce the funding for Reagan. Rafferty was a little bit one-sided and inflexible and his rhetoric was somewhat abrasive. Some people felt that he wasn't the right candidate, and he obviously wasn't.

E: Some others note that there was a drop-off in "kitchen cabinet" activity after the 1968 election. Where do you see the ups and downs, I guess, of "kitchen cabinet" activity?

S: Well, I would say that we probably made our greatest contribution to the governor shortly after his election. Then it gradually dropped off as he had less and less need. After he had been in Sacramento a few months he had his own people around him who could advise him. He had confidence in them, and he had less and less occasion to talk to us.

E: There was some controversy about the governor's residence in Sacramento. Could you tell what all that was about?

S: Well, yes. There was considerable discussion in the newspaper. I headed the group of individuals who purchased a house which we rented to the governor. This group consisted of fifteen individuals who invested $5,000 each to purchase the house. After Reagan left Sacramento we sold the house and everyone made a small profit on the transaction. I, personally, do not believe that there was anything wrong with what we did. With reference to the house that was built on the outskirts of Sacramento, I, personally, was not involved with that project. This house was to be the home for all future governors of California and was built at the expense of private individuals who donated money to the state for this purpose. I believe that the house was completed after Governor Brown, Jr. was already in Sacramento. Apparently, the house did not suit him and he has never occupied it.

E: Could you describe your political work for Sam Yorty?

S: Well, I got involved with Sam Yorty's campaign and finally became chairman of his campaign. That was in 1972, wasn't it?

E: He defeated Bradley in 1969.

S: Yes, that's right, in 1969. So I became chairman of Yorty's campaign in 1969. We had a good campaign and we won. The press accused us of running a racist campaign, but I emphatically deny this accusation. Our campaign did focus on the busing issue and Yorty made it clear that he was against busing children thirty or forty miles across town. Bradley tried to avoid the busing issue but he never stated that he was against it. Undoubtedly, Yorty received many votes because of his stand. I am certain that by this time it is recognized that people who are against busing are not necessarily racist. Also, I think that black candidates actually have an advantage because people are so conscious of not being racist that they vote for the black candidate in order to prove that they aren't racist. That's especially true when the candidates or issues aren't well-known. What got Yorty in trouble was when he said, "If blacks all vote for blacks and whites all vote for whites, then who's the racist?" He was frustrated with the double standard that allowed blacks to vote 100 percent for Bradley without anyone suggesting racism was involved. That's what made people contend that it was a racist campaign, but it wasn't at all. In addition to this issue, the primary thrust of our campaign was that Yorty had done a good job as mayor and his record proved it. Bradley, on the other hand, was associated with radical, almost communist groups. I'm not saying that Bradley was either, but those people supported him. In the end I think it came down to Yorty being better known than Bradley and having a good record.



Henry Salvatori with Los Angeles Mayor Sam Yorty and Chief of Police Ed Davis

E: You knew both Yorty and Reagan pretty well. How did they get along together?

S: They were never friends. Not for any reason. Their paths just didn't cross very often. Yorty is not quite as elegant as Reagan. let's face it. They agreed, I'm sure, on philosophy. And, of course, Yorty was a Democrat. He did support Nixon. I was more or less attracted to him because of his foreign policy. He was very strongly pro defense and anti-Soviet, which has nothing to do with the city, but nevertheless, he was attractive to me from that standpoint.

E: Yorty was a candidate in both 1966 and 1970. Was it hard for you to decide whether to go for Yorty or Reagan?

S: Reagan and Yorty weren't involved.

E: At the beginning of the campaigns, of course, Yorty was running against Brown in the Democratic primary, and he also ran against Unruh in the Democratic primary in 1970.

S: Oh, well, no. No. He never appeared in our thinking because he ran against Brown in the primary. He certainly never ran against Reagan. He was defeated in the primary, so there was never any problem.

E: It wasn't a difficulty for you, then?

S: It didn't even occur to me.

E: Whose campaign will I work for, Reagan or Yorty?

S: It didn't even occur to me. He never ran against Reagan. He ran against Brown and was defeated; therefore, that was the end of that. His views were essentially very conservative.

E: Had Yorty beaten Brown in the primary, would that have been difficult?

S: Well, I don't know. I would have no question that I would have supported Reagan over Yorty. No question about that.

E: You were also in support of some congressional candidates in the 1970 election. You supported [John T.] LaFollette against [Alphonzo] Bell and [Forden] Athearn against [Pete] McClosky in another district up north. Could you tell a little about that?

S: Yes. Well, McClosky, as you know, was anti-Vietnam War, making speeches that I considered almost treasonous. Our boys were dying in Vietnam and his statements were giving aid and comfort to the enemy. For this reason, I had no use for him as a sound conservative. In the case of LaFollette, I knew him very well. Bell was a ne'er-do-well, whom I'd known for years, and he was switching back and

forth. He had no deep ideological convictions. He was an opportunist and I thought LaFollette would be a better man. But he, Bell, was the incumbent, and we lost.

E: Did you generally get involved in congressional campaigns?

S: Well, now and then. Yes, I get involved. I support financially many campaigns up and down the state, depending on the candidates. Now, if a man is an extreme left-winger, I oppose him by supporting his opponent whether or not he has a chance to win.

E: So if there are campaigns that attract your attention, then you really get involved?

S: Oh, yes. That's right. Just as in some of the national campaigns. I supported people who ran against McGovern in the last twelve years. In the election before last I supported a young man who was an ex-POW who was running against McGovern. I gave him support very early but he lost in the last election. I spent a lot of time and money against McGovern, against Church, against Bayh, against Nelson. So I've been nationally supporting conservative candidates against the extreme left-wingers.

E: Was there ever any doubt in your mind, or among the backers, that Reagan would be reelected in 1970?

S: No. There wasn't much doubt.

E: Did you see any tough challengers on the horizon? Unruh was the nominee, but was there anybody else?

S: No, there wasn't. No. Of course, he didn't win quite as many votes as in his first election, but there was never any doubt that he would win handsomely.

E: The 1966 campaign was kind of a donnybrook of sorts within the Republican party, because there were a number of people running in the primary. Christopher, Patrick, and some others. Did you think the party was more unified in 1970 than in 1966?

S: Yes, it probably was. We had no one running against Reagan in 1970, whereas in 1966 Christopher did run in the primary. But there was no question in anybody's mind that Reagan was going to win the general election. He had done a good job. The press was beginning to see that he was more competent than they had previously thought. The media is so important. Actually, the media is more important in the intervening years than it is in the last month of an election. In Yorty's 1969 campaign, for example, the *Los Angeles Times* really went after him in the last weeks before the election. They even printed a very questionable poll in the last week, in fact the day

before the election, that showed Yorty running twenty points behind. We thought, "God, we can't be this wrong." And we weren't. That poll was completely off base. Actually, the *Los Angeles Times* opposition was a plus for Yorty. They were so biased that people recognized it. The real danger is when the bias develops gradually over three or four years and people aren't even conscious that a partisan job is being done. People develop generalizations about issues or individuals that they can't even explain. So to me the long intervening period between elections is very important.

E: Although Reagan did win very handily in 1970, the Republicans lost control of the state legislature and didn't do quite as well statewide . . . I guess he didn't pull a lot of people along on his coattails, as they say. How would you explain that?

S: Well, the Democrats were still very strong. The momentum was still with the Democrats, and the momentum just kept going. I don't think we were as well organized as we should have been in 1970. But one must understand that money can only do so much. Eventually, it is the candidate and the general principles which he espouses that determine the outcome of an election. So in 1972--let's see, in 1972, who was running then?

E: Nationally?

S: Nationally, yes.

E: Nixon and McGovern.

S: Yes, that's right, Nixon and McGovern. Nixon had been defeated four years before, I guess. Am I right?

E: No. He lost in 1960. He beat Humphrey in 1968, and so he was President in 1970.

S: Oh, that's right. (interruption) In 1968 Nixon barely won, as you know, and the Democrats were still strong in California. They had the momentum, and all the liberal policies still dominated the prevalent thinking and, perhaps, some of the other Republican candidates weren't as strong as some of the Democratic candidates, I don't know.

E: There was an effort that Governor Reagan publicized and worked for in the campaign to purge what he called the "dirty dozen" from the state legislature in 1970. Do you recall some things about that?

S: I remember, but I don't recall anything specific. No, I can't add any comment.

E: What are some of the things that stand out to you in the campaign against Unruh, especially in terms of money raising?

S: Well, actually, he was down in the polls from the very beginning, and all the news media considered him to be a sure loser. I'll never forget the television show I saw during the campaign in which a panel of three was interviewing Unruh. All of their questions came down to how could he expect to win when he was so far behind in the polls. He got very frustrated and said, "Why don't you question me about the issues? Don't ask me why I can't win. I think I can win." He was so far behind, and when a candidate is that far behind, or is perceived to be that far behind, he has no chance to win even if people might otherwise agree with him. He never was in the race. He came to my house at a desperate moment in an attempt to get some front page publicity. I think Hearst once said something to the effect that it's better to have your name on toilet paper than nowhere at all. I guess that's what he or his campaign people had in mind. On a Saturday morning he appeared in front of the gate to my home with a large group of radio, television, and news reporters. There were six or seven television cameras together with various trucks and cars. As I walked down the driveway I was surprised to see this large group of men and equipment and I wondered what it was all about. When I reached the gate Unruh quickly greeted me, saying, "I didn't think you were home." The whole affair turned out to be a great media event contrived by Unruh and aided and abetted by media reporters. It was a beautiful example of how the media created its own news using my home as a backdrop.

E: Well, there are press accounts of that. I'd like to hear your account of what happened.

S: I was playing tennis on the tennis court in the back of our house. My wife, who was in the house, received a phone call from our neighbor across the street who, in an alarming tone, told her of the large group of people and equipment in front of our gate. She called me and we both walked down the driveway to the gate. As soon as I saw Unruh he put his hand out to greet me saying that he didn't think we were home. I quickly saw that the whole thing was a campaign gimmick and I said, "You bastard. Get off my property." He had planned and conceived the whole project as a last resort to get some front page publicity. He did, in fact, get a lot of publicity but most of it was very unfavorable. Later Unruh told me that his scheme had backfired and that he had lost votes as a result of it.

E: It's interesting, you were sort of antagonists, but you seem to have been friendly with Mr. Unruh.

S: No, I never was antagonistic to him. I saw him during the Yorty campaign, for example. We talked. He is what you call an old-time politician, whose standard of integrity is opposite to mine or most people. He still has high integrity in his way. In other words, he feels that doing certain tricks for political reasons is perfectly

all right. He doesn't have the same scruples that I would think an individual should have. He's a very intelligent fellow, and probably knows more about politics than anybody I know. What he lacks, in my view, is the gleam of integrity which is reflected in a man's face when he gets on television and talks to people.

E: He had the "big daddy" image, of course, from years before Governor Reagan's term.

S: He said, "Money is the mother's milk of politics," which he believed in. And you know, maybe he's right, but he didn't even have the hypocrisy to say that this is an ideal that you believe in. You know what Buckley said about hypocrisy, that it is the tribute which vice pays to virtue. In other words, you may be hypocritical, but at least the fact that you are hypocritical indicates that you at least believe that the ideal is higher than you're practicing yourself. That's better than to have no ideal at all, and then flaunt it, which is what I think, to some extent, Unruh does.

E: It's generally believed that his image, or even his practice, changed from the "big daddy" image, and later on by the 1970 campaign that he was a completely different politician. Can you subscribe to that?

S: Well, he was a "big daddy" when he was in power because he had purse strings and managed the assembly. I don't think that he was a big power because the people were so unanimously for him. Those who corrupted politicians, business, labor, or whatever, could go to "big daddy" and make some deals or at least make him listen. He was a powerful man in that sense. However, he never won any election outside of his district.

E: In 1970 [John] Tunney challenged George Murphy's senate seat, and he won. What are some of the things that stand out in that campaign?

S: Well, first of all George Murphy ran against the fellow in Paris. What's his name?

E: Salinger?

S: Yes.

E: In 1964.

S: Oh, that was 1964.

E: Yes.

S: Well, in 1970 George Murphy ran against Democratic momentum, and Tunney had a name to some extent. Neither Tunney nor George Murphy were that brilliant as far as articulating their positions. The race

was between two equally nice guys: a Republican conservative, and a Democratic liberal, who was moderate to some extent. Since they were more or less about equal in voter appeal, the Democrat would be expected to win.

E: Do you recall that age may have been an issue in that campaign?

S: I doubt it. It may have had some effect, but in my opinion, the biggest factor was that the Democrats outnumbered Republicans three to two in California. Since neither candidate had a superior appeal and there were no emotional issues on which they differed, the voters voted along party lines.

E: Were you a delegate to the 1972 Republican convention?

S: Yes. That was the Nixon convention?

E: Right, when Nixon was reelected. Governor Reagan appointed the delegates to the California convention. Do you recall what interests Governor Reagan may have had at the convention?

S: Yes, he was there, naturally. He was head of the largest delegation at the convention. He was given all of the obeisance, but he had no other ambitions.

E: No particular interests in party platform?

S: Well, I'm sure he participated indirectly, but not to a great extent.

E: You also know Nixon very well. How did Nixon and Reagan get along over the years?

S: Well, Reagan supported Nixon's philosophy in general. I don't think they had occasion to be close friends. It was just that they didn't see each other very frequently. There wasn't the occasion to be that close. But Reagan never criticized Nixon on the Watergate situation. He never spoke out against Nixon because he had great respect for him and his philosophy.

E: Did you take part in the November election of 1973? It was a special election for Proposition 1, the Governor's tax initiative.

S: Yes, I wasn't too enthusiastic about it primarily because the wording of the initiative was somewhat confusing for the average voter. I was in agreement with its objective but I didn't believe it would pass. I did support it financially, primarily because of my loyalty to Reagan.

E: How about some of the other "kitchen cabinet" people. Are there some that stood out that got involved heavily in that campaign?

Grace and Henry Salvatori flank the Reagans at a social benefit, 1974

S: I don't recall who its principal supporters were, but since Reagan approved it, everyone in our group supported it.

E: It was an interesting campaign in the sense that one of the strategies, or one of the things that was done on behalf of it, was that there was a tape recorded phone message personally from the governor that was played. I wanted to ask if you knew how that came about?

S: No. I do not as I was not too involved.

E: By the time that the governor left office, did you feel that after the eight years he had indeed given you good government?

S: Oh, yes.

E: Were there some things that stood out in the eight-year term that you were especially glad to see take place?

S: He rationalized spending. He did attempt to cut some of the programs that were unnecessary or wasteful. He reduced total state employment without reducing essential services. He certainly created a better business climate to attract new business to the state. Reagan had integrity, probity, and high moral values; the people admired him for that.

E: Over your long association with a lot of the "kitchen cabinet" people, do you feel that some of them may have been changed in their political views by yourself or that they may have even changed your views a little bit?

S: Well, we were almost pretty much the same philosophically. Some were more extreme than others; some less so on certain issues. But in general there were no serious differences of opinion on fundamental questions.

E: Okay, this is kind of winding down. You mentioned that you supported Ford in 1976, which sounds a little bit strange.

S: Well, the reason I did--I felt this way very strongly, and I think I was right--was that an incumbent President should not be opposed by a member of his own party. At no time has such a man won. If he wins the nomination, he loses the election. I thought of it strictly as a practical situation. I felt for Reagan. Through no fault of his own, lightning struck, and he had to face an incumbent President when he shouldn't have. If Nixon hadn't got involved in Watergate, Reagan would have marched right in. I understood how a lot of people felt. It was hard for them and it was hard for Reagan to say, "Let's wait for next time." I was hoping he wouldn't run for his own ultimate good. I asked him before I committed to Ford if he was going to run and he hadn't decided. I don't think

he would have run if he hadn't felt a responsibility to various people around the country who liked him so much and urged him to run. It proved me wrong, but I really thought that if one or two guys like me would go for Ford that maybe he wouldn't run. I really believed that. Maybe that was stupid, but I honestly believed that he would have been better off if he hadn't run. Since Ford could not have been able to run again, Reagan would have had the nomination without any opposition four years later. Reagan ran and we have had four years of Carter. But Reagan is now President, and I thank God for that.

E: When he left the governorship in 1974, were you aware of a preference on his part for who would be the Republican nominee in 1974?

S: Let's see, it was Brown and . . .

E: Brown and Flournoy were the eventual candidates.

S: There isn't very much I can say about that campaign except to say that Brown was a better campaigner than Flournoy and, of course, Brown won.

E: Those are all the questions that I have.

S: Okay.

E: And I thank you very much. It was fascinating.

END OF INTERVIEW

California Government History Documentation Project

Ronald Reagan Era

JUSTIN DART

An Interview Conducted By

Steven D. Edgington

OH 1676

Oral History Program

California State University, Fullerton



JUSTIN DART

JUSTIN DART

This interview with Mr. Justin (D) was conducted by Steven D. Edgington (E), Researcher-Editor for the California State University, Fullerton branch of the California Government History Documentation Project at Mr. Dart's office, 8480 Beverly Boulevard, Los Angeles, California on June 8, 1981.

E: Mr. Dart, can we begin by having you tell something of your family background and your early years?

D: Well, I guess I'm not the subject of the interview, but I was born in Evanston, Illinois, and raised in Hinsdale. I worked for the Walgreen Company until 1941, got fired in 1941, and went to work for the then United Drugs, the predecessor of Dart Industries and Dart & Kraft. That's enough of my life story, I think. I married Jane Bryan on the last day of 1939. She had made several pictures with Governor Reagan, then Ronald Reagan, so our friendship started when we moved to California in about 1945 when he was married to Jane Wyman. At that point of time, when we'd go to dinner with Jane Wyman and Ronald Reagan, my wife would say, "For God's sake, no politics, please!" because he was a Roosevelt lover and I hated him. So he's gone full circle in his political thinking. I had nothing to do with that. Zero. That came as a result of his being the head of the Screen Actors Guild union, which he thought left quite a lot to be desired in a lot of ways. I had absolutely nothing to do with his transformation, but through the process of being in the fire and in the game he learned, he thought, which side the economic bread was buttered on. And that's why he is now what I would call--I hate conservative and liberal--a very responsible, commonsense guy and one of the best communicators that I've ever known.

E: When did you first become involved in politics? You mentioned you didn't like Roosevelt. Were you involved in politics from very early in your career?

D: Only in a small way, although I go back as far as Landon when he ran against Roosevelt. I sponsored a "Dollars for the Landon Campaign" by selling a sunflower--the Kansas state flower--boutonniere for one dollar. That was the big dollar then, not a little dollar like we've got now. Mr. Walgreen wanted me to run for governor of Illinois when I was about thirty-five, and I said, "No way. I haven't finished my business career." And besides that, I hadn't developed the same kind of interest in politics that I have now. See, I was chairman of the California Finance Committee when President Eisenhower ran for the second time. Just one little incident that might be interesting: I went down the street here to call on Holmes Tuttle. I'd never met the guy, and so I said, "Mr. Tuttle, I'd like to have $5,000 for President Eisenhower." He said, "You're out of your mind." I said, "Let's talk about it a little. How many stores have you got?"

"Well, I've got three stores." "How many managers have you got?" "Well, I've got three managers." "How many salesmen have you got?" "I have 'x' number of salesmen." "Now," I said, "if you can't divide up a $5,000 bill among all your people . . . I could if I were in your position." He thought about it a little while and he said, "Well, I think I can." And that's how Holmes Tuttle got into politics. So that's one credit I can take with a great deal of joy and pleasure, because I think Holmes Tuttle has done more to further President Reagan's political career than any single man in the state. Holmes and I are very close. He's been on the Dart Board for, oh, I guess . . . damned near twenty years. We work together very closely on political things and everything else. That was one good thing I did do.

E: That was in the 1956 or the 1952 campaign for Eisenhower? Do you remember?

D: I think it was in 1952, but I don't want to say definitely because I don't remember for sure.

E: Were your interests mostly national politics or did you become very active in state and local politics as well?

D: I was more interested in national politics but, of course, when Ron ran for the governorship, we were all "gung ho" for him. Anticipating your question, "Why did you think Ronald Reagan would make a good governor?"

E: All right.

D: That's simple. He's a commonsense guy, and that's the essence of being capable and being responsible. More than that, he communicated so well and was a great leader. I mean, communicating had been his business in motion pictures, and then he was the head communicator for GE [General Electric] for a long time. It isn't just enough to be a governor or a president, you have got to be a leader as well.

E: You mentioned you worked for Eisenhower. Were there any other political figures, say before 1960, that you were active in support of or that you admired greatly?

D: Well, of course, I was for anybody that was against Roosevelt, because if it hadn't been for the Southern Democrats, he'd have given our country away. Packing the Supreme Court . . . all kinds of socialistic ideology, all of which I would have been for if we could have afforded it. It has now been demonstrated to the American people that when we do things we can't afford, we pay for it. We pay for it in inflation, which brings about the worst kind of suffering to the lowest echelon in the economic strata. It doesn't hurt me a whole

heck of a lot as an individual, except that I know it hurts the country; but in the lower economic brackets, it's very painful and it has to be stopped.

E: Also you mentioned you met Holmes Tuttle in probably 1952 or 1956. Did you meet any of the other people who later became identified as part of the "kitchen cabinet" early on in the fifties or even earlier than that?

D: Henry Salvatori was a friend, a close friend, for many years. The fellow at Union Oil, [A. C.] "Cy" Rubel was a good friend, but not a close friend.

E: How did you meet them?

D: In working for, and being as active as I was in this community since 1946. Obviously, I met the community leaders in due course, whether it was the Community Chest or the Boy Scouts or whatever it might be. So anybody who was out front I automatically knew, you see. Fellows like Ed Mills, who worked for Holmes Tuttle, and Charlie Cook, whom I got to know through Holmes Tuttle. Jacquelin Hume up in San Francisco I got to know really through Holmes Tuttle. It was just a kind of a natural sequence of events.

E: Did you work on any political campaigns with those people as well as getting Holmes Tuttle into the Eisenhower campaign?

D: Well, Leonard Firestone has been my intimate friend for a long time. That one I don't need to talk about. Taft Schreiber was an extremely good friend; Bill Smith, a hell of a good friend. Those were the ones I was closest to.

E: But you had met most of them through the community before the sixties campaigns?

D: Yes.

E: I want to backtrack just a little bit and ask about your educational background and how that got you into your career.

D: Well, I had a Bachelor of Science degree from Northwestern University, and I had one term in law and one term in business because I had an interim year at Mercersburg Academy, where, incidentally, last week I made the commencement address. I didn't have a very profound education. I had just enough education to know that I didn't know very much, and to know that I had to work like hell because I have a very ordinary mentality. I worked hard for whatever I've been able to do, which there's nothing wrong with.

E: Were you involved in any of the Republican organizations in California, like the California Republican Assembly or the United Republicans of California? Did you get involved in any of those organizations?

D: Well, I was involved in all of those things, except that I was not active in those things. My association with campaigns came from a personal side, such as my personal relationship with Ronald Reagan, rather than from a political side. Nevertheless, obviously I was a barking dog when he decided to run for governor, as we all were.

E: Ronald Reagan worked with Democrats for Eisenhower in both 1952 and 1956. Do you have any memories or recollections about Reagan working in either campaign? Some of the things he might have done?

D: It was just a commonsense thing to do. We had, really, more Democrats at that time than we had Republicans. What we all wanted to do was to enlist their support and their votes for Ike.

E: The 1964 presidential campaign was quite a donnybrook, and I believe you were for Rockefeller in that one.

D: So was Leonard Firestone.

E: And some of the other "kitchen cabinet" people as well. There were others that were for Goldwater. Why were you for Rockefeller?

D: Well, in the first place, I liked Nelson Rockefeller. I was his finance chairman in the state of California; although, he told me not to work too hard, because he financed most of it himself. I was so sure, at that point in time, that our country was not ready for Goldwater. After Goldwater was nominated up in San Francisco, Barry Leithead of Clewett-Peabody was my house guest right after that at Cypress Point, as was Ike, and I said, "I'll tell you what I'll do, I'll bet you Goldwater carries not one of the following states, and I rattled off about forty states. Of course, I won my bet. It wasn't that I didn't admire Goldwater. I didn't think the world was ready for Goldwater. They were ready for Ronald Reagan because they have been through the crucible of fire and torture on spending money we didn't have. The economy was fairly stable when Goldwater was running. Inflation was about three or three and a half percent? [It was] something we all felt we could live with. It was just the wrong time, perhaps, for the right guy. That was my viewpoint.

E: You were, then, at the San Francisco convention?

D: Yes.

E: Do you have any recollections about the convention that stand out in your mind?

D: Well, I was plumb disgusted with it, because it was rather clear that they were going to nominate Goldwater. Ike came down with Janie and me to our place at Monterey, Ike and Mamie both, and Ike was sick, absolutely sick. He liked Goldwater. He didn't dislike Goldwater. He just felt that the time for Goldwater was not then, that the country wasn't ready for him, and God knows they demonstrated that with one of the biggest landslides against anybody that ever happened. I felt that Nelson Rockefeller, as a liberal Republican, which I'm not, was going to have a better chance. I don't think that Nelson Rockefeller would have won, but he sure as hell, in my judgment, would have made a much better show than Barry Goldwater did.

E: Were you surprised, or what was your reaction when Ronald Reagan became a very well-received spokesman on behalf of Goldwater? Of course, there was the big speech that he gave. Do you recall?

D: Of course, I recall that speech. Everybody recalls that speech. [It] raised more damned money than any speech that ever came along. Ronald Reagan was dedicated to a philosophy, win, lose, or draw, which I admired very much. I didn't agree with it at the time, but God knows I admired that. He was fighting for what he believed, and he believed in Goldwater's philosophy, as I did. But I was not willing to support what I thought was a 100 percent sure loser. I would rather have a little off-center Nelson Rockefeller than I would have another Democratic president.

E: Did that seem a natural thing for Reagan to shoot into the spotlight from his work in the Screen Actors Guild and for GE, or was it really very surprising to you that suddenly here he was in the spotlight?

D: Well, as one of those who was trying to convince him that, that was what he ought to do, it wasn't so surprising. It was very gratifying to think that Ronald Reagan was willing to tackle that job which was a new deal for him. But Ronald Reagan has never been too much of a compromiser. I realize that the essence of the democratic process is compromise. But compromise how much? Ronald Reagan has never been willing to compromise his viewpoints a whole hell of a lot.

E: In the 1966 campaign, I saw that you were in support of Christopher in the primary. Is that correct?

D: Yes.

E: Why were you in favor of Christopher when some of the others, such as Tuttle and Salvatori, had organized Friends of Ronald Reagan and were plugging his candidacy for governor?

D: Is this when Ronald Reagan was running in the primary?

E: Yes.

D: I don't recall that I was for Christopher.

E: Oh?

D: I've been for Ronald Reagan all the way along the line, and I always felt that he could win. So I never recall being for Christopher when Ronald Reagan was in the picture. I was for Christopher when Ronald Reagan was not in the picture.

E: Were you a member of Friends of Ronald Reagan that Tuttle and Salvatori and some others put together?

D: You bet.

E: What do you recall about that particular group and how you plugged Reagan's campaign in the early going?

D: Well, all of us were sentimentally, emotionally, philosophically attuned to what Ronald Reagan stood for. So it was not surprising, it was not difficult for all of us to be "gung ho" for him. We felt that he could sell himself to the people of California which, of course, he did beautifully.

E: Do you recall anything that stands out in your mind about the 1966 campaign against [Edmund G. Sr.] Pat Brown?

D: Not particularly.

E: Any stories or anecdotes?

D: No, not really.

E: The Democrats tried to use a strategy in 1966 which was called their extremism strategy. They tried to paint Reagan into a corner as being a right wing extremist.

D: That's right.

E: Do you recall that?

D: Yes.

E: What did you think about that?

D: At the time, the difference between political philosophy wasn't as great as it is now. We hadn't had this devil of inflation or any of the other things. But Ronald Reagan was really basically preaching against the Rooseveltian socialistic philosophy, and God knows that

I hated that. As I said before, I've always been for everything the government could do for the people that they could afford to do, and always against what they could not afford to do. This was Ronald Reagan's posture. His posture was always that people, individually and in business, individually and collectively, could do more for the country, for the state, for our economy, than the government could. That was certainly my basic belief so that I was always tuned in with him philosophically.

E: I think Leonard Firestone said that he really, actually, liked Pat Brown, but decided that Reagan would be a better governor. What were your feelings about Pat Brown?

D: I like Pat Brown as a person, but I didn't respect Pat Brown. I'll tell you, Pat Brown is a hell of a lot better man than his son in my judgment. His son, I think, has been more or less of a disaster, but I think Pat had a little better balance than his son. I never disliked Pat Brown, but always felt that he was balanced in the wrong direction.

E: You've been a pretty successful fund raiser for political candidates over the years. How do you do it?

D: Well, in recent years, of course, I've been supporting PACs [Political Action Committees], but before that I did it the same way as I did with Holmes Tuttle. I said, "Now, look. You're the shepherd of your flock, and it's up to you to collect the money." And I'd go to a head of business and say, "Look, you've got more influence with the people working for you than I have. Don't ask me to go ask them for a philosophically oriented contribution. You do it. You've got the muscle; I haven't." I think that's probably been the essence of what little success I've had in raising money.

E: One on one is better than a fund raising dinner or some other means of raising money?

D: When I first raised money for Ike, I had to go and actually see people personally across the desk. Of course, as I got to know them better and they got to know me better, a phone call would do. But originally it was goddamned hard work. You really had to go eyeball to eyeball and say, "This is your country as well as my country and if you agree philosophically with So-and-So, then for God's sake don't just sit back and do nothing." I think it was Edmund Burke who once said that the surest way to get your country in trouble was for good men to do nothing. That's part of the democratic process. When Ben Franklin was asked after the signing of the Declaration of Independence, a lady said to him, "Dr. Franklin, what have you given us?" He said, "I've given you a democracy, if you can keep it." We lose our freedom, our democratically-oriented society, by not being participants. I've always preached the philosophy of participation.

E: And that's basically your motivation for being involved in politics?

D: Yes. I couldn't tell you why I got started, but I've always believed that you had to be an activist if you wanted to earn your right to citizenship. The more that you contribute, the more you get out of life. I still feel that way. In my old age I feel that about all I have left is a chance to better serve my country, and I work like hell at it. That's it.

E: Was it difficult to raise money for Governor Reagan for his campaign in 1966?

D: Well, it's always difficult to raise political money. People are motivated by so many--well, there's so many facets to people's motivations. Some of them want to be recognized. Some of them will want jobs. In my case I've never wanted a job. I suppose, I could have had a pretty good job. The day the guy who I rooted for, John Louis, got nominated for ambassador to the Court of Saint James, some of the papers said I was going to be the ambassador to the Court of Saint James. I not only didn't want it; I wouldn't accept it. I would sit there with handcuffs on and a gag on my mouth, and I wouldn't like that worth a damn. I'll tell you one little story about Ronald Reagan because it ought to be in the archives. I sat alone with him at the Kansas City Convention. Nancy, his wife, had gone out to the convention. I was there begging, arguing, that he should take the vice-presidential nomination with Ford. He would give me every reason in the world why he shouldn't take it. I'm not going to tell you the argument that broke the camel's back because I don't want it on record, but in any event I finally convinced him on a one on one basis that he owed it to his country. He said, "I don't want to sit there presiding over that Senate with a gag on my mouth," just like I said I didn't want to sit with a gag on my mouth in any ambassadorial post. In his own way he was absolutely right and he was totally sincere, but the final line was, "Yeah, I'll do it if he offers it." Well, Ford didn't offer it for two reasons. First, he thought he didn't need Ronald Reagan to win. And second, he was upset with Ronald Reagan for opposing him for the nomination, which is understandable. I like Jerry Ford. I don't think he's in the same class with Ronald Reagan either as a leader or as a thinker or as a statesman, but he had a right to those opinions. Maybe we're better off to let Carter get the country in such bad shape that they wanted a Ronald Reagan to bail them out. You see we only had a 4.8 percent inflation rate when Carter was elected. The history books could read a lot different if it had been Ford and Reagan in those four years. Maybe Reagan wouldn't be president today, which, thank God, he is. I worked my heart out believing that what I was doing was right, obviously, or I wouldn't have been doing it, believing that if Ronald Reagan was the vice president, Ford would get elected. Carter was only elected by one percentage point of the popular vote. One percent! So I think that Ford would have easily been elected if Reagan had been his vice president,

because people who are for Ronald Reagan are not just for Ronald Reagan; they're passionate about it. They're for him hook, line and sinker, you know, and a lot of people were turned off because he wasn't the vice-presidential candidate.

E: Was it against your best thinking or advice that Reagan did run against Ford in 1976?

D: No. I thought he should have run against Ford in 1976. But when Ford was the obvious winner, then I said, "Look, your first duty is to your country. [It's] not to your wife, not to your family, not to anything, just your country. And Ford needs you to get elected." So, as I say, we went through an hour and a half maybe of just one on one of rationale on that thing. But, anyway, I'm not sure it didn't turn out better this way.

E: What qualities do you look for when you support a candidate for public office, if you could list, one, two, three, four, five?

D: Integrity, number one. Integrity. Without integrity you've got nothing. Leadership ability, because in a democratic society leadership must be in place or the democratic process is going to fold up. It's too easy for politicians to promise things that no way can they deliver. So integrity has got to be the whole thing, and leadership to sell people not always what they want but what's good for them. [It's] like the mother with the child who says, "This thrashing is for your own good," you know. But the kid doesn't quite understand it at that point of time. And the ability to communicate. That's part of the leadership coefficient. Then, of course, philosophically, I believe now, and I always have believed, and I always will believe, that we cannot dispense more than we earn as a country. The United States of America is a holding company for every person, every partnership, every business, every individual. The businesses can't do any better than the United States of America does. So the United States of America must be kept strong spiritually, financially, and militarily or it will sink into a second or third or fourth echelon of status. So that I look for a man who is going to be compassionate, but above all realistic. I can promise you $50 million, but I can't deliver it. I can promise you $100 maybe and I can deliver it . . . or $1,000. But the point is that you've got to have integrity, be philosophically in tune with reality, be a leader that people will follow, be a leader who will do things, [and be a leader] who will advocate what is good for the people and not necessarily just what they'd like to hear.

E: When Governor Reagan was elected in 1966, were you a part of the group that helped advise him on appointments and policies in the transition period?

D: Yes, but not nearly as much as Holmes Tuttle. Holmes Tuttle almost went over their qualifications individual by individual. And in the nuts and bolts of structuring the administration, I was not nearly so

involved as I have been in the structuring of the government this time with the cabinet and subcabinet. I have been very much involved in that, and leading ambassadorships, and all those things. But with the state, I was working hard at that time. Our business was small at that time. You said 1966, didn't you?

E: Yes. He was elected in November 1966 and the transition period followed.

D: (Mr. Dart asks for a 1966 Annual Report.) I just wanted to illustrate numerically here why I had to have my nose to the grindstone.

E: Do you recall any specific input on particular nominations, finance director, for example?

D: Well, I guess all of us were for [Caspar W.] "Cap" Weinberger. (The Report is brought.) In 1966, the year we're talking about, our net earnings were $27 million. The year before we merged with Kraft [1979] they were like $150 million. So I had a little shopkeeping to do here, you see, so I was not involved with the "nitty-gritty" of Ronald Reagan's state government anything like Holmes or Ed Mills. But I have been actively involved in the structuring of our country's government which is more in character with my thinking and my dedication.

E: You mentioned that you all wanted "Cap" Weinberger. Why wasn't he the finance director, then?

D: For Ronald Reagan?

E: Yes, at the beginning.

D: Honestly, I've forgotten.

E: The first finance director was Gordon Paul Smith.

D: Was who?

E: Gordon Paul Smith.

D: Honestly, I've forgotten.

E: Okay. When Reagan actually became governor, do you recall any particular times when you felt like you gave him advice that was useful?

D: Not particularly. I can't recall the "nitty-gritty" of various conversations, but in a way, as far as I was concerned, he could as governor almost do no wrong. He and I were so closely philosophi-

Dear Jus - You can see how happy I am with Public Housing. I'm really happy to see you and always will be. Love to Pinky + To you - Ron

The "kitchen cabinet" meeting with President Reagan.
(l-r) Michael Deaver, Justin Dart, Ronald Reagan, Holmes Tuttle

cally oriented that I didn't feel in the state government he needed a hell of a lot of advice from me. He got a lot of it from Holmes.

E: Did you have the kind of access that Tuttle or Salvatori or some of the others had?

D: Access?

E: Yes.

D: Yes. Oh, yes. I could get Ronald Reagan on the telephone anytime of the day or night. He knew I would be back of him all the way, but I wasn't as "nitty-gritty" identified.

E: Was it broad philosophical agreement that really put you in Reagan's camp, or were there some specific issues like the unrest on the University of California campus, or the Watts riots, or taxes, or anything that specifically motivated you?

D: Those were all incidental as far as I was concerned. All I gave a damn about was that he was philosophically oriented in the right direction, doing as near as he knew how the right thing for the most people in California all the time. Look, for instance, [at these issues]: abortion, NAACP [National Association for the Advancement of Colored People], Equal Rights, and all those. Those are all, forgive me, trivial issues as far as I'm concerned. There are two basic issues that are overriding as far as I'm concerned: that is our economic health, economic leadership or economic dominance; and our military defense ability. All the rest of the issues are minor issues, as far as I'm concerned. If we're strong financially, economically, we're going to enjoy the respect of all the countries in the world. When we get weak industrially, economically, we lose a big hunk of that respect. When we get weak militarily, we get our nose tweaked by a bunch of little countries. But those are the main issues. The minor issues, like the Watts riots, they come and go. When I was a kid in Chicago, we had riots on the south side of Chicago. That didn't bother me. They go away. I don't mean that I wasn't concerned about riots in Watts. They were symptoms of some disturbance in the society, but they were minor as far as I'm concerned.

E: I would like your reflections on a couple of people. For one, Robert Finch.

D: I always liked Bob Finch. I think he's better off out of government.

E: For any particular reason?

D: Well, I never thought that Bob had the moxie or the leadership. A nice guy and I was always devoted to him, but he didn't have the qualities that Ronald Reagan does.

E: Jesse Unruh?

D: Who?

E: Jesse Unruh.

D: Well, I don't want to talk about Jesse Unruh.

E: All right. William French Smith.

D: Top grade guy; first class. Totally dedicated to the services of his country and to Ronald Reagan.

E: Were you acquainted with Phil Battaglia or Tom Reed or any of the kind of "nuts and bolts" people in the governor's office?

D: Not well enough that I want to talk about it.

E: Okay. One more question about task forces. Did you serve on task forces that the governor put together?

D: I didn't serve on any. I helped put them together. I helped recruit people for the task forces and they were wonderful. They just did a hell of a job.

E: Is there anything that you want to add. Any last reflections on Ronald Reagan himself?

D: I just think that we've got a commonsense guy, a great communicator, a fellow totally dedicated at this point in his life to what's good for America. In a democracy, you never please everybody. You can't please everybody, because there are going to be sacrifices made to resuscitate the economic and military vitality of this country. We are all going to have to make some sacrifices, and those sacrifices are not pleasant. I think we're just as lucky as we can be to have him as president of our country. I have absolute confidence in him. That doesn't mean I'm going to agree with him on every little detail of what he does, but at the bottom line I'm for Ronald Reagan all the way.

E: Specific reflections on him as governor, any that would add to what you've already said?

D: I don't think so.

E: Okay. Well, thank you very much.

D: You bet.

END OF INTERVIEW

California Government History Documentation Project

Ronald Reagan Era

EDWARD MILLS

An Interview Conducted By

Lawrence B. de Graaf

OH 1677

Oral History Program

California State University, Fullerton

EDWARD MILLS

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This interview with Ed Mills (M) was conducted by Dr. Lawrence B. de Graaf (D), director of California State University, Fullerton Oral History Program, for the California Government History Documentation Project. The interview took place in the Oral History Archives room at California State University, Fullerton on June 23 and July 8, 1981.

D: Mr. Mills, we always like to begin these interviews with a little biographical background. Do you want to give us an idea of where you were born, brought up, and so forth?

M: I was born in Holland, Michigan and lived there until I was twelve years old. Then my parents moved to California in 1918. We returned to Michigan in February of 1919, being homesick, and then returned to California in the fall of 1919. I've lived here ever since.

D: When you say you came to California, was that to the Los Angeles area?

M: Yes. The Los Angeles area.

D: What sort of occupation did your parents have?

M: My father was apprenticed when he was a young lad to a baker in the Netherlands. [He] came to this country with his parents and had no education in this country. His education was in the Netherlands. My mother was born in Amsterdam and came to this country with her parents. She did attend the public schools in the United States, in New York. Then she moved with her family to Grand Rapids, Michigan, where my father was also residing, and they met there and were married. After they were married a short time, they later moved to Holland, Michigan. My father, after working in a private bakery there for a restaurant, opened his own bakery. My mother and father had eight children, six boys and two girls. We all had our chores around the bakery. We were a happy family. In 1918, during World War I, there were wheat shortages, sugar shortages, and restrictions were placed on bakeries. It was a very difficult time. My dad finally decided with my mother to move to California [and] close the bakery on account of wheatless days and some of the problems. He couldn't raise prices. Wheat was guaranteed at $2.50 a bushel by the federal government, and it was very difficult to get an increase in the selling price of the products. My mother's parents--my mother's mother; her father had already passed on--but my mother's mother and some of her brothers and sisters had moved to California in the early 1900s. They would constantly be sending us postcards with oranges and the snow and all those appealing things about California. When business got very difficult in Michigan, my dad decided it was time for us to go to California, too.

D: Did he intend to also go into the bakery business when he got to California?

M: No, he worked in some jobs around bakeries for awhile. Then he leased a rooming house with rentals. He ran that, and that went fairly well. Then he leased a larger one and finally bought it and was in the apartment house business. He never returned to the bakery business. However, I became involved in the bakery business.

D: I was going to say that you eventually got into that. Do you trace that at all to your childhood experience?

M: Oh, yes. We had chores around the bakery so it was sort of natural to look for a job around a bakery. During the summer of 1922, I applied for a summer job at Van de Kamp's bakery and was hired. It was the beginning of a long career at Van de Kamp's. I worked there part time for about six years from the tenth grade through high school and then part time [while going] through the University of Southern California. I didn't work there continuously part time. I had some other jobs, but I had a connection with Van de Kamp's all through college and the last two years of high school. While I didn't go to school with the intention of going to work for Van de Kamp's, it worked out that way. I spent thirty-four years part time and full time, twenty-eight years working full time with them.

D: Were you a business administration major at USC?

M: Yes, a business administration major in the school of business. Out of the eight children in our family--my dad and my mother had eight children as I mentioned--seven of us attended USC, and six of us graduated from USC. My older sister was in the school of music, but she didn't graduate. We had quite a career for the family at the University of Southern California.

D: It certainly sounds like it. Was there anything in particular which attracted you to USC?

M: That was rather a strange thing. My oldest brother, Wilbur, who was known as "Buck," was in the Marines in 1917 and 1918 during World War I. He came out about the summer of 1919. In that interim we had been to California for the first time and, of course, without my brother Buck, who was then overseas with the Marines. While we were out here my mother obtained a folder about the University of Southern California, because she was always interested and encouraging the children to go on and get a higher education. So many of the youngsters in our hometown in Holland, Michigan didn't go on to school. Many of them didn't even finish high school. But my mother was always encouraging us to get a college education. So she had this book about the University of Southern California. When we came

out here my oldest brother went to work for about a year, working in a bakery, and then started at the University of Southern California.

D: The rest of you just followed in his footsteps.

M: The rest of the family sort of followed on with a lot of loyalty, and you know how those things go. Five of us were in the same fraternity.

D: Which one was that?

M: Sigma Nu.

D: Back to your experience at Van de Kamp's. What were your various positions there?

M: When I started out part time I was in the packing department in the plant, and then I worked in one of the stores as a stock boy. As the years went by I was given assignments, sometimes counting pedestrians passing a certain point where we were looking at a location. That is, the company was looking for a location. It was a research type of thing where I was at the end where they wanted statistics. Many times they would call on me to help at some store if I was available on a Saturday or a Saturday night or something of that nature. This worked into various jobs in the company, mostly in the sales end of the business. When I graduated from the university, the sales manager said that I should be talking to the president of the company, Lawrence L. Frank, and that there was a real future for me at Van de Kamp's. So I had a conversation with the president, Lawrence Frank, and one of his more serious questions was, "What can you do?" (laughter) Of course, I'd been there several years and knew the bakery business, and I told him my practical experience was working. I'd always worked. I'd even worked in my father's bakery. I felt I could make a contribution to the company based on the background I had with the business, and based on the information and knowledge I had obtained in taking the various courses at the University of Southern California. He, by the way, was not a college graduate, but spoke in an envious way that he wished he had. But he was a great man. When I got out of the university, I was first employed in the sales department. We would arrange store openings, supply the stores with the various things needed in the way of equipment, arrange for the layouts in the stores, and things of that nature. Mr. Theodore Van de Kamp, who was one of the cofounders of the business, called me up to his office one day. His assistant had passed away suddenly, and he offered me the position. I was a bit reluctant in taking it, because I liked the sales end of the business, and many of the jobs that were related to this position weren't those that I looked upon too favorably. But I accepted the position, and we got rid of some of the more onerous things that had become

attached to that position. I went on to become the assistant secretary of the corporation, then the secretary, then the vice president, and ultimately the president of the company.

D: When did you graduate from USC?

M: In 1928.

D: And you become president of Van de Kamp's when?

M: In 1956.

D: Wasn't it about that time that the company was bought up by another concern?

M: Yes. General Baking Company bought Van de Kamp's in 1956.

D: Did you stay with General Baking?

M: No, I left the company when it was acquired by General Baking Company. It was a mutually agreeable situation. The negotiations for the sale of the business had gone on for a number of months. Of course, I was aware of all of this and discussed it with the chairman of the board, my predecessor, Lawrence Frank. We discussed my situation relative to whether I would want to become associated with General Baking. Van de Kamp's was an unusual business. It had grown from a potato chip store in 1915 to at that time probably $25 million in annual sales, and it was a high quality type of business. Some of the information I had obtained about General Baking indicated to me that they would have a different philosophy relating to the operation of the company. Van de Kamp's had no unions. They were unionized in all but one plant throughout the United States. They had about fifty-four plants, I think, in the country.

D: "They" being General Baking.

M: General Baking, yes. So I advised them early in the negotiations that I would cooperate in the sale of my stock, that there would be a very harmonious situation, but that they should make their arrangements for a new president, which they did.

D: Now, during all of this business career at Van de Kamp's, were you in any way active in politics?

M: Yes. In 1935 the state legislature in California enacted a chain store tax. It was a geometric progression type of tax: one dollar for the first store, [and then] two, four, eight, sixteen, thirty-two, up to nine stores, after which it was $500 per store. This legislation was signed by Governor [Frank B.] Merriam and became

law. There was a general trend in the United States for chain store taxes. They weren't really aimed at a company like Van de Kamp's, but we fell in the purview of the law and were subject to its tax. In principle, if they could do a one, two, four, and so forth geometric progression, they could do that at a different rate. In the bakery business, it wouldn't be possible to pay taxes on a geometric progression basis. You couldn't stay in business. We were manufacturing all of our products and distributed them through our own stores. The aim of the chain store tax and the people who were advocating it was generally against grocery stores and drugstores and others, who were merchandising items with the same labels and selling them at a lower price. In the depression years everyone was looking for the answer to why business wasn't good and why they weren't making a profit. Chain store taxes became effective then in many states. Because of the law in California, we started a referendum petition which we qualified for the ballot. We formed the California Chain Store Association, including Sears and Roebuck, Woolworth, Kresge, Montgomery Ward, J. C. Penney, See's Candy Shops, Van de Kamp's, and others as members.

D: You didn't happen to meet a Mr. Justin Dart of Walgreen Drugs at this time, did you?

M: No, not at that time. (laughter) The Chain Store Association was a successful operation. Getting the referendum qualified for the ballot meant that we were able to forestall the tax, and it was then subject to the vote of the people. In the general ballot in November--I think it was 1936--the chain store tax was defeated in fifty-seven out of fifty-eight counties. We had a good public relations firm and good organization, and we won in all counties but San Francisco. It was a real achievement. I was very active in the campaign.

D: I was going to ask what exactly was your role in this whole thing.

M: Well, it wasn't money raising in those days, because the money in that case came from the chain stores themselves. They assessed themselves for a public relations program which was tax deductible. The political end of it was a nondeductible item, but they didn't go out on a general campaign to raise money. It was handled from within the association of the stores themselves. The public relations factor was really the big problem. I was involved in working with the people in the advertising agency in getting the message [across] of what our situation was all about so that the public could be informed and they could see that if they voted for the chain store tax, they were going to damage See's and Van de Kamp's and that they weren't only going to hurt the cut-rate drug and cut-rate grocery stores. Of course, we had an advantage over some of the cut-raters in that we had an appeal and we had good public rela-

tions. As the vote came out, we won. It was a good experience. It showed that you could defeat legislation enacted by a legislature and signed by a governor. Theodore Van de Kamp had gone to Sacramento to talk to Governor Merriam to attempt to get him to veto the legislation that was enacted by the legislature. But it was passed with such a majority that Governor Merriam didn't see how he could veto it. He said, "Maybe I am doing you a favor. You do have the referendum law, and you can refer it to the public." Well, that ended the chain store tax problem in California when we finally got the public to vote with the chain stores.

D: Were there any people that you worked with on that particular referendum whom you would work with later on in the fund raising?

M: I can't recall anyone.

D: Did that sort of whet your appetite? Did you find political work appealing to you?

M: Yes, and I was president of the ninth grade (laughter) graduating class at Central Junior High in Los Angeles. I was elected to the board of finance at Polytechnic High when I was in the eleventh grade, and I was president of the board of finance of Polytechnic High when I was a senior. Those were campaigns. Then, at the University of Southern California I was junior class president. I was president of Trojan Knights. I was involved in a campaign to get Bob Behlow elected president of the student body and other campaigns. I just seemed to enjoy getting into campaigns and getting interested in activities.

D: Were you always in the Republican party?

M: Yes, I registered as a Republican when I became twenty-one. My dad and mother were Democrats, but it never made for any problems at home. My dad and mother were rather dedicated Democrats, and my mother used to tell about my dad when [William Jennings] Bryan was defeated, that he had tears in his eyes. It really affected him. They were very strong for Woodrow Wilson during his period of office. Even though my dad passed away in 1939, my mother continued to vote the Democratic ticket. She did, however, vote for Ronald Reagan for governor.

D: Oh?

M: Because he had been a Democrat. (laughter) I voted for Herbert Hoover, and I have voted in all the presidential campaigns. I've always voted for the Republican ticket.

D: When did you first get into any organizational work for the Republican party?

M: The first work for the Republican party was the United Republican Finance Committee of Los Angeles County. In those days the [Republican] County Central Committee in Los Angeles set up the United Republican Finance Committee to raise the funds for the campaigns and for the operations of the county committee.

D: And when was this?

M: I would say it was in the early forties. I was active in a lot of the campaigns in the United Republican Finance Committee and in dinners, selling tickets and tables particularly, and getting support to raise money for the party. My first campaign as a finance chairman, I think, was in the latter part of the forties. I'm not certain about the time, but we had a man by the name of Frank G. Bonelli, who was the member of the [California State] Board of Equalization from the Los Angeles district. As the member of the Board of Equalization he controlled the liquor licenses, and he had a rather unsavory reputation. He'd come up in a rather unusual way. He'd been a professor at Occidental College. He'd been a councilman in the city of Los Angeles, and he became a member of the board of supervisors in Los Angeles County. Then he was elected to the Board of Equalization. A fellow by the name of Bob McDavid wanted to run against him. Bob was introduced to me, and he asked me if I would be on his finance committee. I said, "Sure, Bob." About a week later he came to me and said, "Ed, I can't get anybody to be finance chairman. They're all afraid of Bonelli." I said, "Why are they afraid of Bonelli?" I knew, of course. (laughter) He said, "Well, if they have liquor licenses they're afraid of having problems. They realize also that the Board of Equalization can be auditing their sales tax situations, and while they may not have any problems there, they just don't want to encourage any activity." I was with the Van de Kamp Company at the time, and I said, "Well, we pay our sales taxes. We have practically none in the bakery business, anyway, and we don't have any liquor licenses, so I'll be your chairman." Bonelli was getting a lot of publicity which was not favorable in the *Los Angeles Times* because he'd written a derogatory book called *The Billion Dollar Blackjack*. We didn't raise a lot of money. It was difficult to raise money, but we did defeat Bonelli, and then he was indicted. He first moved to Arizona, and then to Mexico. He was never tried.

D: What was he indicted for?

M: I believe he was indicted in relation to the sale of liquor licenses. But, anyway, he never stood trial. He never returned to the United States until he passed away. He was buried in this country.

D: So that was your initial foray as a finance chairman. At this time I think something that anybody who uses this archive should get clear in their mind is what exactly one puts into being a finance chairman and what one gets out of being a finance chairman. When you worked with the United Republican Finance Committee, was your role a paid role?

M: No. Always as a volunteer. I've never been a paid worker in any campaign.

D: Not even the Reagan campaigns?

M: No.

D: All right then, that only underscores the question. What is the motivation for doing this?

M: Well, we have three daughters, and we like to have the future generations have the opportunities that we've had, that I've had particularly. You recognize the power of government over business or over the people, depending upon the kind of people that are elected to these offices. We have a great country, and we have freedom, and things are not going to be that way unless people support the principles on which the government is established. I think our form of government does require accepting responsibility on the part of the individual to do the things that are necessary to do if you believe in a certain philosophy, and there is more than one philosophy available. You have to support your philosophy and then depend on what the voters do. I think that in a great many campaigns I've been on the losing side, but you always accept that and go on to fight for your philosophy in the next battle. I think that's the American way. When Roosevelt became president, I thought for awhile that it was going to be the right thing for the country, but not very long after he was in office it went in another direction from my viewpoint and my philosophy. If one would read over the platform of the Democratic party in 1932, when Roosevelt was elected, and then see what was actually enacted in the way of legislation and accomplishments of the administration, [one would see that] they were quite different. I recall being at Van de Kamp's, and a man came into my office. I was handling locations leases at the time as an assistant to Mr. Van de Kamp. This was around 1933. This man told me he was a veteran of World War I. He was a disability case and he'd been receiving benefits but the benefits were being cut and he was going to have to go to work. He was capable of working. He said he was a keymaker. We had a store in Ocean Park, and he lived in Ocean Park and he wondered whether we could fix up a portion of the store at the rear, which was on a side street, so that he could open up a key shop. He said he might only be able to pay ten

dollars or twenty dollars a month rent, but as time went on he might be able to build it up. In the Depression, business was very bad and we were looking for opportunities to improve our business. He was an appealing individual, and we did make it possible for him to open a key shop. I saw him many times after that, and he was a very successful small businessman there. It was the cut in his pension that caused him to have to go to work, but he was capable of working, and now he was producing. He was happy. I never lost track of that or lost sight of that. It always seemed to be important to me to give people an opportunity to solve their problems and to try to make them successful based on their own efforts.

D: Does that anecdote pretty much summarize your political philosophy?

M: Well, it's hard to summarize (laughter) all of it, but I was discouraged with the way the budgets were increasing year after year. When I was in the University of Southern California, I took a course in public finance from a Dr. Marston. Some of the figures I still remember quite well. The total budget of the United States was under $4 billion. That included the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, all of the various departments, Congress, and it included a fund to pay off not only the interest but a portion of the principal of the debt from World War I, which had reached a maximum of $26 billion and had been reduced to $18 billion when Herbert Hoover was inaugurated. In the first two years of Hoover the debt was reduced a billion dollars a year. Then it was $16 billion when the Depression started, and the last two years of Hoover it went up a billion a year, so that it was $18 [billion] when he went out of office. From that point on the debt took off, and even in a severe period of deflation the debt was increasing considerably. It was a different philosophy. It was a welfare approach, and there were great problems in the country. Many people feel that Roosevelt saved us from revolution, but I think we would have solved our problems in another way. I don't think we would have had all the welfare we have today. I realize that our country has come from an agricultural beginning to being a highly industrialized nation, which creates problems. There was a day when people could go back on the farm or go back with the family and be supported, and today that's not possible. We need many programs, of course, and, personally, I've worked in many organizations to help people, such as the old Community Chest and United Way. I believe in self-help, not that I oppose welfare completely, but I think many of the things that are needed can be done by voluntary efforts.

D: One more question in general and then we'll get back to your career. You've mentioned the voluntary nature of fund raising and your own philosophy, but now there's something else and that is the technique of fund raising. What do you think it takes to be successful at

political fund raising. How did you particularly acquire the reputation that others have said you have as a political fund raiser?

M: Well, I think it's experience and desire and dedication. When I was twelve years old I joined the Boy Scouts back in Holland, Michigan during World War I. The Boy Scouts were asked to sell war stamps and also to sell liberty bonds and to make approaches to try to buy black walnut trees to be used for propellers. (laughter) Well, I really made a campaign out of selling war stamps. It led to many things. I was ringing doorbells during lunch hours, calling on homes. It was necessary to get a card signed for the amount of stamps that the home would want, and the post office would then deliver them and collect the money. Then these cards would be sent to the national office of the Boy Scouts, and we could be awarded a medal. First you had to sell $250 worth of stamps at twenty-five cents a stamp to get a bronze medal from the Treasury Department of the United States. Then for every $100 more that you sold you would get a bronze palm, you know, like how the pilots became aces and so forth. Well, I sold about $7,000 worth of stamps, which to me was a horrendous amount of money. As I look back, that was very small, but one of the businessmen in town took me down to his office. He was a manufacturer, and people were buying stamps there, and he wanted me to have the orders. He had a baseball team which he sponsored in the town, and he'd take me in his car out to the ball park. He wanted me to put up the scores after each inning. I don't know, he evidently took a liking to me. He was a grand fellow. But it opened a lot of doors. I loved selling. I was always able to sell more tickets in a school class if we had a play. Then I was on the board of finance. You have to like that type of thing. There aren't too many people who really like to raise money. Experience is a big factor. Holmes Tuttle and I put on a $1,000 a plate dinner in the Goldwater campaign. It hadn't been done before to our knowledge, and we sold over 400 seats. So we took in over $400,000 at that one dinner at the Coconut Grove. It was a great success. It's kind of interesting how these things happen. In 1956, right after I left Van de Kamp's, I had a call from Justin Dart. It was the first time I had met him personally. He'd read about my leaving the Van de Kamp Company, and he wanted to know if I'd give him a hand with the Eisenhower second campaign. He was the finance chairman for Los Angeles County and also for the state of California for the Eisenhower campaign. He wanted to hire me. I said, "No, Jus. If I do it, I want to do it on the same basis you do. Not that there's anything wrong with being a professional fund raiser, but I'll be a volunteer." Well, he appreciated that. So I went over to his office. I was still on retainer for a year with Van de Kamp's, you see, but I went over there and worked in his office. He was the first one who started to raise, I would say, big money in California. "Jus" is a great salesman. He had a program. He had a list of people

Edward Mills continued his lifelong interest in scouting becoming a regional president of the Boy Scouts in 1957

that he wanted to contact, and he'd done some research on their financial capabilities. His pitch was something to the effect that here's a man, President Eisenhower, who has given one life for his country in the military, was willing to accept the responsibility for the Republican nomination in 1952, and was elected. Then he'd had serious illnesses, and it was a question of whether he was going to run for a second term. His doctors had cleared him, and he'd decided he'd be willing to take a second term if he could get elected. So "Jus" would say, "How can we deny this man the kind of support he needs when he's willing to take on this responsibility? Because it is a great sacrifice." Of course, I was sympathetic with Eisenhower's philosophy and we went calling to many places. "Jus" made most of the pitches, but I knew some of the people he didn't know. But he would ask for $5,000. In many cases he got it.

D: You say that was sort of unprecedented in your earlier fund raising? You hadn't approached people for that much money?

M: That's right! That's how he got started with Holmes Tuttle. He went to see Holmes Tuttle before I was working with him, and he asked Holmes Tuttle for $5,000. Holmes's response that he still repeats once in awhile was, "I told him that was more than I used to think I'd ever be worth." But he gave it. Then, of course, "Jus" would enlist you to raise money from other people to help him raise the money he was trying to raise to win in California. That was a great experience, working with Justin Dart. We're still friends. We haven't always been on the same side, but that's politics.

D: All right. What exactly was the name of your organization in 1956 that you and Justin Dart worked in? Was it statewide or a Los Angeles organization?

M: It was a statewide organization. It was the committee to reelect Eisenhower. I don't remember the official name. I think it was Eisenhower and Nixon.

D: Now, had you been in any Republican party organizations up to that time?

M: I was never, prior to that time, in any official organization. I had never run for the central committee or had never run for office. Other than finance work through the United Republican Finance Committee or on campaign committees as a volunteer, I didn't occupy any office up to that time.

D: Wasn't it some time after that that you became treasurer for the Republican party in Los Angeles?

M: No, that was after the election of Ronald Reagan as governor. I became treasurer of the Republican State Central Committee.

D: Oh, it was after that. What other fund raising did you do in the fifties. Were you in either the 1958 U. S. Senate campaign or Nixon's presidential campaign in 1960?

M: In 1958 I became involved in the right-to-work campaign, a very interesting campaign. It was a watershed election because it practically ran the Republican party out of California. It still has its effects, particularly in the legislature, in California. I mentioned that my philosophy relative to labor relations is that I believe in the right to work. I don't think that anyone should be compelled to join a labor organization. I think he should have the right to join. I think the freedom goes both ways. It's a competitive thing, and labor doesn't believe in that because it restricts their power. In 1956 a fairly substantial group of business people met at the Biltmore Hotel in Los Angeles prior to the decision on the part of Eisenhower that he would be a candidate for a second term. The decision was made to start an initiative campaign for the right to work in California. This was in 1956. Charlie Jones who was then the president of Richfield was a part of the group. A few weeks after the effort had started for the campaign for the initiative there was another meeting called. Charlie Jones reported at the meeting that he had been to Washington and he'd talked to President Eisenhower about the right-to-work campaign in California in 1956. He said that Eisenhower would appreciate it if the issue was not on the ballot in 1956. The people at the meeting agreed that if that's what President Eisenhower wanted, they would drop the matter at that time and bring it up at a later date. So that was done. After Eisenhower was reelected, the group met again and in 1957 started an initiative for the right-to-work issue, which became Proposition 18 on the ballot in 1958.

D: Was there any one person who was sort of the head of this initiative effort?

M: No, I wouldn't say it was any one person. There were a great many. Some of the people who were later in the Goldwater campaign and in the Reagan campaign were involved.

D: Such as whom?

M: [A. C.] "Cy" Rubel, Holmes Tuttle . . . Justin Dart was a contributor. I don't think he was in the actual organization, but he was sympathetic. There was a substantial number of major business people in the community that were for the right to work and were willing to back it.

Edward Mills checking a GOP fund raiser agenda
with Ronald Reagan and Rhonda Fleming, 1961

D: Did you have a particular role in this initiative effort?

M: Yes. Money raising. (laughter) And also to get the petition circulated. I was involved in that and also in the campaign. This was started as an issue. It was not attempted with the initial support of any candidate or political party. It was an issue, but it didn't stay that way. Bill Knowland, who was then a senator from California, came out in support of the issue and decided to run for governor. Goodwin Knight was the governor of California and came out against it. A primary had to be fought, (laughter) perhaps, but it wasn't. Knight withdrew from the race and decided to run for the U.S. Senate. The public looked on this as musical chairs, and it became involved with the [right-to-work] issue. The issue probably couldn't have been won, anyway. The unions had five dollars for every dollar the business people could raise, because they concentrated their efforts all over the United States to raise money. California was the key industrial state, and they recognized the merits of winning in California.

D: You were actually that badly outspent in that campaign?

M: Yes. Yes. The fact that Knight and Knowland got into the political fight didn't help. As a result of that, Attorney General [Edmund G. "Pat"] Brown became governor. From that time on the Republicans have been at a great disadvantage in this state because of the reapportionments that have occurred and, of course, the increased Democratic registration resulting from the industrialization of the state and the vast growth in population. It made a big difference. California had been a Republican state for a long time, but that was the changing of the guard.

D: All right. On to 1960. Did you play a role in the 1960 election in fund raising or any other way?

M: In 1960, Nixon was the logical candidate and seemed the assured winner. I did some fund raising in the United Republican Finance Committee, but I was not active in the Nixon campaign itself. But the county central committee, this being his home area, was involved. We did raise money, but it was also being raised, at that time mostly for the local candidates, for Congress and for the [California State] Assembly and Senate.

D: Now, about this time or sometime before, you entered a friendship that I'd like you to comment on. You became acquainted with Holmes Tuttle. How and when did you first meet him?

M: I first met Holmes Tuttle in the right-to-work campaign, as I recall, although I'd seen him around. I went to work at Community Bank in January of 1959. He was on the board there then, but we were

involved . . . Well, I first met him, I believe, in the 1956 campaign to reelect Eisenhower. I believe that was the first time I met Holmes. That's how I knew him to talk to him about the right-to-work campaign. He helped push it with automobile dealers. He headed up that end of the campaign. I believe that's the first time [in 1956] I met Holmes.

D: And when did you become associated with him in business?

M: Well, in 1959, as I mentioned, I went to work as vice president and became a director at Community Bank. The Community Bank principals were Charles Cook and Howard Cook, brothers. They were in the automobile business and Challenge Cook Brothers Cement Mixers as well as the bank. Holmes Tuttle and I were then both on the board. We still are. I continued with the bank full time until 1967, I believe, and Holmes Tuttle was in the Cook organization. The Cooks were partners of his in his automobile agencies, and he'd worked for the Cooks at City Ford. Holmes came from Oklahoma in the early twenties and went to work in a parts department at a downtown Ford store. After he'd been there a short time, the manager told him there was an opening at City Ford for a parts manager. Holmes was a bit afraid of taking on that kind of a responsibility, but the man told him, "You can do it, Holmes, and call me if you need help." Holmes went over there and that began a long and still continuing relationship with the Cooks. Howard Cook has since passed on. But as a result of that, you see, there's a relationship between the Cooks and the Tuttles. When I went over there in 1967, Holmes and I had already been active in the preliminary campaign for Ronald Reagan. That started early in 1965. I don't remember just the dates, but the exploratory campaign--that's what we termed it--for Reagan was started in 1965.

D: We'll get back to that. It was in 1967 that you went to work for Holmes Tuttle Enterprises?

M: Yes. I was the vice president there, working with Holmes in public relations. We had four automobile agencies, and finance companies, so I was working with him. I still had a connection with the bank; however, and I still had one connection I haven't mentioned, GI Trucking Company. I have an interest there and am a vice president of GI Trucking. It doesn't relate to the Cook Brothers or to Tuttle. It's an interest I acquired in 1947. GI Trucking was started by veterans right after World War II. We had pickets at Van de Kamp's in 1947-1948 for about seventeen months, which, perhaps, encouraged my attitude on right to work. They didn't have our employees signed up, but the effort was to block the receipt of raw materials to shut us off so that we would have to sign contracts to compel our employees to join the unions. There were five different unions involved. We were successful. They picketed, I think,

for seventeen months, but we were able to get our supplies. The GI Trucking Company started in 1946, and they were an important factor in our being able to maintain our line of supply. We were always able to make our deliveries of our finished products because our own drivers were delivering those. Our problem was supply of raw materials. Anyway, that began a long and very pleasant relationship with GI Trucking which I still enjoy.

D: Well, back to your campaign work. What about the election of 1962 when Nixon ran for governor. Were you at all involved in that?

M: I didn't get involved in the primary which was between Shell and Nixon. I was in the URFC activities to raise money for the general elections, and URFC was neutral in the primary. After the primary was over, I did some fund raising for Nixon. I went to see Joe Shell to get his cooperation. It was difficult for him, having lost the campaign, but he did supply lists and so forth for solicitation. It was a disastrous campaign. Nixon lost and practically kissed off politics forever, as you recall the history of it. It was a rather sad period for the whole Republican effort, really. The Democrats increased their position in the state, both in the Congress and in the state legislature. That really has caused great problems for the Republicans relative to redistricting after the census years.

D: Now we come to 1964 and the [Barry] Goldwater, Sr. campaign [for President]. You were active in that, weren't you?

M: Yes.

D: In what capacity?

M: I was on the finance committee.

D: Of the state central committee?

M: No, it was a separate campaign.

D: Just for Goldwater?

M: It was the Goldwater Campaign Committee. I was active in the primary in a minor way. It was an interesting campaign. The primary was fought in California between [Nelson] Rockefeller and Goldwater. California was a vital state. It so happens that Justin Dart and Leonard Firestone were the key people behind Rockefeller in that campaign. They didn't have any money raising job, really. Rockefeller brought his own checkbook (laughter) and was capable of paying his bills. He spent a lot of money in California, and it was a close campaign. But Goldwater won it and then went on, of

course, to be nominated at the convention. After the convention was over it was a rather difficult situation, because Rockefeller did not unite behind Goldwater. There was no coming together of the candidates, including [George] Romney, [William] Scranton and Rockefeller. So Goldwater was pretty much on his own, and he didn't really have the support that was necessary to unify the party. There was more money raised in that Goldwater campaign than had ever been raised before to win an election. It wasn't for lack of money. In fact, there was a surplus, which was given to the National Republican Party after Goldwater lost the campaign.

D: Now, was this large amount of money raised due to a change in money raising tactics or enthusiasm of those with money for Goldwater or what?

M: There were many things that helped it. There was an enthusiasm for Goldwater's philosophy because of the number of years in which many people, in business and the professions particularly, had experienced the results of Democratic leadership in the country. People wanted a change. There was a lot of grass roots support for Goldwater. It wasn't just big money support by any manner or means. Goldwater had a lot of appeal, and the things he said had a lot of appeal to a lot of people. But not the majority certainly. He was defeated. He was badly defeated, and in California the cochairmen for Goldwater were Ronald Reagan and a fellow by the name of Phil Davis. This was what really put Ronald Reagan on the map, I would say, as being a potential candidate.

D: Had you met Mr. Reagan before this campaign?

M: Yes, I went with a group of people, including Holmes Tuttle, to see Ronald Reagan at his home to see if we could get him to run for the U.S. Senate back in around 1962. (laughter) He didn't give us an immediate answer, yes or no, but he said he'd like to have a week to think about it and [asked] if we'd come back. He made an appointment for us to return. We went back as a group, and he told us he didn't think he could make the financial sacrifice that would be necessary based on his family obligations and on his own financial situation and the salary that would be available as a U.S. Senator should he be successful. So he declined.

D: This would have been as an alternative to Thomas Kuchel?

M: Yes.

D: Were you one of that group that went to see him in 1962?

M: Went to see Reagan?

D: Yes.

M: Yes.

D: Who else was in that group?

M: Holmes Tuttle and, I believe, Tex Talbert was with us, and I can't think of the lady's name, but she was an activist in the Republican party over in the Larchmont area. I didn't initiate it. She was pretty much the initiator, I would say. But I went. I was sympathetic. We didn't get a yes, and it probably was a good thing as matters finally worked out. Sometimes if you are unsuccessful in a campaign, that may be the last one, you know. (laughter) Politicians have a way of losing out and never coming back, and you wonder what happened to them. We haven't talked much about "Cy" Rubel, but "Cy" Rubel had been president of Union Oil. He was involved in the right-to-work campaign. So was Harold Quinton, who was president of Southern California Edison Company. We had surveys that were made that were really well done, I would say. They showed that the right-to-work issue could be won in California in 1957 by about the amount [of votes] by which it was ultimately defeated. But it's like going out and watching a bunch of boys play ball on a sandlot. You ask an outfielder what the score is, and he says, "It's seventeen to nothing, but we ain't been up to bat yet." (laughter) The first survey made by a research organization showed that the right-to-work issue would win in California. It was a question of voluntary unionism, the right to work. The question was asked in different ways, and the survey showed that the public supported the issue. But by the time the campaign was well underway, with the amount of money that was being spent and with the unions playing up the position that it would hurt jobs, damage California, and ruin California business, things changed. They made a good pitch. They ran a good campaign and they won.

(Break in interviewing)

D: All right, we've taken you through what you were just telling me off tape were several lost causes: the right-to-work campaign, the Nixon campaigns, and the Goldwater campaign. We now have you down to either late 1964 or early 1965. When was it that this informal group that called itself the Friends of Ronald Reagan first came together?

M: That came into being in 1965.

D: Who exactly was in this little group?

M: Holmes Tuttle was the key man, [also] Henry Salvatori, "Cy" Rubel, and myself. There were four of us who initiated the Friends of Ronald Reagan. There had been discussions after, or even during the Goldwater campaign about the wonderful job that Ronald Reagan was doing. There was a recognition, certainly, that the Goldwater campaign wasn't going to win. The polls indicated that, but the effort was made. Holmes was the one who actually talked to Ronald Reagan about running for governor.

D: When you say what a wonderful job Reagan was doing in the 1964 campaign, in what way was it wonderful? What impressed you most about his work then?

M: Well, he had the ability to talk, to communicate, I should say, and to explain economics. He had the ability to interest people in the total situation that existed in the country. He made a speech that was taped and run all over the country in connection with fund raising for the Goldwater campaign. It raised several million dollars. I don't know the net amount, but it had a terrific appeal. It was a grass roots type of a response. Lots of times you hear comments relative to Ronald Reagan and "The Speech" as though he has only one. His speeches aren't all the same by any means. If one wants to make a collection of them and read them, there are great differences. That particular speech was an important one from the standpoint of fund raising for the Goldwater campaign and was a big help in creating the kind of surplus that existed. The Goldwater campaign never lacked for funds, but it lacked for what you might say would be an understanding on the part of the voting public as to his merits for the job. He lost badly by over twenty million votes.

D: Now, the Friends of Ronald Reagan was formed early in 1965, wasn't it?

M: Yes.

D: And when they approached Reagan, I understand that about a month or so went by, and then he consented to be a candidate.

M: Yes. We used to hold meetings, the four of us, in "Cy" Rubel's office. "Cy" still retained an office at the Union Oil Company, and it was convenient for us to meet there, and that's where the organization commenced. The decision was made that it had to be an exploratory campaign, because if Ronald Reagan had come out and said, "I'm a candidate," he would have had to resign from his income, which was television, and the stations would have had to take him off the air. It wasn't a campaign that was started with a big rush. It was an exploratory type of campaign, and he was not a committed candidate until January of 1966.

D: So in effect, you're saying that it was the four of you who pretty much undertook the exploration?

M: That was the beginning of the leadership. We hired [Stuart] Spencer-[Bill] Roberts. We entered into a contract with Spencer-Roberts, who had done an outstanding job for Rockefeller (laughter) against Goldwater in the primary in 1964. Bill Roberts was the key man assigned by the firm to the campaign. We began to circulate letters in two principal districts, one in the Pasadena-San Marino congressional district and one in the West Los Angeles-Westwood-Santa Monica area, where there was strong Republican registration. We started the letter campaign, both for getting out information and for raising money. We hoped to raise enough money to keep going from this kind of an effort. I believe we put a limit in the letter, nothing over $100 initially. The money began to come in. We also went out and began a canvass here and there of people we knew would be interested. It was a slow starting type of situation, but it didn't require a heavy amount of money. Spencer-Roberts scheduled Ronald Reagan at a good number of meetings for speeches and for getting acquainted with segments of the Republican party and various groups that they thought would be important in initiating the campaign.

D: Did this Friends of Ronald Reagan group gradually grow in size?

M: Yes. Of course, we needed to get northern California started, and Jacquelin Hume up in northern California had been an active Goldwater worker along with Tom Reed. It's hard to remember all the names. Lee Kaiser had been a candidate for the U. S. Senate. He became active. Taft Schreiber. Taft Schreiber had been an agent for Reagan when Reagan got into the movies. I believe Taft Schreiber's partner was Dr. Jules Stein, who just passed away recently and who was one of the initiators of MCA Universal. Taft Schreiber was also related to MCA [Music Corporation of America], but he was Ronald Reagan's original agent, I believe, when Ronald Reagan got into movies. Let's see, who else? It didn't expand rapidly because of it being an exploratory campaign, but things began to happen in January [1966] when Reagan became a full-fledged candidate.

D: Aside from Tuttle, Dart, and yourself, had you known many of these people prior to this exploratory campaign?

M: Dart wasn't with us at that time.

D: Oh, that's right, he wasn't with you.

M: No. Dart and Firestone, I believe, were for Christopher.

D: For Christopher, that's right.

M: Tom Pike, who's part of the Fluor organization now, was an activist and had been in the cabinet with Eisenhower. Christopher owned a dairy up in San Francisco. He was quite popular up in that area. He'd committed himself to be a candidate quite awhile before Reagan. Brown had almost finished two terms. He was in his second term. A fellow by the name of Arch Monson was the campaign chairman for Christopher. He was a San Francisco man and a Boy Scouter. Anyway, we were acquainted. We all knew one another one way or another. When the primary campaign got started, there was a real effort made to come out of it in such a way that we would have unification so that we could go on to a campaign against "Pat" Brown with a united Republican party. The chairman of the [California Republican] State Central Committee at that time was Gaylord Parkinson. "Parkie" had initiated the "eleventh commandment," which was rather important. He kept himself fairly neutral, I would say, as state chairman during the primary. I think I know who his favorite was, but he kept the situation in such a manner that when the primary was over there was pretty good cooperation among the people who had been on both sides in the Christopher and the Reagan efforts.

D: This is interesting. How did a small group of people like the group that comes to be called the "kitchen cabinet" and the head of the Republican State Central Committee strive to assure unity in the party once the campaign was over?

M: Well, the press picks up everything, and they pick up the adverse or something that's different (laughter) more quickly. It makes more news than the other. The Republican party had had quite a few squabbles and unification seemed to be a story. It was a reverse, and there was quite a bit of publicity relative to the "eleventh commandment." Parkinson was very good at it, I think, and the press seized on it. It was a factor in the campaign, being able to come out unified. We never took a poll in the Reagan campaign from the beginning that didn't show him to be a viable candidate. We took one very early. We considered there were four potential candidates on the Republican ticket. That was [Goodwin] Knight, who was still around; [Thomas] Kuchel, who was the U. S. Senator at the time and a potential gubernatorial candidate; [George] Christopher, an announced candidate; and Reagan, an exploratory candidate. It was rather interesting. The first poll that we had showed that the man who could get the greatest vote for governor at that time, statewide, everyone voting--and I mean both parties and independents--was Kuchel. Christopher was second and Reagan was third. But they all showed in that initial poll that they would defeat Brown, which was rather interesting. We weren't starting out with a losing situation. We never took a poll during the exploratory or during the

primary or the general that didn't show Reagan winning. The poll had its variations, of course, but we never did take a poll that showed he would win by a million votes either. That was a shocker! A pleasant one, I might say, from our standpoint. (laughter)

D: Did each of you in this Friends of Ronald Reagan have a specific function?

M: I was finance chairman for the exploratory campaign and in the primary, and I also had the responsibility for paying the bills. We enlisted the help of Fred Rhodes who was with Lybrand, Ross Brothers, and Montgomery which is now Coopers and Lybrand. Fred had been the treasurer of the Goldwater campaign for the state of California. He was a CPA [Certified Public Accountant], and we enlisted his support, and he became the treasurer for the Reagan campaign. Until his retirement he was treasurer for all the committees that were organized that related to the Reagan campaign. He accounted for the funds, arranged to pay the bills, and made the reports to the secretary of state.

D: What was "Cy" Rubel's role in the Friends?

M: "Cy" Rubel. "Cy" was helping to raise money and [he was] developing strategy and enlisting additional support of people. Holmes was over all, and Henry Salvatori was also raising money and enlisting support of people. We all had some ability to raise money, you know. I was coordinating the effort with the treasurer so that everything was being accounted for and handled, and [I was] attempting to comply with the laws that existed at that time. It wasn't a highly organized, specialized effort on the part of each individual because it was a small group to begin with. We would meet with Spencer-Roberts and meet with the candidate from time to time. As we got more people in the situation, we'd sometimes meet out at Ronald Reagan's home and talk about the issues and how we could win.

D: At this point, I think the average student in years to come is bound to wonder to what extent you feel this little group influenced either the positions Reagan took in the campaign or the positions he would take subsequently. Did you find he was going to you for advice or that you were, in effect, laying out his campaign strategy for him?

M: Well, I would say that Reagan has always been his own man. He's not a gullible person, and he's not the kind of an individual who's influenced against his principles. He's a man of principle, I would say. As to political philosophy, he had expressed that in the Goldwater campaign. No one knows everything nor can he do all the

contacting and everything that's necessary when campaigning for an office like governor and working up to that responsibility. So you need a lot of help. You have to have research service to find out what the issues are, what the public considers the issues. Those will influence you somewhat by what the public is thinking and what they're concerned about. Maybe that determines the strategy and what you are going to talk about most. Spencer-Roberts were employed as professionals to develop strategy and coordinate the campaign. You can't know everybody that you're going to appoint so you have to depend on recommendations, and again, research on the part of a professional organization to find out who's qualified. There are people in Washington today that I recommended for jobs on the gubernatorial staff. Why are they there? Well, they had to perform in the governor's office. There are people who are not there, who didn't last very long in the Reagan effort from the standpoint of his first term because they weren't capable of performing. So when you ask a question like that, it takes a general answer. I would say for all of us, the four people including myself, that we didn't have any selfish interest other than what you might say would be a selfish interest if it's trying to get somebody elected that generally relates to your philosophy as to government. Holmes Tuttle never sold an automobile to the state of California, despite the fact that he's in the automobile business. Henry Salvatori's in the oil business, and there's nothing that he ever did that I know of that ever resulted in any business relationship [to state government] or anything of that nature. Henry is philosophically attuned to Reagan, although he didn't support Reagan for president against our Texas friend, Governor [John] Connally. There's an independence in the situation. I don't know what else I could say about that.

D: Okay, let's move on to the election itself. You said that the outcome, Reagan's winning by a million votes was a surprise even to those of you on the committee. Do you have any reflections on why the election might have been so lopsided?

M: No, I don't know to this day why that happened. We had a poll, it wasn't much more than thirty or forty days before the November election which showed that Reagan was winning. [Robert H.] Finch was running behind [Democratic Lieutenant Governor Glenn] Anderson, but the undecided vote was great. Ivy Baker Priest was not winning against [Treasurer Bert] Betts. Secretary of State [Frank] Jordan was winning. The Republican candidate for attorney general's office [Spencer Williams] was losing and did lose. [Alan] Cranston was winning the controller's job against [Houston] Flournoy. But in every case, or in most cases, there was a large undecided vote. In the case of the governor, the undecided vote was a small number by comparison. One day we had a meeting with the governor, and he kind of shook himself and said, "Gee, I'd have to be governor with

Anderson as the lieutenant governor." [It's] much like [Governor Edmund G. "Jerry"] Brown and the situation today with [Republican Lieutenant Governor Mike] Curb. Our campaign had been running fairly independent of the Finch campaign, but we changed that all around in the last part of the campaign. We bought a lot of billboards, and we got copy which was Reagan-Finch. We changed a lot of ads, TV and radio ads, to Reagan-Finch, and Finch actually won with more votes than Reagan. But I think you could account for that by the fact that Finch actually made a real effort to get newspaper endorsements. And he had them. He went around the state and got newspaper endorsements, and I think that was a very good move on his part. But also, Finch had the advantage of our using the total media in the later part of the campaign on a Reagan-Finch effort. We won all the statewide constitutional offices except attorney general. The incumbent [Tom Lynch] was retained. It took two days before Cranston knew he was defeated. We had heard that Cranston had actually diverted some of his campaign funds to help Brown, feeling that Brown was in trouble, but not recognizing that he was in trouble.

Looking back, it was somewhat like the 1980 presidential election. There wasn't any pollster a couple of days before the election that was predicting the big change in the U. S. Senate that actually occurred in the Reagan sweep and the small number of states that the Democrats would take. Well, there were several California State Assembly districts that we could have won in 1966 if we had known that Reagan was going to have the coattails that he did. Reagan had coattails in both campaigns, I'd say. Nixon didn't have coattails. There was a difference. We could have actually gained the majority in the assembly, I believe, in 1966. We actually did achieve it in 1968. I was then treasurer of the [Republican] State Central Committee and finance chairman for the [Republican] State Central Committee, and we concentrated funds in the election of assembly candidates in an effort to get the majority, and in the California State Senate also. We didn't achieve a majority in the senate until a later date. It didn't last very long, but it was interesting and very important.

I went to Hawaii the day after the election. We had a meeting of the Region 12 of the Boy Scouts over there, and I didn't find out about the Cranston defeat until we were in Hawaii. Pleasant victory. (laughter)

D: Now, once the campaign was over, many of those who had been instrumental in the Friends of Ronald Reagan continued in an advisory capacity to Reagan, particularly during the transition period before he was inaugurated as governor. Were you one of those people?

M: Yes. Holmes Tuttle, "Cy" Rubel, William French Smith, Taft Schreiber, Jacquelin Hume, Lee Kaiser, and Tom Reed.

D: Tom Reed. That's a name I hadn't heard.

M: Tom Reed was an important factor practically from the beginning.

D: What was his position?

M: Tom was in the San Francisco area with Jacquelin Hume, and he pretty much directed the campaign up there in the San Francisco area. He went into the Reagan administration and became the appointments secretary, and in 1968 in Miami he was elected Republican National Committeeman for the state of California and served for four years. He was general campaign chairman for the reelection of Reagan in 1970. He probably should be interviewed by you because he would have a lot of things to say. [He] became Secretary of the Air Force under President Gerald Ford. I believe it was under Ford. It could have been Nixon. So that's a divergence again.

D: When did this group--well, first to some of its functions and then I'll get to its name. What exactly did you do during this transition period with respect to Reagan. Did you advise him on appointees or what?

M: Yes. We met with him from time to time, and sometimes some of the people would be there. "Cy" Rubel, I would say, was heading up the effort on the appointments. A lot of letters were coming to him with recommendations. I don't remember how we encouraged those letters, but there was an effort made to get, through county chairmen and through party people, recommendations for appointments. The key positions were the ones, of course, at the head of the list to be filled. The billboards for Reagan, when Reagan was on the [campaign] billboard by himself said, I think, "Integrity and common sense." He was played up, not played up exactly, but he was featured as almost a nonpolitical candidate. His life hadn't been such that he'd come up through politics, really, and his first effort for elective office was governor. So it was a little different type of campaign. When we were working on the appointments, we'd sometimes meet at "Cy" Rubel's office; sometimes we'd meet other places. There was an effort being made in San Francisco, too. Some of the people who had been in the campaign wanted to go to work; some of us had no interest in any kind of an appointment. We were just happy to have won. (laughter) But we found out that when you win, you can't go home, because when a man accepts the responsibility to run for an important office like governor, it's like becoming chairman of the board of the largest business in the state. There are hundreds of people who are going to go out of office who've had the responsibilities for conducting the business of the state, and they've got to be replaced. You've got to find good people, and what we were looking for was people who didn't necessarily want to

go there forever but who would take a responsibility and would help to change things. I think we did a good job overall in the kinds of people we were able to encourage to become a part of the Reagan administration.

D: Did you tend to define "good people" in terms of the philosophic position they had on issues or partisan affiliation or what?

M: Ability in the field. For example, if you were to take on the finance job in the state, you would have to be somebody who was capable in finance. The first man we picked [Gordon P. Smith], I'd say, didn't really succeed and he was replaced by [Caspar W.] "Cap" Weinberger, who did an outstanding job. There was a great resistance in the state among some of the political activists that "Cap" was a so-called liberal. (laughter) But "Cap" was probably one of the most accomplished and capable people. He'd been chairman of the Republican State Central Committee. He'd been a candidate for attorney general. He'd been active in politics, an attorney. He did an outstanding job.

I don't think I mentioned that Holmes Tuttle and I went to see Roy Crocker. Roy Crocker was a prominent man in politics and a longtime activist. In fact, he'd been active as a committee member in the selection of Nixon to run for Congress in the initial campaign. He was head of Lincoln Savings and Loan. He'd been in the Eisenhower campaigns among others and was a substantial contributor, a wealthy man and a very mild-mannered individual. Well, Holmes and I went to see Roy Crocker. We were looking to get a younger man involved in the campaign, because "Cy" and Henry and Holmes and I were approximately the same ages. We wanted to get some young person. Well, Holmes and I had been active in the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce and were serving on the board of the chamber, and we had met a young fellow there who was working for Roy Crocker. I don't recall his name now, but Roy didn't think he was the man for the job; but he did suggest Phil Battaglia. We knew Phil, also, because he was currently president of the Los Angeles Junior Chamber of Commerce in 1965. It may have been early 1966. We went over to Phil's firm, which was Flint and McKay, and talked to one of the partners about the possibility of them making Phil Battaglia available and if it would be okay with them if he got into the campaign. We explained that we were looking for a young person, preferably with a lot of connections and especially with the junior chamber, a person that would be active with a lot of young people. We did succeed in getting Phil Battaglia. Phil became the executive secretary to the governor when he was inaugurated, but he was only there a short time. He was then replaced with Bill Clark who later became a California State Supreme Court Justice. Bill Clark had been in the campaign in Ventura County. I'd had contacts with many of the county chairmen when we were raising money. We talked to them about what we needed

and what we had to do, and we'd schedule the candidate for fund raisers and things of that nature. Anyway, Bill called me a short time after the inauguration and said he certainly would like to go to Sacramento. And I said, "What are you doing this afternoon?" He said, "Nothing." I said, "Can you get a plane out of Ventura someplace and get up to Sacramento? They'll be looking for you because they need help." Well, Gordon Luce had been in the campaign down in San Diego, and he went in as secretary of business and . . . what is it, commerce?

D: Transportation.

M: Transportation, yes. Secretary of the Business and Transportation Agency. It included savings and loan associations and banks, that type of thing, and the public utilities commission and so forth. We were talking one day that we needed someone for the motor vehicles department. I said, "What about Verne Orr?" I knew Verne Orr in Community Chest activities. He'd been head of the Community Chest over in Pasadena before it was combined with the United Way and the combined group. He also had been in the savings and loan business. I also knew his father, who had been in the Sales Executives Club. He'd been a Chrysler Corporation vice president in California. I knew the Orr family so I gave Verne a ring. Everybody thought, "Gee, it would be great if we could get Verne." He was a well-known and successful individual. For Motor Vehicles? Well, he'd been in the automobile business. (laughter) We knew he was a good administrator. His wife was home, and he wasn't. Anyway, she said he'd be home for lunch: "I'm leaving, but I'll leave a message." Well, she put a message on the bulletin board at home, and he called back. We interested him and he went to Sacramento. Later, he became head of the California State Department of Finance after "Cap" Weinberger resigned. It was things like that. Where do they come from? Where do you find them? We had people who wanted certain jobs, but we knew they weren't qualified. At least, we didn't think they were the best people for the job. We were looking for people that we thought would do an outstanding job and would make for a successful administration.

D: In effect this little group served as sort of a screening committee?

M: Yes, it was a screening.

D: What were your relations with legislators? Perennially, legislators like to exercise a certain amount of patronage and get people from their own districts into jobs.

M: There weren't very many. Vern Sturgeon had been a state senator, and he was active in the general campaign. He was actually in the Wilshire office. He'd come down from the north and did an out-

standing job in the campaign because he had a lot of connections when you wanted to get things done. He knew people all over, especially in his area, Paso Robles and San Luis Obispo. But he'd been a state senator, and he knew people. He went in the governor's office for liaison with the state senate. I'm trying to recall the name of one of the assemblymen who worked with us. Charles Conrad from San Fernando Valley. He was active in the campaign. These people were able to relate to the incumbents in the legislature.

D: You didn't find yourself at conflict with recommendations from legislators coming in to Reagan saying, "Appoint this man. He's from my district," whereas you felt somebody else was more qualified.

M: In fact, we were so inexperienced on some of those things that (laughter) a lot of that in the early days was pretty much ignored, I would say. When the governor actually was inaugurated and began to get a staff organization, then a lot of those things had to go through the governor's office. Of course, ultimately they all had to. We were really looking for something different than political hacks.

D: When did your role as a screening committee for appointees sort of fade away?

M: Well, it reduced quite a bit after the inauguration, but it never ended; because they were always looking for people, we were always looking for people. When we knew there was going to be an opening, we would always be looking for someone who we thought would work with the governor and would be a good appointment and would be helpful.

D: Did you continue to do this sort of thing all through Reagan's eight years as governor?

M: Yes, even through now, you know, as President. There are many people that were in the governor's administration who are now in Washington, like Ed Meese. Ed Meese became the governor's executive secretary, and Mike Deaver was the assistant to the governor and also assistant to Ed Meese, and they're both in Washington. I'd say, if I may use the term, it's a noble effort to try and find the right kind of people. When you say right kind, are you going to describe that? Well, it's people who will do a good job and who are thinking in the interest of our country.

D: Did this group meet on its own accord once Reagan had been elected, or did Reagan call you together from time to time? How exactly did you function?

M: Well, if there was a problem or something coming up, sometimes Holmes might get the group together. Sometimes, if there was a general situation to get together about, Reagan might ask us out to his home when he was down this way. I wouldn't say it was a highly organized type of thing. We never had a secretary. (laughter) We'd just (laughter) round up the gang. Sometimes Ed Meese or Mike Deaver would give a call and say the governor would like to confer about some things.

D: How frequently, once he was in office, did these meetings take place?

M: Not too often. Not too often. It wasn't very long after he was in office when we organized a nonprofit corporation, the Committee for Efficiency and Cost Control. Ultimately, that involved raising about $350,000, and I think around 250 people from business and the professions went to Sacramento--we did hire some professional leadership--to study government and its activities to find ways to operate more efficiently. That was a noble effort. They came up with about 1,600 suggestions for improving the operation of the state government.

D: Was this put in some written report?

M: Written reports, yes. I think they divided themselves into about seven different teams, and a CPA named Ken Pryor headed it up. He was a retired CPA from one of the national firms. They did an outstanding job. When my oldest brother went up there, he was retired, and he was on a team that visited prisons and state institutions. His forte was he'd been in the cold storage business for most of his lifetime. He knew costs of foods, and he knew varieties of foods, and the methods in which they were purchased at the lowest prices. He told me about one situation where in one of the prisons they had liver for dinner. The liver had been purchased from a vendor, sliced. The cost of that meal for the number of people I think he said, involved over a $2,000 differential. Business is responsible for some of the things that happen in government because they have salesmen and they are trying to get business. People who make different types of equipment are always trying to get it specified, whether it's in the college system (laughter) or whether it's in the prison system or other types of institutions. Many state institutions were being bilked with requirements that had been legislated and were in the "specs" [specifications]. (laughter) For example, they decided that they didn't need but one church in some of those institutions, and they could change the stage to have what the situation required, whether it was Protestant, Catholic, or Jewish. It seemed like there was an effort made to have separate facilities for these situations. The athletic facilities in some of these institutions required specifications for olympic tracks for the use of the

inmates, which weren't necessary. We had people who worked for the telephone company that were on these teams, and they'd find people sitting in Sacramento maybe as close as you and I are sitting, yet, they had a connection between the two which, of course, was an additional telephone charge. All they had to do was turn their head and talk. (laughter) Some people like a lot of buttons because it's a prestige type of a situation. There was a building that was about ready to go to bid under the Brown administration, which was never built under the Reagan administration. People from Hughes, who were specialists in office space, were up there on the teams. They found lots of space by how they set up their own offices when you have a lot of people. This was the kind of an effort that was being made by these people. They were all provided to the state without one cent cost to the state. That was the effort behind the Reagan team.

D: Were you part of this whole committee?

M: I was helping to raise the money and provide the funds as needed. Of course, the reports had to be made because it was a nonprofit corporation. They had to be made by law.

D: Overall, would you say a great many of the suggestions of this group were put into effect?

M: The vast majority were, and they really kept track. It was done in a nice way, too, with the cooperation of state employees. Many times the suggestions came from them as the studies were being made. They know where the inefficiencies are, many times better than someone else.

D: Were the final reports and recommendations printed at state or private expense?

M: The funding?

D: No, the final report and recommendations of this group.

M: They were all made at private expense.

D: Do you know if copies of that document or documents have been deposited in major libraries?

M: I don't know whether they have been or not, but they should be. There certainly wasn't any secret about it. It was all up and above board, the recommendations were made, and the department people that were involved were notified. I'd say, again, that it was a noble effort in the interests of what really the group was trying to accomplish: government efficiency.

D: How long did this committee on efficiency last?

M: I think about two years.

D: Did your group take any other form? The first was the Friends of Ronald Reagan, then it was the transition team, then it was the committee of efficiency.

M: The "kitchen cabinet" is kind of a name that gets rather involved here, who was on it and so forth. After the Reagan administration was in office, they recognized the need and value of this kind of help. There were a great many ideas, and the question would follow, "Well, how do you do this thing?" If you are going to study it, if you hire a lot of professionals and consultants, it's going to cost you an awful lot of money; but if you've got business people and professional people who can make people available, it's no longer a political contribution. They can contribute manpower to the state. Walter Knott, for example, contributed a man. He paid a man to go up there by the name of Bill Spurgeon, and Bill served on one of the committees. Bill couldn't do it on his own because of his financial position, but Walter Knott could, and he provided Bill. [There were] many companies, such as Hughes Aircraft, the telephone company, the gas company, and Standard Oil who made people available. About 250 people were involved. Some spent a short time; some spent a long time. Some were retired people, but they were people that had a qualification based on their backgrounds.

D: Now, to this term that you brought up of "kitchen cabinet," one that I think first began to come out about 1967. I think Jack Greenberg of the *Los Angeles Times* had an article to that effect about then. First of all, what are your own observations of the term? Was it a commonly used term? Did you ever think of yourselves as the "kitchen cabinet" or use the term among yourselves?

M: No. No, [we] never would have thought of that. Having been in the political campaign and a part of getting a man to change the whole course of his life, and recognizing the responsibilities that he has taken on, you feel an obligation to help him. In the kind of government we have, it changes overnight. When you elect a man, he's sworn in in one hour (laughter) and the whole responbility is his. If you did that in private business, it would be chaos. There is some chaos when you do it in government although, fortunately, we have the departments of government that go on and there are the civil service employees that carry on their functions. But without that leadership and direction things are at a standstill until you get people in place that have the responsibility and the leadership who are going to change things or leave them the way they are. We were looking to cut down the cost of government. Under Brown the

state was spending over a million dollars a day more than it was taking in. Needless to say, politically, the Democrats didn't want to increase taxes to balance the budget. The state, fortunately, is not allowed to operate without a balanced budget. They accomplished the balanced budget through an accounting method called accrual accounting. They balanced the budget by accruing revenues which had not as yet been received. They were due; they were accrued, just as you in business say, "It's coming, but I don't have it yet." Many or most businesses are on the accrual basis. They accrue expenses and they accrue income, even though it hasn't been received or paid. The government of the state of California had never operated on an accrual accounting basis until Brown's last year. They balanced their budget by accrual accounting. That was only good for a short period of time, because the minute Governor Reagan came into office he was in a deficit situation. So he had to do something to increase the revenues of the state to have a balanced budget. That put the onus on him, and he had to increase taxes, and, of course, that's political. He did [increase taxes], but I think he did an excellent job in a total tax program. In fact, other than some minor situations relative to rates, even young Brown has not increased taxes. Of course, inflation has increased the total revenue tremendously, and the systems that were inaugurated by the legislature and signed by the governor made it possible even to have a huge surplus in this state that enabled the shock of [1978 ballot proposition] 13 to be absorbed. Without a grand surplus like the state had, we would have had chaos.

D: Yes, we would have. All right. We have some idea now of the "kitchen cabinet," except its continuing membership. When the original article in the *Los Angeles Times* came out in 1967, ten people were named, most of whom I think you have named. You were one of them. Since then, I've seen other names associated with that term. One is Alfred Bloomingdale. Did he play any role, do you recall, during Reagan's governorship in this advisory group?

M: I don't recall that he did in the initial efforts. The Bloomingdales are good social friends of the Reagans. They were supportive, of course. Al Bloomingdale was not active in the campaign, but available and supportive of Governor Reagan, certainly.

D: Another name that I've seen is William A. Wilson, apparently a Santa Barbara rancher and investor. Was he in your group at any time?

M: No, not at that time in the initial effort. He was supportive but not an activist in the campaign. The Wilsons are also good friends of Ronald and Nancy Reagan, and especially later they were always helpful. They were there at the inaugural, as I recall. I think

they've continued the social relationship clear to this date. They're friends, good friends.

D: But he was not one of this group of advisers that screened appointments and so forth?

M: No.

D: Did anybody else to your knowledge come into this group during the Reagan administration?

M: Who else do you have on that list?

D: Well, Jack Wrather.

M: Jack Wrather came in later, I would say. I mentioned Taft Schreiber? Jacquelin Hume? Lee Kaiser? Of course, Holmes Tuttle, Henry Salvatori . . .

D: Justin Dart and yourself.

M: Dart wasn't in there early.

D: That's right. He came in after the Christopher campaign.

M: I don't know how soon it was after that. I think it was sometime after that.

D: How about Arch Monson? When did he join?

M: Arch helped. Arch, as we said before, was the chairman for Christopher. After Ronald Reagan was nominated in the GOP primary, he went to San Francisco and met Arch Monson up there. Senator [George] Murphy also went up there. He was an incumbent at the time. Ronald Reagan went down to Christopher's dairy to see him and to cement relationships for the future, which was a good thing to do. Arch Monson was interested, and the people here, Tom Pike, Dart, and others, were helpful. [It's] hard to remember exactly what they did. Arch Monson was from the north and knew people in the San Francisco area and had been interested in politics and continues to be.

D: Now, a tenth name that's usually mentioned is William French Smith, who we know is an attorney. When exactly did he join your group? Was it during the campaign or only when Reagan was elected governor?

M: I don't recall when William French Smith came into the picture, but I believe he was in there before the primary election. I don't

recall him being in the exploratory campaign, but I'm not certain about that. He was in there fairly early. He was active in the period, very active, between the election and the inauguration. I just don't quite picture him, but certainly he became very important in the total picture as time developed.

D: Bearing in mind that sometimes journalists very carelessly use terms, now that some of the people that advised Reagan in his gubernatorial years have also been advising him in his presidential years, some correspondents have also brought up two other names of out-of-staters recently who have apparently become influential advisers to Reagan and link them in with the "kitchen cabinet." One is Paul Laxalt of Nevada. Did he ever join your little group in advising Reagan?

M: Not in connection with the gubernatorial campaigns. I think Governor Reagan got acquainted with him when he was governor and Laxalt was governor of Nevada. They had a good rapport, and they were trying to solve problems at Lake Tahoe and some of those things. I believe that was the beginning of their relationship, after he was governor. Then when the presidential campaign efforts started, Laxalt became important.

D: The other name is beer magnate, Joseph Coors. Was he, do you recall, ever a part of this advisory group during Reagan's gubernatorial years?

M: No, not to my knowledge and not until the presidential efforts. He could have supported us financially at the time, but I don't even recall that.

D: Let's move on to the work of this, if you don't mind the name, "kitchen cabinet" for the duration of Reagan's administration. Did you continue to be a fund raising body at various campaigns in 1968, 1970, 1972, and 1974?

M: Well, some of the so-called "kitchen cabinet" (laughter) were not fund raisers. Holmes Tuttle is a fund raiser, and Justin Dart is a fund raiser. Taft Schreiber was a good fund raiser. Jacque Hume is a good fund raiser up in northern California.

D: Leonard Firestone?

M: Leonard Firestone.

D: That's a name I haven't raised. Was he in your group, at least after the primary campaign?

M: For some of the time he was in, but then he was very close to [Gerald] Ford, and he was very close to Nixon. Leonard was not in the operation. We had some help from him at one time. You see, he was for Nixon in 1968, and we had the "favorite son" campaign for Reagan. So Leonard Firestone was not as close in the picture as any of the others. You know, when you use that word, "cabinet," you might say some people were kind of in and out. Then you've got a campaign and you've got actual staff people, and you've got campaigns that weren't for the governor but were for state assembly seats and senate seats and congressional seats. The thing is an involved situation, and I wouldn't want to give the impression that there was a group of people that did all of this, because it took an awful lot of organization: county committees and party organizations like United Republicans of California, California Republican Assembly, and some others. Lots of times they embarrass you with resolutions, because there are people there that have a certain philosophy, and they're entitled to it. Yet, the press quite often will play those viewpoints up as being the party. What is the party. Well, you register. You don't have to pay anything to register. You can be registered Democrat or Republican or Communist or Peoples Party or whatever. You don't have to pay any dues, but you say you're a member of the party. Well, you might have a lot different viewpoint than someone who is also a member of the party.

D: Back to the various campaigns. Did most of this "kitchen cabinet," at least those of you expert in fund raising, come together or stay together each campaign during Reagan's gubernatorial tenure and raise funds for that campaign.

M: No, I wouldn't say that. We had an advisory committee. We had an executive committee for the campaign. We were building it. We had county committees, and we had doctors committees, and agricultural committees, women's committees, all the types of organizations. You could break it down.

D: So you didn't again play the central role you did as the exploratory committee in 1966, as far as fund raising and planning strategy were concerned?

M: It [participation] was being expanded, because it had to be. You didn't need as much money in an exploratory campaign, but the minute you got into a general campaign, I mean in the primary, the need for money was much greater. You had to hire people, and you had a lot of communication work. You had to open headquarters: first the major headquarters in Los Angeles and then a major one in the north in San Francisco, and then gradually in the counties. You had to fan it out, and you had to get everybody active that you could.

James Halley, Chairman State Central Committee; Governor Ronald Reagan; and Edward Mills, Treasurer and Chairman of the GOP State Central Committee, 1967-1968

D: Didn't you become involved in this within the Republican State Central Committee?

M: I was not a member of the Republican State Central Committee at anytime during the campaigns for Reagan, in the primary or the general of the 1966 campaign.

D: No, I mean after that.

M: After the governor was elected, I did. Now, I was very active in both the primary and the general campaign. I was southern California finance chairman for Reagan in the general campaign and vice chairman for the state Reagan committee. We continued that through the whole year.

D: Through all of 1966?

M: All of 1966. After the governor was elected, I thought I was pretty much through other than helping screen the appointments. There was a lot of mail coming in. [We were] working with that, and we were raising some money for the inaugural. There was a fellow by the name of James Halley, who was vice chairman of the [Republican] State Central Committee. Parkinson was the chairman, and then you elect another vice chairman. Well, anyway, when the [Republican] State Central Committee met, Halley was made chairman and succeeded Parkinson. I'd met Halley during the campaign. He was from San Francisco, and he asked me if I would be the treasurer of the [Republican] State Central Committee, which was an elective office. I had a good answer and told him, "I'm not even a member of the State Central Committee." I really wasn't looking for any more work. I was having a hard time keeping up with my own activities and everything else. It gets to be two jobs, you know.

D: I can imagine, yes.

M: He kept after me, and I said, "No, Jim, I've been at this for almost two years now, and I think I've done my job." He said, "We need you, Ed." Lee Kaiser had been the finance chairman and treasurer under Parkinson. He'd done a good job. They were solvent. Anyway, one day the phone rings, and Governor Reagan was on the phone. He said, "Ed, I hesitate to bring this up with you. I know how much time you've been giving and how much work you've been doing, but I've got to do it because I've been asked to do it by Jim Halley." He said, "I told him I would. He wants you to be treasurer. So I'm asking, and whatever you say will be all right." I said, "Well, governor, knowing what you've taken on, and if you're asking me, I can't (laughter) say 'no,' knowing what sacrifices you're making." So I became the treasurer. They found a spot where I could get a

nomination from the governor to be on the Republican State Central Committee, and I was elected treasurer. I took on the job of finance chairman, which Lee Kaiser had, and also the [job of] California representative on the Republican National Finance Committee.

D: How long did you hold those posts?

M: Two years. The first two years until the next chairman, who was Dennis Carpenter of Orange County. [He] was elected vice chairman under Jim Halley, and then he came in. So we set up the finance. We raised the money for the Republican State Central Committee as well as what was needed in special elections. Also, we had Max Utt, who was an attorney that had been long active with the United Republican Finance Committee in Los Angeles County from the standpoint of legal advice relating to political campaigns. He was an expert really. He made a suggestion that there's always a problem with political money in the governor's office. The governor does need money, you know, political money. The people provide certain funds. They pay the governor's salary; they pay the staff, certain positions; and of course, the mansion. (laughter) Yet, there are certain expenses. There's an allowance of a certain amount of money that the governor has, which he can spend without having to account for it. I think it was $15,000 annually or something like that. When you get communications by the hundreds of thousands, and when you develop relationships statewide in political campaigns, and there's always that potential of the next four years, you have to organize politically as well as for the position which you operate at the election of the people. If you send out Christmas cards, if you can do it within the $15,000 or whatever that amount was, fine. But you can't run a governor's office that way. So additional funds were needed. Max Utt suggested that we open up an account in the Republican State Central Committee called GOP Number 1, Governor's Office Political Account Number 1, which we did. We had a committee, and a list of all of those expenditures that were made in that account were sent to the people on that committee. They were also in the audit by the treasurer. I was the treasurer, of course, but we had an audit of the state funds every year by a firm of CPAs [Certified Public Accountants]. But it was exposed to the Republican State Central Committee and was not a secret fund in the governor's office where political money would be sent to the governor's office. We set up dinners around the state. We shared with the county [party organizations], with the Republican State Central Committee, and with the governor's account. But the governor's account was kept in the Republican State Central Committee, and we spent the money. If the governor sent flowers; for example, if some legislator's wife died or there was an illness in the family or something, those bills would come through and they'd be paid by the political funds. Entertainment [was another area]. A governor

would come from another state or something and these functions would be handled by that fund. The governor's entertainment of the legislature, or entertainment of the state supreme court, all those things were included. You couldn't do it with the funds that were set up by the state. So it was political money that was raised from dinners and things like that.

D: That gives a considerable importance to the job of treasurer and finance secretary.

M: Oh, yes, it becomes a big job, especially when you get into special elections. Of course, we were always looking down the road to 1968, when we hoped to be able to accomplish a majority situation in the state legislature, especially in the assembly. Unruh was the speaker, and we wanted Monagan. (laughter) As a Republican, he was the minority leader, and we succeeded in 1968. We raised funds, and we had what we called the Cal Plan. With the help of Spencer-Roberts, whom we hired to concentrate on that particular function, we were able to elect a majority. We gained three seats in 1968. It was 41-39, Republican.

D: In your years of fund raising, particularly your two years as Republican State Central Committee treasurer, what sources of funds did you concentrate on? How did you find it most efficient to raise funds?

M: Well, we took the five largest counties, Los Angeles, Orange, San Francisco, Alameda, and San Diego, and we scheduled the governor to appear in each of those counties for a fund raising dinner. So the local county central committee or their fund raising group set up the dinners, and then we shared on a percentage basis. The county got 40 percent of the net, the State Central Committee got 40 percent of the net, I believe it was, and 20 percent went to the governor's support account. Sometimes we combined some of the smaller counties, and the governor would appear at a fund raising dinner. We did direct mail, and we expanded the direct mail situation in 1970. We had over 100,000 names of contributors to Republican events in the state of California, which was our mailing list. It was a pretty good mailing list from which to raise funds when you had good reasons.

D: Was it a computerized mailing list?

M: A computerized mailing list, yes. Those were the principal things. Every year we had an anniversary inaugural, at least, when I was treasurer. We did it every year there for four years, and we were able to raise funds. We'd have an inaugural anniversary in Sacramento and invite people and have a dinner, and I think it was

$1,000 a couple. It would be a nice event, and we'd raise a $100,000 or maybe $125,000 or so with that type of thing. We'd help the State Central Committee, the governor's support account, and the Cal Plan with that type of thing. There weren't as many limitations in the financing as we now have with the account numbers, state laws, and federal laws relating to fund raising.

D: Your mention of fund raising dinners and inaugural balls suggests that one had to be fairly well-to-do to afford that sort of fund raising, which leads me to the issue which Jesse Unruh raised in 1970, charging that the Reagan administration was in effect a millionaires' club.

M: Yes.

D: Would you comment about that?

M: Well, that's a lot of applesauce. You take the fund raising when we sent direct mail, for example. When you use computer lists for direct mail to 100,000 people, I think our average contribution was about fifteen dollars from those that responded. Certainly, Henry Salvatori and Holmes Tuttle and other people are millionaires, but they are successful people, people who had great successes in their own individual businesses. They were interested in politics as they were interested in many other things: community activities, business associations, universities. Whether it's the Firestones, the Darts, the Fluors, the Salvatoris, or the Tuttles, you'll find them in a great many activities. It isn't because of financial status; it's because of an ability to do things and an interest in accomplishing things. When people try to say, "Well, that's a millionaires' club," that's a term that's used in a derogatory manner and belies the purpose of the people. They weren't in there for the money for themselves. They were in there, I would say, with the noble purpose of good government.

D: But not impugning the purpose at all, what do you recall was the percentage of funds you raised from the fifteen dollar average direct mail solicitations as opposed to percentage of funds you raised by one hundred dollar or five hundred dollar a plate dinners or thousand dollar a couple inaugural balls?

M: Well, to that, I would say the higher proportion of money came from dinners, $100 dinners, and direct mail, lots of direct mail, and there were campaign solicitations by counties. There were events to raise money, and a check would come in because they had some kind of event where they were selling some kind of merchandise to make money, [from] a women's group, for example. The sources of funds were varied. We did have some substantial contributions from people

who were capable, but in many cases it wasn't more from them than it would have been from some person that would give five dollars, you know, in proportion to their wealth. The vast numbers, of course, were small contributions to the campaigns.

D: The vast number of contributions were, but I was wondering about the total amount of money you received.

M: I couldn't give you an answer as to what the percentage was. For example, we sent out one letter as we initiated the second campaign. We were sitting in the Dart Office Building and Dart had taken on, I think, the statewide chairmanship to raise money for the Reagan reelection. Jacque Hume was northern California chairman, and I was southern California chairman. So I suggested that we do a direct mail over the signature of Governor Reagan to go to this list of about 110,000 people in the state of California. "Jus" Dart didn't have much confidence in direct mail. He said, "Ed, do you think you'll pay for the mailing?" (laughter) I said, "Jus, if it raises less than $100,000, I'll be amazed, and I think it'll do much better than that." We decided to go ahead and do it. We got a computer letter with a carbon, and we sent the computer letter out. The mail strike occurred after the letter was mailed, and so we got a call from the post office across the street from the Dart Building. We had rented an office in the Dart Building to handle the finance campaign. They asked us if we would come over and pick up the mail. There was a strike on, and they said we had so much mail there [that] they wanted to get rid of it so they could clear up some of their space. So we sent one of the fellows over, and he couldn't bring it all back in his car. It took us days to get it opened, but when we got through, finally, with that mailing, with that carbon letter, we had raised over $350,000 from that mailing. I think the average was somewhere around fourteen dollars or so, and so "Jus" was amazed. (laughter) I was quite surprised that it was that good. There were very few large contributions, maybe a couple three or four $1,000 contributions and some $500s. Most of them were small contributions.

D: What about before the federal campaign law in 1969 and the subsequent state campaign restriction law, which initially was put up as Proposition 9 in 1974? What about the role of corporate contributions? Was most of your money raised directly from corporations?

M: Yes, we could take corporate contributions in the state for state elections. That made it easier to raise money, of course, so there were a lot of corporate contributions. But they were all recorded. Political fund raising is a competitive thing. If there are legal restrictions in place and both parties are subject to the same restrictions, you can usually live with them. There have been bad practices grow up in political fund raising, but it was usually because the laws weren't clear. The minute the law was clear, I

think, there was a conformance. If your competition, the other side, is doing something, you generally have to compete. But even though we have these laws today, I'm not very sympathetic with the federal law relative to the running of the final presidential campaigns with the contributions through income tax forms. But it's a law, so whatever the laws are, we should conform to them.

D: A few final questions about your reflections on the Reagan governorship in general. First, as to the couple of efforts to get him beyond the governorship. When was there first talk about his possibly being put up for presidential nomination that you recall?

M: The first was after Governor Reagan was in office in 1967 and 1968. Of course, there was a presidential, national convention in 1968 in Miami. Nixon, despite the fact that he had practically decided by his actions in 1962 never to be a candidate again, still had been speaking around the country. The "Potomac Fever" was there. He had a lot of "IOUs" around the country for things that he had done. He was making speeches and he seemed the logical candidate, despite the fact that he had lost in 1960 and 1962. But there was kind of a uniform saying among political people that, "He's the most qualified candidate, but he can't win." He had eight years as vice president, and he had been a senator and a congressman. He'd run for the presidency. So he did have the background, and he'd come within a squeak of winning, and who knows if all the votes were counted properly. There's still a contention, you know. Yet, Kennedy became the President. Nelson Rockefeller wanted to run. He really had a burning desire to become president of the United States, and he'd been a successful governor in his state from the standpoint of getting reelected. [He was] a so-called part of the Eastern establishment, whatever that is. (laughter) It's another one of these terms like "kitchen cabinet." There was a question of whether Nixon could get nominated, and Rockefeller was an on-again, off-again candidate. Do you remember that he had a problem? I think he'd divorced, and one time he was going to run and then he wasn't going to run, but he was potentially a candidate. In politics, it's always a good thing to have something in reserve, you know, in case. Nobody knows in these days. Somebody can get assassinated, a plane could drop out of the sky, and the whole picture changes. Well, there was discussion around Sacramento, particularly that despite the fact that Ronald Reagan wasn't in office very long, he was a national figure, having won California like he did with over a million votes. I think at that time he'd been chairman of the Governor's Conference, and he'd gained a lot of prestige. He'd done a lot of speaking around the country even before that so it was felt that he was a potential candidate for president. So an effort was organized to get him nominated, and I would say it was

a kind of a reserve type of situation, not knowing what might happen but that he would be available. It also would increase his prestige for down the line.

D: Were you part of that effort?

M: Yes. Tom Reed was a part of it, and Holmes Tuttle, Jacque Hume, and a lot of other people. There were more than there were in the original group, by far. So Ronald Reagan became the "favorite son" candidate for the delegation from California. While there was an indication that Nixon might contest the state--this was still his home, his home base--he didn't. So we went to Miami with a "favorite son" candidate, Reagan. There was an organization and a setup, contacts were made, and a national organization was established to win support from other delegations. It's rather interesting; Nixon didn't get practically a single vote in the five major delegations but, yet, he won on the first ballot. California, when the roll call was made, was 100 percent for Reagan; I believe New York was 100 percent for Rockefeller. Pennsylvania was, I believe, practically 100 percent for Rockefeller. Ohio was 100 percent for Governor [James] Rhodes, the incumbent "favorite son." I believe Michigan was 100 percent for "favorite son" Romney on the first ballot. Yet, the Nixon people had put the delegations together from the "solid South" and were able to offset all of that. Before the roll call was completed, Nixon was nominated on the first ballot.

D: Do I gather in backing the "favorite son" candidate, Reagan, there was some thought that perhaps the Republican Convention would be deadlocked?

M: Well, that was a possibility. There was also a strong feeling among many of the delegates from the southern states that they liked Reagan and would like to vote for Reagan. But Goldwater and [Senator John] Tower of Texas and [South Carolina Senator] Strom Thurmond, who had become a Republican, had put together the South for Nixon with commitments. (laughter)

D: Was there any similar effort made to put Reagan up as a candidate in 1972?

M: No, because Nixon had won in 1968, and his opportunity for reelection was there. There really was no contest. No effort was made to contest the nomination. Actually, Nixon won in forty-nine out of fifty states before the disaster struck. (laughter) Watergate.

D: Were you also in a fund raising role in the 1970 election when Reagan was reelected?

M: I was the finance chairman for southern California and the vice chairman for the state campaign. [It was] pretty much what we'd done in the primary in the first election, the primary and the general. We set up several committees around the state, county committees and different committees within the Reagan campaign, and we were able to raise the funds. Unruh was quite unsuccessful, I would say. While Reagan didn't win with the same majority, he did win very handily.

D: You say you set up. Do you find that these party fund raising committees are things that in effect have to be rebuilt after each election, county by county?

M: We had county committees, county by county, and in Los Angeles County we had several regions.

D: I mean they're just not the sort of an organization that carries on from election to election?

M: It's pretty much volunteers and a small paid staff. There's some continuity but lots of new faces. There was no organizational chart type of thing. We were trying to not only raise money, but to tie it in with the political area, the people. Then also in segments of industry and segments of the population relative to Mexican Americans, blacks, Orientals . . .

D: Did you have a separate committee for each of these ethnic groups?

M: Yes. They were political, and some of them were fund raising, Japanese Americans, for example. We tried to schedule the governor into some of these areas, not only to win votes, but sometimes to raise money. Some people would host a cocktail party or some people would organize a barbecue, depending on the areas. It was both fund raising and political, to get publicity, to get the interest, and to get the money.

D: Who actually made the decisions, for example, to set up various ethnic committees and so forth? Were you instrumental in that?

M: Politically, that was done by the overall campaign chairman. That was Tom Reed in 1970. But in finance, I did some of those, especially in southern California. We had previous connections with some of the groups that could be helpful. In some places we tried to establish quotas to help meet our overall budget. So sometimes they would hold dinners within dinners or have a cocktail party before a dinner or something of that nature. And if you could have the governor meet with the people, it would encourage more activity.

D: Was there any talk of Reagan running for a third term in 1974?

M: No. The governor had foreclosed that himself by saying he would only go for two terms. He had foreclosed it, and there was no effort made to change that.

D: All right. When it was known that he wasn't going to run for a third term, did the "kitchen cabinet" have any discussion among itself of an ideal alternative in the 1974 campaign well before the actual campaign?

M: There wasn't a "kitchen cabinet" effort, but when Nixon was in effect impeached and Ford became the President, there was an effort made to get consideration of Ronald Reagan for vice president. Rockefeller was actually selected. Maybe it's a good thing it didn't happen. (laughter) Sometimes fate seems to dictate how these things ultimately work out. If Reagan had accepted a vice presidency under Ford, he couldn't have contested the Ford nomination in 1976, right?

D: Yes.

M: And after 1976 there was a serious question of whether there was any future for Reagan.

D: Who in California approached Ford and suggested that Reagan might be appointed?

M: Well, I'm sure that Justin Dart and Holmes Tuttle made contact, but there was never any invitation, to my knowledge, for Reagan to come back and be interviewed relative to the situation.

D: So it wasn't that Reagan would not have taken it; it was that Ford never even offered it to him?

M: It was never offered in that period. I couldn't answer that question relative to the time in 1976 when Ford was nominated. I'm not sure in my own mind. Reagan had said all along, and had actually written a note at the bequest of his brother Neil, that he would not be a candidate for vice president. The Ford people at the convention in Kansas City were attempting to say, and to put the situation on the basis of Ford and Reagan, that it was a sure thing. Reagan never put himself in that position. After it was all over, whether Reagan would have considered it, I don't know to this day whether he would have.

D: Back to the 1974 campaign in which, of course, the Republican party ultimately nominated Flournoy for governor. Did your little group that we're referring to as the "kitchen cabinet" have any particular

role in that? Did you have any choice before the primary of who you would like to see go in as Reagan's successor?

M: Well, the primary contest was between Ed Reinecke and Hugh Flournoy. It wasn't what you'd call a "kitchen cabinet" type of thing. I guess things had got beyond that. The Flournoy campaign was a new group. The Ed Reinecke campaign was a new group with some of the old group. It was a changed situation. But when Ed Reinecke was indicted, some of us, including myself, felt that he had no chance to ever become governor of California. He should have withdrawn. He shouldn't have stayed in the race. In fact, he shouldn't have raised the money, but he took the position that he had made a commitment to his constituents, to the people who were supporting him, and he would not drop out of the race. Well, an indictment to the voters, to the average voter, is guilt, regretfully so. Connally couldn't overcome an indictment and a jury trial [verdict] of "not guilty." The primary cost a lot of money, and the Flournoy campaign was pretty heavily in debt when the primary was over. It took a long time before they could overcome that and really get cranked up for the general election. The Republican situation relative to Watergate didn't help the total picture. Flournoy was clean-cut, and he came within a few points of winning. I think, perhaps, if Reinecke had dropped out of the primary and the campaign had been in better financial condition, it could have started out in the general on a better organized basis, and I think he might have won.

D: Did you have any fund raising role in that campaign?

M: Yes, I helped in the general. We stayed out of the primary, strictly on the basis that we were close to the Reagan campaign, the Reagan effort, and didn't want to take a position. I wasn't in the primary but was in the general. I helped raise money. I was not the chairman, but we did help raise money.

D: Have you remained active? Were you in the 1976 and 1980 campaigns?

M: For President?

D: Yes.

M: Yes. My role has been less, because when it became a national effort it's much more difficult to try and keep your occupation. (laughter) When you try to set up an organization or become heavily involved in a national campaign, you really can't stay in California. But I've been active, and I've helped raise money. In the interim period there was the Citizens for the Republic, which was an interim situation to keep Governor Reagan active, before the public and based to communicate, and to keep some of the organization that had been

achieved throughout the country together. There were a few meetings of that committee. What'd we call it? We had so many committees. (laughter) It was the Committee for the Republic.

D: Were you also in this more recent effort that Justin Dart headed that was going to raise about $800,000 to lobby for Reagan's budget and tax reforms?

M: No, I was not involved, and I think that "Jus"'s idea was . . . Personally, my thinking is that "Jus" was trying to accomplish something that he thought would be in the best interest of the country, but I think it was a mistake. And it didn't succeed. It was dropped. It can be misinterpreted.

D: Were you part of the transition team when Reagan became President? I think it was called the Transition Appointment Team.

M: No, I wasn't active in that, although I had been making recommendations to Pen[dleton] James, sometimes through Ed Meese and Mike Deaver. I was involved in other things at the time, but I've been in constant communication with Holmes Tuttle relative to suggestions, and also with the personnel office. In fact, I wrote one [recommendation] today. (laughter) Somebody locally would be willing to serve, and I think he's an outstanding person. It's hard to find the right people when you're looking for them. There are thousands of people that want these jobs, but the right people are the important ones. It isn't easy to get all the right people, and I think that many people are discouraged from taking an appointment today because of the disclosures that they have to make. Some people are private people. They don't like to have to disclose their financial position, and so they just won't go through this kind of a thing. I think we lose a lot of good manpower for our country because of some of these laws. There are reasons for these laws, but sometimes the cure is worse than the disease. It's like political fund raising. There are reasons for fund raising laws, but I think the more we keep the campaigns based on the public's willingness to pay for them and to back up their own philosophies, the simpler it can be. Perhaps that would also be the most effective. I have expected there would be more party proliferation because of the funds available at the presidential election because of the income tax form. In fact, we had one this time in a Republican who became what you might call an Independent. Right? It's possible that someday someone might qualify who was a Socialist or a Communist, and based on my philosophy, if I even just gave a dollar, I wouldn't want even one cent to go that way. But if you give it on the income tax form, it's going to go to people who qualify based on their rules and regulations. That may not get the results that the American people want, in my opinion. Also, I believe that if that item was on the form as an additional contribution over and above your tax, it would

be a fairer indication (laughter) of the public's support. Thousands of these forms are made out by professional tax preparers, and they automatically check the box for a gift of one dollar of Uncle Sam's money. The money is not additional. The money is a part of the total tax take. It's not an additional contribution so people are not giving when they mark that box. I don't think it's a good system, myself. I oppose it in principle. But, yet, we've had two elections on that, haven't we?

D: Yes. You can't really say it has shaken up the political system particularly. (laughter) Well, there's one final brief question, and then I think we'll call it quits. It's the end of the hour. The whole area of fund raising and party organization is not particularly well-recorded in history, at least in modern history. If a student were to want to look into this whole thing in greater detail, what sort of documents are you aware of that might help them? What would you suggest in the archives or library that they should try to get their hands on that might give them a better idea of what all this is about?

M: There are, of course, the campaign reports that have to be filed in Sacramento with the secretary of state. So that's a source. I think if someone really wanted to make a study of it, of course, there are a lot of things that have been written. Common Cause has a philosophy relative to fund raising. They'd like to see all campaigns, I believe, based on limitations and tax funds being used for the campaigns, especially the general elections. It's very expensive today to run campaigns because of the media availability. TV is tremendously expensive. You can put on a spot and have many thousands of dollars gone (snap of fingers) just like that. It's very difficult and expensive to reach a large segment of the public. One of the things that we looked at in the early days relative to Reagan was his prominence. If you wanted to measure it in money (chuckle) compared to, say a product being known, you would have had to spend millions of dollars to have the position that Reagan occupied in 1965 and 1966. His radio situation, the *G.E. Theatre of the Air*, his baseball broadcasting, which wasn't major, but his *Death Valley Days* and his political efforts were; all of this and his movies contributed to name value, so to speak. The average person, despite his ability to occupy a political office, has a real challenge in trying to get known. I'd say [Houston] Flournoy wasn't well known. He wasn't as well known as [Edmund G. "Jerry"] Brown because of Brown's father. But if someone wanted to get into that, I think between the study of the national situation as being reported now by the commission and research of the states, which have varying laws, a person would gain experience in the field. There isn't any perfect answer to fund raising, but I don't think general regulation is the answer either, because you could get an

interpretation by a commission completely prejudiced that would put a candidate that the people elected out of his office. It could happen. It's a man-made situation. It's pretty hard to thwart the public from the grass roots. But it can be done, I think, through regulation that might not be totally objective.

D: Well, I want to thank you very much for this interview, and I think this concludes our interview now.

MILLS

This is a second interview of Mr. Edward Mills by Dr. Lawrence de Graaf. It is occurring on July 8, 1981 in the Archive Room of the Oral History Program at California State University, Fullerton.

D: Mr. Mills, I would like to focus today on the actual legislation and some of the administrative decisions of the Reagan administration, insofar as you either observed them or have particular opinions on them. We'll begin with the first administration, and I'd like to begin with a comment you made in the earlier interview to the effect that Reagan's tax program, in your estimation, was an excellent job. Were you referring to the tax legislation which inaugurated withholding?

M: Yes, and you may recall that the governor said that they would have to drag his feet to the fire to get him to ever sign that, but he did sign it. While I am not an advocate of withholding, the governor did sign it, and it meant a lot of money to the state.

D: At that time do you recall that either you or any others on the so-called "kitchen cabinet" were disturbed by the governor's endorsement or acquiescence in withholding?

M: Not particularly. The problems were difficult and severe, and something had to be done. Of course, when you withhold, you get the money in advance, and that makes quite a difference in the cash flow. It had been recommended to the governor by several legislators and experienced people. I think "Cap" Weinberger also recommended it. He was heading up the finance division, and the legislature passed it. I would say if you looked at Governor Reagan's total tax program, related to savings also that were made, it put the state in an excellent financial position for many years. Actually, surpluses were acquired, and they were returned in one form or another through tax rebates or by giving people credit on their income tax in a certain proportion. There were different methods of refunding the money to the people. The governor was not in favor of having large surpluses around, because based on past performance he recognized that money available would be spent. I think if you look back now from the date that we are talking, because of inflation, the surpluses were much greater than anyone ever anticipated. When Proposition 13 was passed [1978], the state had such a large surplus that they were able to bail out the counties and cities and other segments of the state.

D: You had mentioned also in our earlier interview that at the time of the election of 1966 you felt that Brown was actually running the state at a deficit and was only able to go through the appearances of a balanced budget because of his use of accrual accounting in the last year or so of his administration.

M: Yes.

D: Does not withholding in effect become somewhat similar to accrual accounting in that in both cases the state is obtaining funds in advance, or at least in bookkeeping, giving the appearances of having funds in advance of spending?

M: I think there is something similar in it, but actually the withholding did produce a surplus. So it wasn't quite the same in that accrual accounting was actually changing the fundamental method that the state had used for decades in being on a cash basis. When you make comparisons, there is a somewhat similar situation in that money is available at an earlier date than it would be otherwise, but it's cash and not an account receivable.

D: Prior to offering the tax program that included withholding to the legislature, do you recall, did Governor Reagan discuss this with your little group of advisers?

M: Not that I recall. This group was not what you would call a permanent group. It varied from time to time in its membership. I shouldn't say membership, but rather the people who were working with the governor. As the years went by there were new people brought in who were active politically. The second campaign had new people who weren't in the first campaign because of the relationships that had been developed during the governor's first administration. I don't recall a discussion of that, but from time to time the governor would have a group in and would mention problems and ask for suggestions and welcome ideas and suggestions.

D: Prior to the tax program, perhaps the most celebrated idea I can recall that the governor put forth to try to restore what was in his estimation fiscal solvency to the state, was a 10 percent across the board spending cut. I think it was his first finance director who brought this idea in. Do you recall whose idea that initially was? Was that a campaign pledge that the governor had made or did it come from another source?

M: It's been so long ago I don't recall it. I don't recall any 10 percent . . .

D: Finance director Gordon Smith, I believe, was the first one to put forth this proposal.

M: Gordon Smith was the first finance director.

D: But I'm not sure whether it was his or whether it was Reagan's. I was curious. You don't recall that the little "kitchen cabinet" group ever discussed that?

M: I don't recall it ever being discussed.

D: Now, going from financial legislation to other legislation in general during the first administration, do you recall any proposals or actual passed legislation that you would regard as particularly outstanding on the one hand or which particularly disturbed you on the other hand?

M: Many of the things that were done were administrative decisions that had a wide influence in which I was particularly interested. For example, the governor was aware that under the previous governor, [Edmund] "Pat" Brown, the numbers of people on the state payroll were increasing on an average of 7 percent per year. So in eight years that would, compounded, be maybe 60 percent or so. The governor decided that he was going to try and hold the numbers of people on the state payroll at pretty much the level at which he came in. It would not be done through firings, but it would be done through attrition. Then, as the state grew, of course, some people would have to be added. As I recall, in the eight years the governor's administration was in power, the number of people on the total state payroll was approximately the same. There's always this question of who's included in the total state payroll, whether you include all of the personnel related to state universities and colleges and so forth. That was a growing segment of the total payroll, but when it came down to direct employment by the state, the governor really concentrated on keeping it at a level which did not increase over what it was. That was a real accomplishment, in my experience. It's so easy to add people. But it was done, I think, with good finesse. For example, in the corporation department of the state, a young man by the name of Robert Volk was appointed and took the responsibility. In his case, I think, he reduced the number of people in that department by over 25 percent. Yet, it was done over a period of time. There was no general exodus of employees. If we're talking about the total eight years, one of the items that the governor attempted to accomplish was to limit taxation in the state. That was in his second administration. That was Proposition 1 [1973 special election]. It was opposed, generally, by organizations such as state employees. Robert Moretti, who was then speaker [of the California State Assembly], opposed it and gave leadership to the opposition. The public schools generally opposed it. The unions opposed it, and it was defeated, not by a large vote, but it was defeated. However, it was the beginning of some of the legislation that has been enacted around the country to limit taxation in relation to gross national product and other indices.

D: And you feel that it was a sound idea?

M: I think it was a sound idea.

D: How about appointments? Were there any appointments that he made that you though were ill-advised? You had mentioned that at least early in his first administration there was a good deal of screening of candidates by your advisory group. Did you ever feel that sometimes either your advice was not being taken or some people quite the opposite of the ones you would have recommended ended up getting positions?

M: Well, I think I mentioned before that when a governor comes into office, it's like taking over the biggest business in the state, and it is. There are tremendous numbers of appointments to be made, and it's not possible for one individual or a group of individuals to be acquainted even with the numbers of people that are needed or with their qualifications. So it becomes a real job to get that accomplished. Of course, the governor does appoint a secretary for appointments, and I think he had good men in those jobs who had a political background as well as a background which would make it possible for them to consider the merits.

D: Who were those men during his two administrations?

M: Paul Haerle at one time. I think Tom Reed was the first one. Tom Reed later went on to become Secretary of the [United States] Air Force. Tom Reed was very active politically and a very intelligent person. The governor established some parameters relative to what he was looking for, especially in the first administration. That was to find people who had backgrounds in the fields that were needed and could provide information and assistance based on personal backgrounds. We did get a number of people to go up there for a limited period of time, in many instances at a great sacrifice pertaining to their personal financial situations. A fellow by the name of Ned Hutchinson was in the position for a considerable period of time. Ned also was an excellent man. Of course, when you're in the appointments job, there are many people seeking positions, and there are many sources of recommendations: the legislators themselves, people who are running the departments who know of certain people that they feel would be helpful to them in administrating their departments, [and] political people in the counties and cities. When the governor first went into office, the mail relating to recommendations for appointments was overwhelming--as it is now in Washington. (laughter) It's so massive that you can't even respond to it.

D: But you can't recall any specific appointments that particularly surprised you or disappointed you?

M: I'm trying to recall. Of course, there were a large number of appointments which I had no information about because of the numbers involved, but I can't recall one that irritated or aggravated. I

know there was one made that got quite a bit of political reaction, and that was "Cappy" Weinberger. Some of the Republicans had placed him in the position of being a liberal. There are so many people who do like to categorize and put people in a position which isn't warranted at all. But "Cappy" Weinberger did an outstanding job, and I heard the governor say on more than one occasion what a tremendous asset he was to the administration. He did talk about the heat he got when he appointed him, but that died down rather rapidly. "Cap" Weinberger did an excellent job, and now he's in Washington with one of the toughest jobs in the country [Secretary of Defense].

D: From the issues that you have discussed--the governor's tax program, the governor's holding the line on appointments, the governor's appointment of Weinberger as finance director--I would be inclined to draw the conclusion that what most interested you about Reagan and his administration were in effect his economic decisions.

M: Yes.

D: In general, do you recall that the group of advisers with which you've been grouped, the so-called "kitchen cabinet," was as concerned, say, with what he did with the University of California or in areas like crime control or his welfare plan. Were any of these as significant an issue to you as the matter of the economy and taxes and hiring?

M: I remember him talking one time about the University of California, and, of course, the University of California was in the newspapers considerably because of the rioting. There was a lot of unpopularity among the general public relating to students who had an opportunity to go on to higher education for what appeared to many to be a lack of appreciation for their opportunities, especially with what was going on around the country with the burnings and destructive things that occurred. What was the president's name of the university who resigned?

D: Clark Kerr.

M: Yes, Clark Kerr. The governor was completely unaware, I believe, when he went to that [University of California] Regents' meeting that Clark Kerr was going to resign. The governor made no effort to get Clark Kerr to resign, as I recall him speaking later. You would have to get information from someone like William French Smith, who was a regent. I don't know whether he was a regent at the time. I think he was. The press in some instances made it appear that the governor was forcing a resignation on the part of Clark Kerr, but I don't believe that was so. It's an important point in history. I believe it was a unilateral decision on the part of Clark Kerr to resign.

D: That's something about which we'll have to see what other people say, because I certainly recall that the prevailing opinion, at least in academic institutions, was that Kerr was pretty much pressured into resigning. We'll be interested in seeing what other people have to say about that.

M: If you're interviewing Holmes Tuttle again, he may be more familiar with it, and certainly if you get an opportunity to interview William French Smith he would be more familiar with it.

D: We hope to do that in a year or so.

M: I think he still is a regent.

D: I believe he is.

M: Yes. Certainly, in my opinion, the governor has never been anti-education. I think certain things had to be done relating to the increased costs and inflation that required tuition on a modest basis. I believe it still is modest in relation to what private schools charge. Having worked my own way through college, I think it is possible for people to participate in the payment for an education, and sometimes I think it's more appreciated.

D: One other thing that Reagan not only made a considerable issue of as governor but seems to be stressing again with his recent appointment of a Supreme Court Justice, is the death penalty. Was this a matter of any great interest to you or other members of the "kitchen cabinet"?

M: I don't recall it ever being a subject of discussion, but I know that the governor, in the position papers that were put forth even in the first administration--before, in the election and in the primary--took a strong stand on capital punishment. I do believe that capital punishment is a deterrent. In fact, I served on a committee one time when later Governor ["Pat"] Brown was attorney general. It was a large group of people studying crime, and we visited some institutions, and on one occasion I recall listening to some people appealing to the parole board to encourage their own paroles. It was evident to me that in some of the discussions that occurred then, when the information was given relative to some of the people that were before the parole board on the question of whether they had a gun when they committed the offense, that the effort was made not to show a gun so it couldn't be proved that they had a gun when they did a holdup or some other crime. I have long felt that capital punishment is a deterrent. I certainly don't feel it's a complete answer or deterrent by any means, but I do think there are some innocent people who would be alive today if capital punishment was the rule rather than the exception.

D: You mentioned you served on this committee. Do you recall the precise name of the committee?

M: I think it was known as "The Attorney General's Commission to Study Crime" or something of that nature. This was when ["Pat"] Brown was attorney general.

D: Oh, you mean the older Brown?

M: Yes, the older Brown.

D: That's right. The younger Brown was never attorney general, was he? Pardon me.

M: The younger Brown became secretary [of state] in the second administration.

D: Yes. Secretary of state.

M: I think I mentioned to you in our first interview about Secretary of State Frank Jordan's stroke and the fact that he was completely disabled. His wife had the power of attorney and could have resigned for him, but they couldn't afford to resign because of the salary and the health benefits available to them in his position as secretary of state. The governor would have had an opportunity to appoint if he had resigned or if his wife had resigned him or if he had died, but as fate would have it, it left the door open for now Governor ["Jerry"] Brown to become secretary of state. He did well politically with the office and succeeded Governor Reagan.

D: Now, one thing I know that Reagan did quite a bit was to appoint task forces to study various things. Besides the Governor's Committee on Efficiency and Cost Control, which we've discussed, were you appointed to any other task forces?

M: No, I was not on any of those task forces because I was pretty much working in the fund raising effort. In the first two years, I think I mentioned to you, I was treasurer of the Republican State Central Committee, the finance chairman of the State Central Committee, and the representative for California on the National Republican Finance Committee. So that was plenty of activity. (laughter) I also held a portion of that position as finance chairman for the state committee in the seventh year of the governor's term. I was involved in money raising a considerable portion of the time. We had an annual Governor's Inauguration Dinner, usually in Sacramento, and we raised money. There was a real need for money for items that were political in nature, or that could not properly be charged to the state.

National GOP Committee members Edward Mills and Janet Johnston
with Governor Ronald Reagan

D: This pretty much ruled out your being on any of the task forces?

M: It didn't rule it out, but [it was] the time consideration.

D: Time, yes.

M: I've always enjoyed fund raising. Some people don't like it, but I've been reasonably successful at it. It was challenging. I was campaign chairman for southern California in the general election before the first administration, and both terms I was vice chairman for the state for the finance committee.

D: Did you also do fund raising in the off gubernatorial year campaigns of 1968 and 1972?

M: Yes. During 1967 and 1968, we had the Cal Plan, and later, also.

D: Is that C-A-L?

M: Yes. And the purpose of the Cal Plan was to determine which assembly and senate districts had the greatest potential for replacement of a Democrat. It was also where there were problems in maintaining a Republican situation, but principally it was to get additional Republican representatives in the state assembly and the state senate. When the governor came into office, the assembly was forty-one Democrats to thirty-nine Republicans. In 1968 we succeeded; it was forty-one Republicans to thirty-nine Democrats. I think I mentioned that if we had realized the coattails that Governor Reagan had in the first election and had worked harder and spent more money in a few districts, we probably would have had the majority in the first administration. But we did succeed in getting the majority in 1968. We elected a net increase of three so we reversed the situation. It became 41-39, and Bob Monagan became the speaker, replacing Unruh.

D: That, as I recall, didn't last very long, did it?

M: Well, it lasted until 1970. Two years; not long enough for the reapportionment. The census is taken every ten years, and that's the basis for the reapportionment, and not being in power in 1970 in the legislature, we weren't able to reapportion the state as the Republicans would have.

D: That raises an interesting question. You've mentioned Governor Reagan's coattail effect, and yet, when he ran successfully for reelection in 1970, he did not bring a majority of Republicans to either house, as I recall.

M: That's right.

D: Why do you think that was?

M: I think [it was] the economic condition in the country. The party suffered severe losses in every area of the nation. We lost a Republican assemblyman in the area around the Lockheed plant in Burbank. We lost one in the Douglas plant area in Long Beach, and we lost one in an area in San Jose. All of them were defense plant industrial areas but had high unemployment, and when you have high unemployment, people vote for a change. They're related politically, and I think that it was one of the major reasons. There are other reasons. When you are in office, you make enemies; but he won substantially. Of course, Unruh, in my opinion, wasn't the candidate that Brown was, if you look at it that way. It's hard to make these comparisons, you know, from election to election, and sometimes people don't get as excited. They say, "Well, it's a cinch" so they don't vote, whereas when you're out of office, you can quite often stir up a greater interest in making the change. It was a good majority, and the fact that we didn't maintain our situation in the legislature was unfortunate from the Republican viewpoint. When you look at the registration in California, it's an uphill fight for the Republicans to gain the position that they have. If you look at the percentage vote that the Republicans get in elections, they don't turn that into that percentage in the legislative bodies in Congress or in the state of California particularly, because of the gerrymandering that's done in the legislative districts.

D: All right. Going on to the very end of the Reagan tenure as governor, I think you mentioned last time that he never seriously considered running for a third term as governor.

M: I believe he had a commitment, and he made that quite early, that he would not go for a third term.

D: Do you recall that the so-called "kitchen cabinet" was in any way involved in thinking about or screening possible successors to Reagan as the 1974 gubernatorial election approached?

M: Well, Ed Reinecke was the lieutenant governor, and he'd been selected by Governor Reagan. Ed had been a congressman, and the governor appointed him while he was an active congressman. There was discussion on who should succeed Lieutenant Governor Bob Finch when Bob Finch went to Washington [in 1969]. The governor did solicit ideas relative to a replacement, and my own recommendation at the time was that Evelle Younger be appointed to the position. I was aware that Evelle Younger was interested in running for attorney general. I had been in his campaign for district attorney for Los Angeles County, and I knew that if he were appointed it would be helpful to him in running for the attorney general's position.

I just thought it would be a good appointment. Evelle Younger did succeed in becoming the attorney general. Unfortunately, Ed Reinecke was indicted by the [U. S.] Senate committee which was investigating Watergate, and he had been involved with a commitment made by the ITT organization relating to the Republican National Convention then being planned for San Diego. Indictment is a very severe thing in a political career, and it crippled Ed, I would say, regardless of the merits. Of course, when you become involved in politics, you have to live with your decisions whatever you do. Personally, I think that Ed Reinecke should not have contended for the governorship in 1974. Flournoy had served for eight years as controller and did a good job. As far as people lining up that were in the so-called "kitchen cabinet," I think many people were personally favorable to Ed Reinecke, but they recognized the difficulties under which he campaigned. Unfortunately, there was a primary battle, and it takes more money for two candidates to run than one. Flournoy wound up with a huge deficit in his primary and wasn't able to launch his general campaign because of the financial situation until really too late. The polls were showing him, as I recall, twenty points or so behind ["Jerry"] Brown. I think the Republican party suffered severely from Watergate. Flournoy came within five points of beating Brown, and I think if he'd had the money and had been able to become as well known as Brown, it might have made a difference. Many people don't recognize the importance of name recognition, whether it's in buying a product or voting for a candidate. That's one of the things I mentioned before that we had in Governor Reagan as a candidate, because he was well-known and had a recognition factor that was pretty high. Flournoy didn't achieve that. Then the controller's job, if you asked today, a very high percentage of people would be unable to tell you who the controller of the state is.

D: Were you active in fund raising in the 1974 campaign?

M: Yes. I stayed out of the primary, but I did help in the general. The governor maintained a neutral position, and some of us who were rather close to the governor because of previous campaigns, took the same position. I was active in the general campaign and raised some money for Flournoy. I also raised some money to help Ed Reinecke with his deficit.

D: Once Flournoy started into his full campaign, did he ever ask anyone of this "kitchen cabinet" to play somewhat the same role with him that you had played during the 1966 campaign? Or did he ever indicate that were he elected he would want you to be some sort of an informal adviser?

M: Not that I'm aware of. There were several people who helped him, but he had a different background. He was in politics, you know, as an assemblyman and then, I believe, he'd left political office for awhile. I'm not positive of that. Then he'd run for the controller's job in 1966 pretty much at the last minute and succeeded in beating Cranston, which was quite an accomplishment. There again, I attribute it to the Reagan coattails and the disenchantment generally with Democrats at the time. People were looking for a change. I couldn't say positively. I know I never was close to the Flournoy situation, although I did help raise money. I think you get into these things a little differently sometimes, and it's new groups and new people. I think a lot of Hugh Flournoy. I think he's a very fine person. I think he would have been a good governor. I don't think he's as hard a worker as Reagan. Although Reagan sometimes is referred to as a "nine-to-five" executive, I think he has his mind on things quite a bit. I think he's making up his mind on the various issues. Flournoy didn't impress me as being as hard a worker.

D: Well, I think this concludes most of the questions that I have, and I want to thank you very much again for consenting to these interviews.

M: Thank you, Dr. de Graaf.

END OF INTERVIEW

California Government History Documentation Project

Ronald Reagan Era

HOLMES TUTTLE

An Interview Conducted By

Steven D. Edgington

OH 1675

Oral History Program

California State University, Fullerton

HOLMES TUTTLE

HOLMES TUTTLE

This interview with Holmes Tuttle (T) was conducted by Steven D. Edgington (E), Researcher-Editor for the California State University, Fullerton branch of the California Government History Documentation Project at Mr. Tuttle's home on June 9, 1981.

E: Mr. Tuttle, can we begin by having you talk about your family and your early childhood?

T: Surely. I was born in the Indian Territory in 1905 in what two years later became the state of Oklahoma. My parents were cattle ranchers. After the Civil War, they moved into the "Territory" from Texas in the latter part of the nineteenth century and settled in what is now the town of Tuttle on the South Canadian River. They still had a sizeable ranch of several thousand acres when I was born, the seventh of ten children, and we lived there until 1918. I went to school on our ranch. My father donated a little place on our ranch, about ten acres, so that a school could be built. They had a schoolhouse with eight grades, and that's where I started my schooling. Later on I left there and went to a boarding school in Minco. When we left the ranch in 1918 and moved into town, I attended high school in Tuttle, Oklahoma. Later on in 1920 we moved to Oklahoma City, where I finished my high school grades. But, unfortunately, my father fell into hard times, as most of the cattlemen did during that time. I hate to use the word, but he lost his entire fortune. After a few years, he passed away in 1922, and it was necessary for me to go to work. I went to work in 1923 for the Ford Motor Company in Oklahoma City in an assembly plant. I stayed there in Oklahoma City until 1926. Then I took, supposedly at that time, a leave of absence to come to California with a friend of mine. As a young boy I liked what I saw here in California, and I decided to stay. Fortunately, I went to work the day after Christmas in 1926 for the man who's now my associate, Charlie Cook, and we've been together ever since.

E: I believe there's a story behind your trip out here to California. Is there a particular way that you got out here?

T: Well, a friend and I heard some boys talk about coming to California to attend their fraternity meetings out here and that they hitched a ride and so forth. This friend of mine, Bob Scott, who was a very close friend, almost like a brother, had lost his job with the Ford Motor Company. Naturally, he was desirous of saving all the money he could, and we decided that we would go out hitching a ride to California. That was quite an experience. Instead of it taking three or four days to get here, it took us over two weeks. We hitched our rides, and for a short time we even rode on a freight train, which was something new to me. I know that my mother was quite concerned about us taking this trip. I'm sure if she had known exactly what we were doing, she'd have been terribly upset. But it

was a great experience. Bob Scott had a brother who lived in Los Angeles, and that's how I got to work for Mr. Cook. A friend of his introduced me to Mr. Cook, a Ford dealer in town. I decided then that I did not want to go back to the factory if I could find a job in the retail business. I didn't think that the factory held the same opportunities for me for the future. Having known some of my friends in Oklahoma that had got into the retail business, I felt that it would afford me a better opportunity to achieve the things I wanted to achieve. So I think I made the right move.

I went to work for Mr. Cook in 1926, and we've been together ever since. I worked with him in Whittier for three or four years. I lived there with Charlie Cook's mother and sister, and I became a member of the family. Finally, in 1930, they sold the agencies, and we came to town and opened up the agency on Sunset and Broadway on June 1, 1930. We stayed there during the Depression, worked hard, and were able to survive. We were very proud of it. We were the only new dealer that came in, in 1930, that did not go broke; but we worked hard. Maybe we didn't have more ability, but maybe we just worked a little harder than the other dealers.

Finally, in 1936, we got into the heavy duty equipment business. When the war started, all the automobile dealers closed up, but we still had our heavy duty equipment business. We were busy all during the war building these big heavy duty dump trucks and single trucks for contractors. But at the end of the war the Ford Motor Company and, naturally, all the manufacturers were anxious to get back into the business. They had closed up most of their dealerships because, as you know, they had put a freeze on all cars and trucks at the beginning of the war.

Now after the war, the Ford Motor Company was desirous of getting dealers established on the other side of town. So they came to me and asked if I would go out on the west side, where they didn't have a dealership, and asked if I would be interested in opening up a dealership out there. At that time I didn't know whether I wanted to or not. We were into the heavy duty truck business; it was interesting, I enjoyed it, and it was profitable. So I didn't know whether I wanted to go back into the retail business, but they convinced me that we should, so we opened up a place. We started building that place before the war ended, and we opened up in 1946. We kept going and in 1950 we obtained another dealership. In 1955 we obtained a third dealership in Beverly Hills. The one in 1950 was a Lincoln-Mercury dealership. The one in Beverly Hills was also a Lincoln-Mercury dealership. Then in 1958 we obtained a Ford dealership in Tucson, Arizona. Later on in Arizona we established another Ford dealership. Our boys now are running the dealerships. We have the two in Arizona, one in Beverly Hills, one in Los Angeles, and we're just opening up another dealership on La Brea Avenue in Los Angeles,

The Valley News

Tuesday, October 9, 1973

AUTO DEALER HONORED BY 400

50-Year Career Noted in Tribute to Holmes Tuttle

A luncheon noting the half-century mark in the career of prominent Beverly Hills auto dealer Holmes Tuttle was also a family tribute arranged by his wife and their children.

The observance Friday at the Beverly Wilshire Hotel honored Tuttle's years with the Ford Motor Co. which started in 1923 when Tuttle joined the Ford assembly plant in Oklahoma City, Okla. He came to California in 1926 on a freight train.

Learned of Plans

His career as businessman and Republican leader is chronicled in a brochure, prepared by his family for the anniversary event, which calls it "Fifty Golden Years."

The luncheon was readied as a surprise to Tuttle — until the list of distinguished guests, including Tuttle's friends, Gov. and Mrs. Ronald Reagan, grew rather long.

Tuttle was told of the plans 10 days prior to the date to be sure that he would be there also.

Some 400 guests were at the luncheon and were greeted by Mr. and Mrs. Tuttle, their daughter Sally (Mrs. Boone Gross Jr.), and granddaughter Kathy Gross.

The Tuttles' son, Robert H. Tuttle, who became president of Holmes Tuttle Ford and Beverly Lincoln-Mercury in 1971, was master of ceremonies.

Paid Tribute

A part of the luncheon decor was a shiny Ford of the 1923 vintage. Now an expensive antique on loan from the Los Angeles Carriage Club, the Model T was purchasable in 1923 for $450.

Speakers paying tribute to Tuttle, in addition to Gov. Reagan, included the Hon. Alfred P. Murrah, director of the Federal Judicial Center, Washington, D.C.; Ernest R. Breech, honorary chairman and director emeritus of TWA and honorary director of Dart Industries, and Justin Dart, chairman of the board and president of Dart Industries.

Speaking also was Boone Gross Jr., president of Christiana Companies Inc. and son-in-law of the guest of honor. The Rev. Don Moomaw of Bel Air Presbyterian Church delivered the invocation.

In his response, Tuttle led a standing ovation to his spouse and principal planner of the program. The auto dealer married the former Virginia Harris on Aug. 7, 1934, in West Los Angeles.

First Major

The brochure depicts Tuttle's life from his birthplace on Tuttle Ranch, near Tuttle, Okla. through the many steps of his career. As son of James H. Tuttle and Carrie Tuttle, part Chickasaw Indian, Holmes Tuttle was enrolled as a member of the Chickasaw Tribe.

In California, Tuttle worked in Whittier and Puente before his first major job as sales manager for the new Cook Brothers Ford, organized in 1930 by Charles and Howard Cook at Sunset Blvd. and Broadway in Los Angeles.

He opened Holmes Tuttle Ford in 1946 at Beverly Blvd. and La Brea Ave. in Los Angeles and Holmes Tuttle Lincoln-Mercury on La Brea in 1950 and acquired Beverly Lincoln-Mercury in Beverly Hills in 1955.

Tuttle later started Ford dealerships in Tucson, Ariz., and in 1968 established in Beverly Hills the first exclusive Lincoln agency in the United States.

Elected to Board

He was active in the Presidential campaigns of Dwight D. Eisenhower and Richard Nixon and the gubernatorial campaign of Ronald Reagan. He helped organize "Friends for Ronald Reagan" and was cochairman with Henry Salvatori of the Reagan campaign finance committee.

In 1958 Tuttle was elected to the board of Dart Industries and in 1961 he was named to the boards of Challenge-Cook Brothers and Community Bank. In 1969 he became a member of the board of TWA.

Robert Tuttle introduced his father's sister, Mrs. Bill Riley of Oklahoma City; his father's nephew, Chevrolet dealer Jim Click, and his family and the master of ceremony's own wife, Donna Tuttle.

Another "family" guest was Mrs. Fred Jones, widow of a former Oklahoma City business associate of Holmes Tuttle.

Guests Named

Other guests were State Controller Houston I. Flournoy, State Atty. Gen. Evelle J. Younger, Sheriff Peter J. Pitchess, Councilman John Ferraro (Fourth District), Justice William P. Clarke Jr., Putnam Livermore and Mike Deaver and Edwin Meese III of the Governor's staff and their wives.

Attending as guests from the Valley were attorney Roland Rich Woolley, his daughter, Mary Alice Woolley, and Ferdinand Mendenhall, all of whom have been active with Holmes Tuttle in Republican presidential and gubernatorial election campaigns.

Among additional guests were Charles Cook, Mrs. Justin Dart, Mr. and Mrs. Steve Dart, Mr. and Mrs. Freeman Gosden, Mervyn LeRoys, Mr. and Mrs. Pat Nerney, Mark Taper, Sally Cobb, Mrs. Paul Trousdale, Mr. and Mrs. Franklin Pollock, Stanley Rumbaugh Jr., George Dailey and Bill Lynch.

ACTIVE for many years in affairs of Republican party, Holmes Tuttle, left, Beverly Hills auto dealer, is shown with Gov. Ronald Reagan and former President Dwight D. Eisenhower. Reagan and Mrs. Reagan were guests at 50th anniversary luncheon honoring Tuttle.

HONORED GUEST at anniversary celebration, Holmes Tuttle, whose service with Ford Motor Co. spans 50 years, is shown with wife, Virginia who led planning for luncheon tribute to her husband.

which is a Pontiac agency. We also opened up a Ford agency last year in Irvine down in Orange County, one of the largest dealerships down there. We've also branched out into many other things. I became a director of the Community Bank and a director of Challenge-Cook Brothers, which is our heavy duty equipment company. Mr. Cook and my family are still associated.

E: Could you tell how you first got involved in politics or became active in politics?

T: I have always been involved, even if only in a very small way. In 1930 I was living in Pasadena and I was a part of the local community drive to solicit money and get people to the polls. I was always interested in politics and thought that one should take an interest in it. In fact, I was interested in politics in high school. I tell the story of when I was going to a private school in 1916. My father was a "Bull Mooser" [Theodore Roosevelt progressive], and I was a Republican when Hughes ran against Wilson. I went to bed that night thinking that Hughes had won, and I woke up the next morning and we had lost. I had kidded my good friend that night, and he kidded me that next morning, but I wasn't a good sport about it so we kind of got in a little argument. Anyhow, I've always been interested, and as I said, I took an interest in our community of Pasadena and in the elections after the war, when [Thomas] Dewey ran for President in 1948, and when President [Dwight] Eisenhower ran for office the first time. Then in 1956, I really got interested through my good friend, Justin Dart, who was then the finance chairman for Eisenhower. I never will forget the day that "Jus" walked into my office, closed the door, and said, "Holmes, I want a $5,000 contribution." I said, "Jus, you've lost your cotton-pickin' mind!" Well, "Jus" is a pretty persuasive person. He not only got the $5,000, but he put me to work. I was working morning, noon, and night assisting him in the fund raising.

E: That was in 1956?

T: In 1956. Then in 1958 we worked on the state campaign here, when Knowland came out and ran for governor and "Goody" [Goodwin] Knight ran for the [U. S.] Senate. We took a terrible defeat. Then I got interested in the 1960 campaign. I have always taken a great interest in politics and felt that we businessmen had the most to be concerned about. I think that's been one of the problems, that we in business who had more to be concerned about than anybody else would say, "Well, we don't want to get mixed up in politics." I think we found out that was a bitter lesson for us, that we let the politicians do it and we didn't have the right people in there. We just sat back. A lot of our problems today we have created ourselves.

E: Did that change the degree of your involvement, would you say, when you worked for Eisenhower in 1952 and 1956?

T: Yes, it did, especially in 1956, because for practically three months I was helping Mr. Dart morning, noon, and night. I worked with "Jus" in the finance center that he ran, going all over the country and raising money. That was really what I would call the start of my active involvement.

E: Did you know Mr. Dart before then?

T: Yes, I had met him. He came out here, you know, after he became head of the Rexall Drug Company. He moved the headquarters, moved it lock, stock and barrel, from Boston out to Los Angeles just down the street from where I have my office. I got to know him well.

E: There have been references in written sources about your being known during the Eisenhower period as a liberal Republican. Would you like to respond to that?

T: I have never liked that, when they begin to put labels on you. I was not a so-called liberal Republican; I was just a Republican. I don't think that over all the years that I have been registered that I have changed my belief. I felt that the Republican Party best served the things that I feel this country stands for. I think how that reputation as a liberal Republican came about was through the [Ohio Senator Robert] Taft-Eisenhower choice in 1952. Sure, I was a Taft man. I think he was a great man, a great senator, and would have made a great President. But I felt that Eisenhower, when they convinced him he should run and he went to the [Republican National] Convention in Chicago, certainly had a better chance to win. I felt that he was probably--I hesitate to use the label--"conservative,"--but his beliefs were the same as Taft's and mine. So I changed. I guess that some people criticized me for it when I changed and went to Eisenhower. I supported him again in 1956. Of course, you remember that President Eisenhower did not have any opposition at that time, but I think that is how that reputation came about.

As far as Holmes Tuttle is concerned, I don't think I have ever changed. I have remained the same in my beliefs, which are typically Republican. I think this country is for free enterprise and I strongly believe in the capitalist system. I felt that, starting in the [Franklin D.] Roosevelt period, we were beginning to get away from that. We were creating all these agencies and, unfortunately, when you create one of those during an emergency, they are never dissolved. They just keep funding them and funding them, when they were supposedly set up for a short time for an emergency. I think President Roosevelt would turn over in his grave today if he knew that some of the things he started would be where they are today.

I don't think he ever intended it. For instance, Social Security started at one-half of one percent, and now it's up to . . . well, I hate to even talk about it and some of the other programs.

Anyhow, that is where we are. I have not changed my beliefs. I just became especially concerned as things got worse. I think a man who was ahead of his time was Senator Barry Goldwater, Sr. Senator Goldwater was speaking out on some of the things that our government was doing that he thought were not the responsibility of the federal government. He felt they were interfering with states' rights and also the private rights of the individuals, you understand. I certainly concurred with that. I was concerned about it; my associates and I were concerned about it. Unfortunately, I think the Vietnam War caused his defeat. Lyndon Johnson was well known on his voting record as an extreme liberal. However, he was able to come in and convince people that he was conservative. He wasn't. He was anything but conservative. He was a politician; whatever it took to be elected. He would go to the businessmen and convince them he was a conservative, and then go over to the other group next door and convince them he was a liberal. The record speaks for itself. He got more of the social programs through in his administration than all of the other presidents put together, and we are paying for it today. I think some of these people who would not help us in the 1964 campaign for Senator Goldwater deeply regret that they supported a man like President Johnson.

E: When and under what circumstances did you meet Ronald Reagan?

T: I met Ronald Reagan right after the war. I met him through his wife, Jane Wyman. She was a good friend of some very, very close friends of ours, so, naturally, we met her and Ronald Reagan. As long as they were married we would see each other occasionally, but only socially. Ronald Reagan, in his high school days and his college days, was always interested in politics and history and so forth. He was quite outspoken in his beliefs, and several times when we were together we had--I'll put it this way--some spirited discussions. Then, after he and Jane Wyman were divorced, I did not see too much of Ron until he married Nancy Davis, and then, occasionally, we would see them socially.

Reagan first registered as a Republican in 1962, and then it was natural that we began to see each other more often, during the 1960 campaign and the 1962 campaign. Then in the 1964 campaign we went together--Nancy, Ron, my wife Virginia, and I, with Henry Salvatori and his wife--to the Republican National Convention in San Francisco. Of course, we worked hard before that in quite a spirited campaign here in California between Goldwater and Rockefeller. We pulled quite an upset, because the odds were two to one or three to one that Rockefeller would win, but he didn't, Goldwater won. So we went

to the convention together.[1] Then, after that, Salvatori was the leader of the Goldwater campaign here in California. He appointed Ronald Reagan as cochairman, along with Phil Davis, another co-chairman. All this time, Ron was going up and down the state and in other parts of the country speaking for Goldwater, wherever they asked him to go.

Of course, Mr. Salvatori and I were busy trying to raise the money, and it was difficult to raise the money. It was difficult because the Eastern establishment and also the polls showed that Goldwater didn't have much of a chance. But at that time we didn't believe in polls too much, and we worked hard. We decided that we had to do something, that we had to have money. So we decided that we would put on a $1,000 a plate dinner here in Los Angeles, which was unheard of at that time. They had been used to having $100 dinners, or occasionally, if they would want to really go for it, they would have one for $200, but we decided we would have a $1,000 a plate dinner. They asked me if I would run it, and I said, "Sure," and I did.

We decided that Ronald Reagan would be our principal speaker. Rather than import somebody else, we thought that he would be good. That night was kind of the start for him politically. He first said, "Should I talk ten minutes?" I said, "No, I wish you'd talk a little longer. You're going to be the only principal speaker, and in fact, the only speaker other than a few remarks from myself, and they are going to be short." So he was our speaker. After he got through, I was besieged--my goodness--by people that said, "He spoke of the issues, of the things that we are concerned about: government involvement, all these social programs, and all this 'womb to tomb' spending and so forth. We feel our federal government is taking a position that the Constitution never intended for it to do." So anyhow, we were besieged with requests to put it on tape to let people know about it throughout the country. So we did. First, we were going to do it statewide, but then there was such a demand for it that we put it on national tape. At the bottom of the tape we put a little rider on it saying, "Please send in your check." It looked like the national campaign was going to have a substantial deficit, but because of the film the money kept pouring into the bank. So instead of having a deficit, they had a surplus because millions of dollars came into the bank.

However, we took a bad defeat. We always say we had 26 million strong, but Johnson had 41 million. So we kind of licked our wounds and decided that we had to do something about it. We couldn't give up. We didn't want that to be the demise of the Republican Party, so we thought the best way to start rebuilding was here in California. I came up with the idea that, "Here. Here's a man. Why should we look

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[1]Henry Salvatori and Holmes Tuttle were delegates. Ronald Reagan was an alternate. Ed.

any further for a candidate? If the people of this country respond to him like they did in this speech and are concerned about the things that he enumerated, why shouldn't we consider him as our candidate here in the state of California, the largest state in the union, to run for governor?" My associates at that time, Ed Mills, [A. C.] "Cy" Rubel and Henry Salvatori--there were only the four of us--talked about it, and I said, "Why shouldn't we see if we can convince Ronald Reagan to give up his career and run for the office of governor of California." Anyhow, we thought that might be a good idea, so I went to see him. In fact, Mrs. Tuttle went with me, and we spent the evening at Ron's home. At that time I presented the idea: what would he think of running for governor of the state of California? I said that I felt that we had to start rebuilding, and if he would, we were committed to see that he got the necessary funds and the organization to run. We knew that it was a big decision for him to make, because here was a man who was doing quite well in his profession. If he did decide to run, he would naturally have to cancel his contracts. That was quite a decision. We decided that night that he would talk to his family, talk to some of his friends, and we would discuss this with other people, and we would keep in touch with each other. After about thirty days--I never will forget--he called me and told me that he would run if we still felt the same way. He and Nancy had discussed it and decided we should try it. He suggested that instead of announcing that he was going to run, we should just kind of put feelers out. He could go throughout the state wherever he could, speaking to service clubs or any groups of people we could get together and expound his theories, his concerns, his philosophy, and so forth. So fine; we did. But not too surprisingly the response to it was overwhelming, and he kept getting stacks of mail at his home. That's when we acquired the services of [Stuart] Spencer-[Bill] Roberts [political] consulting firm]. We made a deal with Spencer-Roberts--Mr. Salvatori, Mr. Rubel, Mr. Mills, and myself--that they would manage the effort if we decided to announce that he would be a candidate in the primary [election campaign]. We then formed what we called the Friends of Ronald Reagan.

E: Since you did meet him in 1946 when he was a Democrat, and you have had contact with him since then, how do you account for his change in political outlook?

T: I think that it was because he became president of the Screen Actors Guild. As you know, they had a real problem. They had a strike, and it was a very bitter one. There was a lot of picketing and it got very involved. I think at that time Ron decided those people, who he thought were his friends, and who were Democrats, were involved the most in this socialist--I don't like to use the other word--this socialist trend. I think he thought he was being duped. In fact, he has always said, "My party left me; I didn't leave my party."

They were getting to be so much on the left. If you recall, that's when they had the hearings back in Washington. I don't know whether Ron would agree with me, but I have always felt that this convinced him that the things he felt his party stood for had been abandoned and that they were drifting down the road to socialism. Again, his party left him; he didn't leave his party. I think his brother also had an affect on him, as other people did, and he began to grow up in his views. I don't think that there's any question about it. As you know, during that period, there was quite a discussion in some of the hearings at Washington about some of these people who were in the industry that were quite on the left or leaning to the left. I think it [the strike] had its effect and its influence.

E: Do you have any recollections of Reagan working for Eisenhower when he was in "Democrats for Ike"?

T: No, I didn't come in contact with Ron at that time. I knew about it. He was in "Democrats for Ike," but they set that up in a completely separate organization, and I was working so hard with Mr. Dart morning, noon and night, raising money, that I didn't get involved in it. I knew about it, but I would leave the house every morning at 6:30 or 7:00, holding breakfasts and lunches and raising money. I spent 99 percent of my time on that and didn't get into the actual political end of it. I was just strictly raising money in that 1956 campaign.

E: What do you remember about Reagan or--let's make this a double question. What do you remember about Reagan's role or your own role in the 1960 Nixon campaign?

T: Well, as you know, Ron is a master at speaking. He went up and down the state speaking and working for Nixon. My role was at the local level helping the county organization and helping them raise money. We have never found any substitute yet for political organizations or for money. You have to have large sums of money. But my involvement where we first actually worked closely with Ron was in 1962 and 1964.

E: Speaking of the 1962 campaign, the Republican primary was Richard Nixon against Joe Shell.

T: Joe Shell. That was a bitter one.

E: What do you recall about that?

T: Well, until Vice President Nixon came out here, it was pretty well understood that we were all going to support Joe Shell. Joe was doing a good job. He was the minority leader at that time in the California State Assembly in Sacramento. There was no question that

Joe would have been the nominee. But then a group--and I didn't participate in it, but I encouraged them--went to convince Nixon that he should run. It would be a good way to get back into things if he wanted to run for the office of President again. It looked like he would be a cinch to be the nominee and win the election for governor of California. They convinced him, and I know that Joe Shell never quite forgave me. I know that it was a difficult decision for Mr. "Cy" Rubel, because "Cy" was very close to Joe Shell. He stayed with him during the primary. But then, of course, because Mr. Rubel was a good, loyal Republican, he worked hard for us after the primary.

When we came out with Ronald Reagan for governor in 1965, Joe Shell was really bitter against me. He never hesitated to talk about it, because he felt that we were throwing him overboard. Why should we take a man that had never run for any office and place him in nomination over and above him? I know his family was quite bitter. I tried to tell Joe and his family, especially his wife, that I was doing this because I felt that Ron was a good Republican, his views now were well-established, and I felt that he was the man who could beat [Governor "Pat"] Brown. And I wanted to win. I was tired of losing. I had gone through the 1964 campaign, and sure, we came out 26 million strong, but we lost the [U. S.] Senate, we lost the House, we lost both the assembly and the senate here in the state, and we were in bad repair throughout the country. I wanted to win. I tried to convince him, but they never did quite forgive me. But I stayed true to my beliefs, and I thought that we could win, and so did Mr. Salvatori and Mr. Rubel. I know it was difficult for Mr. Rubel. Many times we had Joe down to the office, talked to him, and told him we would like him to be a part of the campaign and a part of the administration. He was a good leader when he was in the assembly, but we never did convince him.

E: There seems to be a theme or a pattern developing with your political involvement, the whole theme of the unity of the party and balancing different persuasions within the party to make a good showing.

T: Well, I don't like to pat myself on the back. I will say that the Republicans, as a minority party, must have unity in the party. Whenever we've been unified, we've always won or made a credible showing. In 1964 we were not; we were divided. It was the same way in 1962. Nixon never did get the party back together. He came out and made some statements about the extremists, the Birchers [John Birch Society], and read them out of the party. That's what defeated him. We needed everybody. That didn't mean that we ever espoused what the Birchers did. For instance, in 1966 when Ron ran for the governorship, if the Birchers supported us, they accepted our philosophy. We were able to bring the people together.

Just to give you an idea of what it took, when we announced in 1966, there were a lot of people--good friends of ours who are now strong Reagan people--who were for [San Francisco Mayor George] Christopher: Justin Dart, Len Firestone, Tom Pike, and a couple of people in San Francisco. But what we did, instead of trying to battle each other, was we would meet periodically, maybe once or twice a month, and say, "Now, look, let's just keep this thing on track, and after the primary, whoever wins, we'll get together." And we did. After the primary--the next morning--we were on their doorsteps saying, "Come on in!" We took all of them into a responsible position in the campaign.

It was the same way in 1980. I went throughout the country in this last election keeping everybody together. Unity, unity, unity. After the convention in Detroit, we brought everybody in: Democrats, minorities, and everybody else. Bring them into the party. Unity; you cannot win without it. I am a great believer in that. But I have never sacrificed my philosophy or my principles.

One of the things that I think helped Ron to win the election [in 1966] was getting the liberal vote, especially the Jewish vote, in southern California. I will never forget a meeting we attended. At that meeting we had about fifty or sixty of the most prominent Jewish people out at the Century Plaza Hotel, and they put the pressure on Ron to read the Birchers out of the party. Ron said, "Wait a minute; wait a minute. I'm not going to read those people out of the party. I don't espouse their beliefs. My philosophy, I think, is well-stated. If they work for me or support me, they accept my philosophy. You know what I stand for. Maybe there are some things that you stand for that I don't espouse, but if you support me, then you accept my philosophy." After that we had Taft Schreiber and Ted Cummings and some of the Jewish leaders. I think that meeting did more to convince the liberal wing of our party plus the Democrats here in southern California. I think in a large measure that helped us win the election against Pat Brown, because at that time he [Reagan] convinced people that he was not going to be wishy-washy, but he also was not going to read anybody out of the party.

E: We've already talked about your meeting with several of the later "kitchen cabinet" people. I think we've already touched on Justin Dart and Henry Salvatori and "Cy" Rubel. I'd like to ask you about a couple of others and have you reflect on when you met them and some other things about them.

T: All right.

E: Lee Kaiser.

T: Oh, Lee is a great man. I met Lee in 1962, and as you know, he ran for the [U. S.] Senate office, I think, in 1964.

E: Yes.

T: He ran in the primary against George Murphy but was defeated. I got to know Lee very well. I have so much respect for this man. Lee and I have become great friends. In fact, I just got a nice letter from him. He spends his winters down at Palm Springs. Lee came through here and, unfortunately, I was--leave it to me--sick and in the hospital. Lee is loyal. He worked hard. He gave of his time. He gave of his money. He never wavered from his beliefs. He's a great American. That's all I can say about him. He is great. We are still good friends, and he is still active in the party.

E: Taft Schreiber?

T: I have known Taft Schreiber a long time. Taft was strong for Christopher, he and Len Firestone and Ray Lee. I give Taft Schreiber credit after we won the primary--and I've told him this many times and so has the President--for bringing the majority of the Jewish vote, the Democratic vote, and the liberal wing of our party to Ron in 1966. I give him the credit. He was a loyal booster of Ron but, unfortunately, he got a little crosswise before his death. He felt that Ron should not run against [Gerald] Ford in 1976, and he and Mr. Firestone got a little crosswise on that. I feel everybody has a right to their own beliefs and their own thinking. I've always felt that Taft was sincere, a good American, and a hard worker. He and I remained good friends until, unfortunately, his very tragic death.

E: How about Leonard Firestone?

T: Well, with Leonard it was the same thing. Leonard's been a great friend of mine for years, he and his first wife, Polly. She was a great gal. We've spent a lot of time together. We worked hard in the Eisenhower campaign--Mrs. Firestone, too. They worked in the Eisenhower campaign. They worked hard in the 1958 campaign. He has always been generous with his time and his money. He worked hard in the 1960 campaign and in the 1962 campaign, but not so hard in the 1964 campaign. If I recall, he did endorse Goldwater. I'm not certain, but I think he did. He never was enthusiastic about Goldwater. He was for Christopher, and when we came out [started Reagan's candidacy for the 1966 election], he worked hard for Christopher. As I say, Christopher had Justin Dart, Tom Pike, Taft Schreiber and those people. He [Firestone] worked just as hard after the primary for Reagan, and when we made a "favorite son" run in 1968, he was down in Miami working just as hard as I was, calling on all the delegates. We all worked morning, noon, and night, and Len was right there, but he thought that the governor should not run against Ford in 1976.

E: I read something where Ronald Reagan was a little upset with Arch Monson during the 1966 primary because of some things that had gone on in the Christopher-Reagan primary battle. Then later, apparently, that healed. Do you want to say something about Monson?

T: No. No. It was exaggerated; it was never that serious. Arch was Christopher's campaign manager, but one of the things that Christopher got sore about was that he was upset with me. I felt they were using President Eisenhower. They showed his picture with Christopher and used it in their ads. I told them to cut it out. At that time President Eisenhower was a personal friend of mine. I talked to him and he liked Ron, but he remained neutral. However, I thought Christopher's campaign was taking advantage of him. I tried to get them to cut it out. When they wouldn't, I called President Eisenhower myself. I told him what the problem was, and he had his aide sit down and dictate a telegram to me. I asked him if I could use it, and he said, "You bet you can." So we, Mr. Salvatori and I, put ads in the paper of that telegram, and that infuriated Christopher. I told him, "Why are you infuriated? You are running an ad showing the President saying that you were a great mayor and so on and so forth. That's an insinuation leading people to believe that the President is endorsing you. How naive can you be? Or how naive can we be?" But that was all forgotten after the primary. In the general election, Arch Monson came out and was a strong Reagan supporter. Christopher never felt that Reagan would be a serious candidate. He thought he had the thing wrapped up and was going to win. He kind of sulked a little bit after that, but then, later on in 1976 he came out for Ron. In 1980 he worked hard for Ron.

E: That's Christopher or Monson?

T: Christopher, Monson, all of them. They all worked just as hard as they could. They were there 100 percent.

E: Another San Franciscan that apparently little is known about is Jacquelin Hume.

T: Jacque has always been, and is, a good--I hesitate to use a label--conservative. He worked hard for Goldwater. I got to know Jacque. Jacque has been for Ronald Reagan ever since day one. In fact, he was our leader in northern California along with Tom Reed and Paul Haerle. Jacque's a great guy. I just talked to him last night. He's been working hard on the selection committee ever since Ron was elected. He spent a lot of time back in Washington helping select and recommend people to the President. I know that the President is very grateful to him. He's a good friend of mine, a good citizen, a good American, and a great guy.

E: Earle Jorgensen came on a little bit later than most of these people, didn't he?

T: Earle and his wife have always been good friends of the Reagans, but Earle never took an active part. Anytime I wanted anything, I never had Earle Jorgensen say "no" to me in his life. He was a good loyal supporter, not only of Reagan but of Eisenhower and Nixon also. He has always been loyal right down to the core for President Reagan. When Ron was running for President, he became active. We invited Earle to come in and become a part of the so-called--I don't like that word--"kitchen cabinet." He worked hard. He worked hard in the steel industry getting people to support Governor Reagan for President. I guess I have known Earle Jorgensen longer than any of these other people. I knew Earle Jorgensen longer than any of these other people. I knew Earle Jorgensen back in the thirties. He and I have been good friends. He always remarks when we get together, "Holmes, we've always been friends." When you speak of Earle Jorgensen, I think he's a most dedicated, most generous person. The things he does for his city, his community and his country--he is great.

E: How about Ed Mills? How did you meet? Can you talk about your association?

T: Sure. We got to know Ed when Ed was the president of Van de Kamp's. Ed was always a pretty well-respected citizen of the community, in the leadership of the Boy Scouts, and things like that.

E: Can you approximate a date on when you met him?

T: Yes, I guess I got to know Ed around 1952 or 1953 or 1954, right in there. Then Van de Kamp's sold out so that in the 1956 campaign he didn't have anything to do. He wasn't busy at that time, but he knew Justin Dart, and we all knew Ed. He went down to Justin's office, and he was there working with Justin in the 1956 campaign. My associates at Community Bank, Howard Cook and Charlie Cook, offered Ed a position at the bank since Ed was free. I think he came to the bank in the late fifties. We made him a vice president, an officer in the bank, and he served on the board at the Community Bank. He's still on the board. Just a short time ago, in the interim, he was made president.

In 1964, when Mr. Cook and Charlie twisted my arm to get me to get more active in the Goldwater campaign, I said, "Okay, I will, if I can have Ed Mills." I felt that I had to have somebody of that ability, stature, knowledge, and so forth. Ed stayed with me all during the campaign in 1964. Then we got into the Reagan thing, and all during the eight years of his office he stayed right with me and took an active part. He played a very major part in Ron's success

in California, helping him get the right people in Sacramento, he and I together carrying out the requests that needed to be done such as the task forces and keeping the party finances. He made sure we had sufficient funds to take care of all the party needs.

After Ron left office in 1974, about a year later, Ed became involved in quite a major way in the equity part in the veterans' big trucking firm. Ed then gave up his office with me and took his office down to his firm. Ed lives down in Laguna Beach. He drives back and forth. Ed never failed to participate whenever he was called upon. He is probably one of the most respected people in this community. He has always taken great leadership responsibility. One of those responsibilities that was his great pride and joy was the Boy Scouts. He has always been a leader in that and held the highest office they have. Any civic participation, Ed never has turned down. He is a great guy.

E: Did he orchestrate your fund raising?

T: We worked as a team. Ed was in my office, and we worked as a team. Ed was right there to help me. Also, I give Ed credit that there was never a black mark on the governor in his eight years, because Ed Mills was there and he handled all finances. He saw that everything had to be just so; dot the *i*'s and cross the *t*'s. That "Dutchman" was right there, and sometimes he would say, "Holmes, I don't think we should do that." Whenever Ed said, "No, we don't do that," then we didn't do it. That was it. That's why I give him a lot of credit, and I'm free to tell you I think the President, and I know Mike Deaver, wanted him to come back and do some things. But, you know, Ed's getting up in years--my age. They have a great, great respect for Ed Mills. Everybody has. He is a great person. You will find, wherever you go, they will tell you that Ed Mills is a great citizen. I think Henry Salvatori would say the same thing about him. He played a major part. In any worthwhile endeavor, you can always expect to get the support of Ed Mills. Any endeavor.

E: Do you have some thoughts you could add on Henry Salvatori?

T: Henry is a great man. He's a great guy.

E: When did you meet him?

T: Well, I've known Henry for, my goodness, a long time. I think it was in Oklahoma that we met. After Henry graduated from the University of Pennsylvania, he came out to Tulsa. His wife is from Tulsa. I think it could have been that I met Henry before the war, but I've known him for a long time. I knew his wife because being from Oklahoma--I have a lot of Oklahoma friends--it was a natural happenstance that we would get together. But I've known him for a long time.

E: Did you work together on any political campaigns before Goldwater?

T: Oh, yes. We worked very hard. Henry took a bigger part. Even in the Dewey days Henry was working hard. Henry at that time was very well-off financially, and he worked hard on all those campaigns. I know that he took an active part in 1952, in 1956, and then in 1958, when Knowland came out and ran for governor. I'll never forget, President Eisenhower came out and tried to help raise funds for Knowland and, of course, we took a terrible defeat. So Henry's been very active in it, very active, for as long as I can remember.

E: One other person was "Cy" Rubel.

T: Oh, dear "Cy." What a great person! What a great patriot. I got to know "Cy" in the same way. At that time he was an executive of Union Oil. I think he was vice president of Union Oil.

E: And that was when?

T: Oh, you're stretching me. (laughter) Oh, let's say in the 1950s. "Cy" was great. He always took a great interest in his city and in his state. He was a great man. He was dedicated to our system, to the betterment of our community, to the betterment of our state, to the betterment of our country. He was that kind of a man. He took a great part in city administration and in the schools, in most everything. "Cy" was an exceptional man, an exceptional person, and I always enjoyed him. We became very close friends. I didn't have the real muscle that "Cy" had. In my younger days I admired "Cy" and naturally worked close with him when we got to the Nixon campaigns in 1960 and 1962 and the Goldwater campaign in 1964. When we decided in 1965 that Ronald Reagan was going to run, "Cy" had retired as chairman of the board and chief executive of Union Oil. We had decided instead of him [Reagan] announcing that we'd go throughout the state and he would speak wherever we could get enough people to sit still to listen, speaking in service clubs and things like that. "Cy" had a large office and a secretary in a wing at Union Oil, and that was our office. That was the only place we had. There was just the four of us: Henry, "Cy," Ed Mills, and myself. That's all there was to it. We used his office whenever we'd meet.

We decided we'd form what we called the Friends of Ronald Reagan and we started sending out mail. He [Reagan] started getting bales of mail up at his home so that's when we had to go acquire the services of Spencer-Roberts. The main thing was to set up speaking engagements and answer all that mail.

E: About how early in 1965 did the Friends of Ronald Reagan form?

T: I would say it would have to be around May. This all took place after the first of the year. I think that it was May or June. When we decided that we'd form the Friends of Ronald Reagan, we had a little letter sent out, and we asked them for a very small donation. The four of us put up the necessary money to get the thing started, the traveling expenses and that kind of thing, but we asked for small donations, and my goodness! The response when we would send something out was like that overwhelming. That was another thing that influenced us, the response to it. We asked for $10,000, but we received over $100,000. Well, that took care of all of our needs until we definitely decided to run in January of 1966.

We knew we had a candidate. We decided that he'd go throughout the state rather than making a formal announcement. Then we'd come back around September or October and take a poll and find out, because at that time Christopher was out doing the same thing. But we knew. Every time we'd send him some place the response was overwhelming. So we took a poll in October of 1965, and at that time we definitely decided that we had a candidate. So everything was all set to go, and Ron had to cancel out of his contracts. They ran up to the first of the year, and we announced after the first of the year in 1966.

E: How did one become one of the Friends of Ronald Reagan. How many people were involved in that organization? You had a staff of four, you mentioned.

T: Well, we had a staff, but then we started going around the state making speeches, meeting people, and getting geared up. So Jacque Hume of San Francisco came on. Wherever we'd go, we'd get people. Actually, even though we didn't have any headquarters and we didn't have any money after we announced, we had the makings of an organization. When the Friends of Ronald Reagan and Spencer-Roberts had him speaking throughout the state, we attracted people throughout the state. We knew that we were going to invite them to come in and, at least as soon as we could, we'd let them know that we were going to announce. Now, at the time we were going around we were an exploratory organization, but after we took the poll we let them know that this was going to be for real, that we were going to announce formally, and that they were going to be asked to come in and take a prominent position in the campaign.

We had the makings of an organization. It didn't take us long to put it together. Now, we didn't have any headquarters. We'd still been using Mr. Rubel's office. So finally, we found a place out on Wilshire Boulevard, down just a short way from the old Ambassador [Hotel]. We didn't have a real campaign manager so we started interviewing. We wanted to get a young man, and that's how we got Phil Battaglia. Phil was at the head of his class at USC [University of Southern California], and he was head of the [Los Angeles] Junior

Chamber of Commerce. Then we went to San Francisco and met with Mr. Hume and Paul Haerle. We had people throughout the state. We had Gordon Luce and a lady, Pinky Roberts, way down in San Diego. Then, I'll never forget, Ron called me one day and wanted to know if I knew Jim Copley. I said, "Sure, I know him very well." He said, "Holmes, he's got a man named Lyn Nofziger, who's their Washington representative, and everybody says he'd be great for us to handle our press. Will you get him?" Well, Bill Roberts and I went down to see Jim Copley. By that time we'd made Gordon Luce and Pinky Roberts chairmen in San Diego. We went to Jim's office in La Jolla, and I said, "Jim, I've got a great favor to ask of you." So after I told him, he said, "That sure is." But then he agreed he'd give Lyn a leave of absence, and he never went back to Copley again. (laughter) So that's how we got Lyn Nofziger.

E: Also you had a northern campaign chairman, Tom Reed. How did that recruiting go?

T: Tom Reed. I think we met him through Jacque Hume. We made him northern campaign manager in the same way that we had Gordon Luce and others in different parts of the state. I'm positive we met through Mr. Hume.

E: How was the decision made to hire Spencer-Roberts, and who was perhaps the most responsible for that?

T: Well, just as I told you, the four of us started looking around, and these people had worked with Republican candidates. They were recommended to us, and so we sought them out and asked them to come over. We sat down there in that little office, Mr. Rubel's office, and we made a deal. The first deal or contract we made with them was during the time in which we were deciding whether to run or not. Then we made another contract with them for the primary, and a third contract with them for the general election.

E: How did you share responsibilities in the campaign then between yourselves and Spencer-Roberts? Was there a "we'll handle the money and you'll handle the campaign" kind of agreement?

T: Well, generally speaking, but I kept pretty close control of it. They knew that we kept some control. I never tried to impose my will or become a king or czar or anything like that, but I just felt that I wanted to know what was going on. Finally, we got to where we could have a little better coordination. After we got into the campaign we'd meet every Monday morning, four or five of us, up at Reagan's home and talk over strategy. So I knew what was going on.

E: You kept an eye on the campaign?

T: I sure did. You bet your life. I was busy. Naturally, we were busy raising money and so forth, but I didn't want to be in just the "raising the money" part of it.

E: Were there some tensions about who was going to make the decisions in the campaign?

T: Very little, Mr. Edgington, very little. One time Bill Roberts got out of line a little bit, and I had to let him know who was boss, but very little. In the way of dissension, there was practically none. As I say, we were united. We brought all of those other people into the campaign from up north: Tom [Reed], Mr. Hume, Arch Monson, and all of them up there. You've heard of Justice [William] Clark? Justice Clark was the head of our campaign up in Ventura County. He was a budding young attorney. We really had an organization. Brown outspent us with his money, but he didn't have the organization we had, and that's why we killed him. We had a hard-working organization. And the women, you could never do without the women; they're the hardest working people in the world. They worked morning, noon, and night. We had a great organization, a working organization, throughout this state. You name it, in every town and county we had a strong organization. We really had people. I'd visit those people, and we'd invite them in. We would have meetings maybe once a week, or every two weeks, and we would invite them all in. I'd go up and meet with the people in northern California and meet with all of their leaders. They had a hardworking organization.

E: What do you recall that stands out to you about the primary campaign against George Christopher?

T: Ronald Reagan, as he convinced us in the 1964 campaign, had a great appeal to the people of this country and of this state. To show you a perfect example, we took fifty of the "captains of industry," and we invited them down to the California Club here in Los Angeles. The night before that, we had a little skull practice--and Ron doesn't need too much skull practice--up at Mr. Salvatori's home in Bel Air. We went through some "Q and A's" and decided that "Cy" would chair the luncheon. The next day there were just the four of us there, and we welcomed them. They came in and sat down and we had a quick lunch. "Cy" got up and thanked the gentlemen for being there, and he said, "I'm not going to speak and neither is Ronald Reagan. He's going to talk about three minutes, and then we're going to throw it open to questions and answers." Ron has no peer or equal when it comes to that. But I will never forget Willard Keith--God bless him--he's quite a prominent man here in the city. Do you know him?

E: No.

T: He is a fine man, a good friend of mine. He's getting into very bad shape now. He's about eighty-four or eighty-five [years old]. He stood up and said, "Mr. Reagan, what the hell makes you think that you, a movie star, without having any elective experience, can run for the high office of governor of the state of California!" That's exactly, precisely the wording. I can quote it. I've quoted it a thousand times, and that's the way he started Ron out. But Ron has a great knack of convincing people of what he wants to do and what he stands for. He doesn't talk like a politician. When he would go throughout the country talking to people, they would listen. He was consistent about what he was talking about, and he just convinced the people of this state, or our party, that he was the man that should represent them and that could beat Brown. He had a great appeal across party lines. We knew that. Of course, you had to win your primary first. I just think that Ronald Reagan, as I say again, is so dedicated, and that comes across to people. He comes across to people that he's sincere. Just like now, he's winning over people. I'm anxious to find out how that meeting went this morning.[2]

E: Do you recall the Drew Pearson column that came out about George Christopher's involvement in some kind of dairy incident back in the 1930s?

T: I'll tell you a little story about it. Brown's people were convinced that if they could get rid of Christopher and get this movie actor, they would kill him. So they brought up this whole thing about the milk incident which we never even went into. In fact, we spoke out against it, disavowed it, and said it was a low blow, dirty politics. It was an old issue and it had no place in politics--that was Ronald Reagan's view. I'll never forget, one of our very great disciples now was a Brown man. After the primary they had a big celebration over at their headquarters in Hancock Park because Christopher had been beaten. They said, "We've won the campaign now," and they had a big victory celebration. Ted Cummings, who is now going to be an ambassador, was a part of the Brown organization. They thought they would kill this movie star since they got rid of Christopher.

E: How about the general election campaign? What are some things that stand out to you about that, issues and so forth?

T: Again, Ron never got into gutter politics. He went throughout the state talking about what the state needed, what he intended to do, and we never tried to answer attacks. You know, Brown came out with this big ad that said that President Lincoln was killed by an actor. I don't know if you remember that. He had a big ad.

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[2]President Ronald Reagan's meeting with the Democratic congressmen concerning budget cuts held June 1, 1981. Ed.

E: Yes.

T: We never tried to answer it. I can't think who we had in charge of "Democrats for Reagan." We had an organization, and we gave it substantial financial help, but they raised most of it. These people worked; they really worked, and believe me, we had speakers going in every direction. My goodness, Ron hardly had any time to get sleep. We just had a great organization, a great organization. We invited Democrats in. We invited all the Christopher people. I told you the next morning [after the primary] that they were part of our campaign. I do say, I have never seen such an effective campaign as we had in 1966.

E: One of the issues the Democrats raised was what they termed the extremism issue.

T: Oh, they tried to make out that he was another Goldwater, but they never got to first base with it, because Ronald Reagan wasn't any more Goldwater than Brown was. So they didn't get by with it. Brown made some very bad mistakes just like this one we're talking about. It was things like that, character assassination, but they never got to first base with it. They would stoop to anything, but we never let it deter us. We just kept going. We had a great organization and we just kept working and working and working.

E: Also in my research I came across a film that you helped to put together or sponsor--I'm not sure which--about campus disorders. It was a film about the Berkeley demonstrations.

T: That was after he became governor.

E: All right. I understood that it was during the campaign and Spencer-Roberts was very much against using it.

T: I don't know whether we had that or not. I do know this, that the governor really spoke out on the school situation. He really spoke out during the campaign, and that certainly set well with the people throughout the state. The mothers and fathers in the state were getting very concerned about their school systems. That was one of the issues.

E: And that was a great concern of yours?

T: Yes sir, a great concern of mine. I was always concerned about that. It's hard for me to imagine--look at UCSB [University of California, Santa Barbara] here, a beautiful campus--that we make it possible for them to get a free education and then they go up there and try to burn and tear it down. It's hard for me to see how kids could get into that frame of mind. Same thing up at Cal [University of

California] Berkeley. They made a mistake, Brown did, with this fellow at Cal [Mario Savio, leader of the "Free Speech Movement"] by letting him get by with it. That's initially the way it started throughout the country, is through this thing that he did up there. He was almost leading a revolution, and they should never have let him get by with that. They should have stopped him right in his tracks, but they let it go too far. That element, that's almost identical to what he [Reagan] had to go though when he was in the Screen Actors Guild, that kind of thing. Some people don't believe in our system. Just like Jane Fonda. It's hard for me to understand how she can accept all these millions of dollars income from the free enterprise system and still want to go out and destroy it. I don't understand their thinking, but they just don't believe in our system. They don't believe in the capitalist free enterprise system. They want to nationalize everything; nationalize the banks, nationalize the schools, nationalize the railroads. I think they should look at some of the countries that have done that.

Anyhow, I don't think you want to get into that. We were the same in both campaigns. In 1970 Tom Reed was the chairman, and I was cochairman with him. I had just come out of the hospital, and I was helping him and keeping my hands in the campaign. Tom was a real "goer." But we did the same thing then; we just stood on Ron's record and ran on it and ran on it and ran on it, and we won again. Of course, we didn't win by a million votes, but we won by over a half million, around 600,000 votes. That was even after some of his tough decisions. Then we also had quite a depression, if you remember, started in this country.

E: In the 1966 campaign there are a couple of other issues. One was the whole controversy about the Rumford Fair Housing Act and its repeal. Do you recall what part that issue played in the campaign?

T: Oh, it never played that much of a part. I think the press . . . it never played that much. It did, maybe, in northern California where it started. It was never a real tough issue, and it never got that far.

E: Also there was Proposition 16, which was the antipornography proposition that year. Were you involved in supporting that?

T: Yes, there is no question. Ronald Reagan spoke out against pornography. He spoke out strongly and today he still does. Don't worry about that. He really spoke out about that, you bet your life.

E: Did you work closely with that campaign?

T: Oh, no. He spoke out on it, but it was never a main issue or an important issue. Oh, I shouldn't say it was unimportant, don't mis-

understand me. It was important, but it never was something that we hung our hat on or anything like that. It was one of the things that the governor and everybody in the state were concerned about. I guess they are still concerned, and we're still not getting very far with it.

E: In Lieutenant Governor Robert Finch's campaign I understand that your group gave him a little shot in the arm toward the end of the campaign?

T: We sure did. I'll never forget, about four or five weeks before the end of the campaign, he was running way behind in the polls so we had a meeting at the Reagans' house. I'll never forget that. We changed a lot of spots [televised political ads], and we set aside, oh, I think it was almost three-quarters of a million dollars. We went down and made different spots with Ron and Bob, because Ron said, "I don't want to go to Sacramento with a Democrat lieutenant governor." He didn't want this fellow Anderson as lieutenant governor. So that morning we went back down and we called out all of our advertising people. We pulled off a lot of the other spots, and then we put up billboards. I forget how many billboards Ed Mills was able to get throughout this state. He came in all excited. He picked up where we could put "Reagan and the Team," and "Reagan and Finch." So we turned that thing around. Of course, the thing is that all of a sudden, at the last, all the newspapers endorsed Finch more so than they did Ron. Every one of them. So he polled more votes, actually about 100,000 more votes than Ron did. But the polls! I will never forget that meeting up there. Boy, we really came undone.

E: Did you lend support to some of the other candidates? Houston Flournoy [moderate Republican candidate for state controller], for example?

T: Oh, sure. We didn't realize that we were as far ahead as we were. We could have pulled Williams [Spencer Williams, Republican candidate for attorney general] in. He was the only one of them that lost. I think if we had put the same help behind Williams as we did behind the others . . . It looked like he was so far behind, but he didn't lose by too much. We won all the other offices, but that's the only one we lost. We just couldn't believe that we were that far ahead, and I think if we could have realized that, we could have put more money elsewhere. We had the money, and we were getting the money. But we just couldn't believe that we were that far ahead.

E: Did you concentrate at all on the assembly and senate races?

T: Not to a great extent. Wherever Ron went to speak, you understand, he put his arm around the candidates. But if we had had any idea that we

were that far ahead, we could have taken a lot of money and put it into some of those races, which we could have won.

E: You mentioned your organizational strength several times. Do you think that was probably a carry-over from the organizational ties you made when you were in the Goldwater campaign?

T: Oh, I'm sure it helped. Basically, those were people that all fundamentally believed in the same things, so we had no difficulty in rallying those people around. But we not only got them, we even had some Democrats come into the original campaign at the end of 1965. We invited them all. Sure, we had that nucleus of strength right there. There was no question about it. We had that nucleus from 1964, you bet your life.

E: Were you involved in some of the suborganizations in the Republican Party, like the California Republican Assembly or the United Republicans of California, any of those groups?

T: No, it's kind of strange. I never held an office. They'd see me down there at the convention, running this and doing that and taking a leadership role. I never will forget, I would be asked by some of these people throughout the country, "What is your position, Mr. Tuttle?" And I would say, "Well, I don't have any." They'd say, "You must have something, because you're so close to the governor, you're making these decisions, you're doing this . . ." and on and on. I said, "I just don't have a position." I never did. I never did.

E: Was that because you felt you'd be more effective?

T: I wanted to be more effective. I didn't want to be tied down. I could be more effective without a position. We could appoint people to those positions. It was the same way with all of our group. They didn't want anything from the governor. That was one of the reasons he was so successful, because they didn't want anything. They just wanted to help. We never had a black mark on the governor when he was in office, money or otherwise. We never had one black mark. We just never let it happen. As long as we had that "Dutchman" Ed Mills, sitting there watching that money, he'd be sure that everything was just exactly right.

As I say, I think it's rather unique. The whole campaign and the eight years of his administration, I think, are rather unique to me in the annals of politics. We spend about forty-five days searching this state, because Ron said, "Now, look, boys, I don't want a bunch of guys that are looking for jobs. I want you to search out this state and get me people who you have to arm twist and drag up here to give up two, three, or four years of their lives to help me." So we

did that. We met down there, about eight to ten or twelve of us, for almost six weeks. We searched, and we had some of these head-hunters that would help us get people from the organization, and then we would recommend. We always tried to give the governor two or three choices or recommendations, and he made the final decision. That's why I think he had great success. It was the quality of people that he had in Sacramento. I always kid the governor that out of the thirty-five or thirty-six top positions, we only made one career politican appointment, and that was the poorest one we made.

E: You were saying that you never had a black mark against the governor. You will recall that Reagan often said that your group, the "kitchen cabinet" or however you want to term it, never asked anything of him except good government. What would you consider to be good government?

T: Well, the things that we were concerned about. We were concerned with the taxes in this state. We had to have a new tax law. In this state under Brown, taxes were getting high and it was spend, spend, spend. We felt that we should get back to the basic fundamentals that this country was founded on and not get off on a lot of these things that we're doing now, like food stamps. The trouble of it is that welfare is what it was never intended to be. You destroy the initiative of people to strive and work hard in this country. You've got to create jobs. You've got to stop this excessive spending. Inflation, that's what hurts you the most. So those are the kinds of things we tried to tell the people that Brown was doing. He just kept spending, spending, spending. That was fundamentally the campaign that we ran on. Ron was going to stop all this foolishness. Unfortunately, we never got control of both the senate and the assembly.

I was speaking to a group one time down in Florida, and I said, "Governor Reagan is honest to a fault." Someone said, "Wait a minute. What do you mean he's honest to a fault?" Well, I stopped and said, "I'll tell you. We had a big tax bill that the governor was trying to get through for the state of California. It was a great tax bill. We were up there at midnight one night and we only needed two votes. We finally got one, but we just couldn't get the other. Finally, about one o'clock in the morning two legislators--I'm not going to tell you who they were so don't ask me--came into his office. They said, "Governor, if you'll give each one of us two appointments for judgeships, we'll change our votes." What'd he do? He threw them out! But now you could say that by giving two judge's appointments we'd have gotten a wonderful tax bill. But it also would have destroyed Ronald Reagan. He threw these guys out of his office. "Get out!" But by giving two judge's appointments, which many politicians would have done, he'd have gotten his tax bill, which would have been a great thing for California.

E: Was there a consensus among the "kitchen cabinet" about what good government was?

T: Oh, you bet your life! Basically everybody was concerned. Yes, you had to have a consensus. That doesn't mean that there weren't differences maybe on one little issue or on how to approach it, but the consensus was there on basics and fundamentals. It had to be.

E: In this particular article by Jack Greenberg, "The Kitchen Cabinet," *West Magazine*, April 23, 1967, it was mentioned that the "kitchen cabinet" met with Governor Reagan once a month and had dinner together.

T: Oh, that's not exactly right. We met, but we never had any set times for any meetings or anything like that. If any of them had anything they wanted to talk to the governor about, that wouldn't have been any problem. Or if they wanted to go up and sit down and have a meeting, or if he came down and they wanted to have dinner socially or something like that, or had a problem, or if something came up, that was fine. But as far as having any regular meetings, no.

E: My question was about access.

T: Oh, the access was there, because, my goodness, how fortunate he was to have such a great group of people like that that he could call on. For instance, you know about the time when he got the 250 or 300 businessmen to come up?

E: Yes.

T: It was great. He called me up and said, "Here, Holmes, this is what we're going to do. Now, you do it." We went to work and it never cost the state. We raised--Ed Mills and myself--about $400,000 to cover all of the expenses for this group up there, and it was a great thing. But it's great to have people that you could say, "Here, will you do this or do that."

E: That was the Task Force on Efficiency and Economy in Government?

T: Yes, that's right. That was one of the greatest things in the world that ever happened to this state, and I'm inclined to think that the governor would do the same thing after he gets things going in Washington. That's the only way I think he's going to get real efficiency and cut expenses in government back there.

E: Were you on any other task forces besides that particular one? He had several.

T: I think I have been on every one he had. I participated in them.

E: What was the nature of the work that was done? How did you go about it?

T: Well, when Ron decided to do this, we decided that if we were going to do it, we would do it right. We didn't want to impose ourselves on the governor. Neither did we try to interfere with his organization. We were a group of people that were, I think, about as dedicated a group of people as I have ever had anything to do with or ever worked with. We were there, and the governor knew that we were there to assist, give suggestions, and work with him, you understand. The governor was a very strong person. He made all the major decisions. We never did try to interfere. For instance, even this last time for the President, we researched the whole United States and tried to come up with the best people there were. We said, "Here it is, Mr. President. Here is what we recommend." He spent one full Saturday with us going over each one of the men, listening to why we . . . his background and so forth. Naturally, he knew it was his decision to make, you understand, and he made it. I think this is rather unique in the annals of political history, and I think it will go down that way. The way it was done was the same way it was done in California. These men never tried to impose their will or interfere. In fact, it was a great working relationship with all his staff like Ed Meese, Gordon Luce, Mike Deaver, Tom Reed, Bill Clark, all those people. We all are now very fast and close friends because of that camaraderie. Everybody was working, trying to help the governor. That was all; to help the governor for good government, and that still remains the same way today.

E: What do you think of the term, "kitchen cabinet"?

T: I never liked it, but I can't do anything about it. The press started it. I never liked it, but I never paid any attention to it. In fact, I don't know what political writer ever took the credit for it. They nailed it on, and then they started writing about it. Then this year, when we started to have these meetings, instead of calling it the "selection committee," they called it the "kitchen cabinet" again. A lot of the people on this never worked with the governor as far as the original "kitchen cabinet" is concerned.

E: I wanted to ask you about fund raising. You were obviously very good at it. How did you do it?

T: Well, I guess you'd do it like you'd do anything else that was a business. You had to have an organization to do that. We had finance people throughout the state. I worked hard at it; I didn't do it half-heartedly. I don't think you can be successful if you

don't do it right, do it effectively, and work hard at it. I knew it had to be done, and I expected the same of everybody else throughout the state. We had a good finance committee.

E: What was your best method of raising funds? Was it more one-on-one persuading of friends? Or mailings? Or dinners?

T: Well, we did everything. We had dinners. We had mailings. That's the reason I wanted Ed Mills. He was a past master at that. Ed went throughout the state setting up these organizations and fund raisers, and he had mailings. We had professional people to help us, but practically all the people--and that was the great thing about our organization--most of them were volunteers. Now, see, Pat Brown didn't have that. Most all of the people in our campaign were volunteers. They were dedicated. We had professionals, but we used very few of those. You take our headquarters in Los Angeles; I'd say maybe 60 percent of the people, even in the headquarters, were volunteers.

E: One of the people I forgot to ask you about was William French Smith.

T: Well, I was surprised. I was going to bring him up. I got a call from one of my great friends. Herb Sturdy called me, God bless him. What a great guy. He was the senior member of the firm that Smith was in. He was one of the real leaders back in the thirties and the fifties. He said, "Holmes, I've got two fine young men down here. They are interested in politics. They want to help." Of course, when he mentioned Bill Smith, I'd known Bill Smith when he married Jean, and I went to their wedding. I said, "I didn't know that Bill was . . ." He said, "Yeah, he's always taken an interest in politics. In fact, he worked in the Nixon campaign [in 1962]. I think he would be a great help to you." So I said, "Send him out." So Bill came out and I just took him in. Bill was always my right arm. He worked hard, he helped us, and any problems we had, he just became a part of it. Then, after the governor first took office, he set up these organizations to take judicial appointments out of politics. All the names would be channeled through Bill, and Bill would put them into these committees. It didn't matter who you were, you had to pass that committee. You had to pass that committee or you couldn't even get to first base as far as judicial appointments. It didn't make any difference; you might have done this or done that. So he took judicial appointments out of politics, and Bill was a great help to the governor. Pretty soon, Bill just became a great part of it [the "kitchen cabinet"].

E: And he became Reagan's attorney after that?

T: Yes. He helped him on his legal matters and so forth. Then Mr. Dart, Jules Stein, and myself looked after the governor's financial affairs.

When Bill came out, we just took him in. He became a part. (snaps fingers) That was it.

E: Could you elaborate a little bit more on the transition period and the various groups that met together to advise the newly elected governor on appointments and policy?

T: Yes. We made "Cy" Rubel chairman. We met down at the California Club. There were about ten or twelve of us. We started by taking each department of government: The Department of Education, the Department of Motor Vehicles . . . To these--I don't like to call them headhunters--executive hunters we'd say, "We want you to look through the state's corporations and maybe go to some corporations." Let's just take transportation. We'd say, "Who is the head transportation person in their organization and throughout the state?" We'd get that, and we'd go through all these people. We would sit there, with ten or twelve of us around this big table, and we'd go through all these people or anybody else that we would want to recommend, you understand. Maybe I had somebody I knew, or others had somebody, and we'd discuss it and discuss it. Finally, we reduced it down but to never less than three, and maybe, sometimes, we would give him five names. After we decided that those were the top five names, we'd send those to him with all the resumes and all the backgrounds.

Then we would go on to the Department of Motor Vehicles. For instance, take Verne Orr. I never will forget this. This is a classic story. He's now Secretary of the Army. We knew Verne Orr at the time we were looking for the head of the Department of Motor Vehicles. His father was an old-time automobile man, and Verne was at that time the head of a savings and loan [association]. We looked over all these people. Well, he was so outstanding that we just knew he was our number one choice. Ed Mills knew him and I knew him. Ed Mills called him and told him we'd like to put his name down as top man for the DMV [Department of Motor Vehicles]. "Ah," he said, "I don't want to go to Sacramento." So I called him. I said, "Verne, wait a minute. You know, you're one of these business people sitting around bellyaching about the way the government runs, and then when we call on you, you say 'no.'" He got rather indignant. He said that I shouldn't talk to him that way. Anyway, he went home and talked to his wife that night, and she really scolded him. She said, "Yes, you do sit around and bellyache. Holmes is right. You bellyache. Now, because they have asked you to go up there to Sacramento, I can tell you we're going." So the next morning he called, and we put his name in as number one choice, and he became head of the Department of Motor Vehicles. Then pretty soon the governor met him, and he had all this experience, and he became head of the Department of Finance. Then he went back to Washington, and now he's Secretary of the Army. Outstanding man. Worked his fanny off up there in Sacramento. He

did a great job. But that gives you an indication of how we worked.

We took each department. At that time, we also took the [California] Alcoholic Beverage Control Board. They were almost on the verge of a big scandal up there under Brown. So we searched and searched, and we came up with an outstanding man, Ed Kirby. He was retired from the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation]. We looked at him. They had done the same thing in New York. That's one thing that [Governor Nelson] Rockefeller did do in New York. He really cleaned that up. We took a look at the man, and this man was outstanding. So we recommended that the governor appoint him, and he really saved the state. He cleaned that mess up. What a mess it was! There were payoffs; there was everything you could think of, and he really cleaned it up. It could have been a heck of a scandal, but he cleaned it up and got it going right. But that's an indication of how we were looking for top people.

E: Are there some other examples of some people, maybe some other stories?

T: Oh, yes. Let's take the superintendent of banks. You know, businessmen are a little selfish themselves. Just like . . . let's go back to this liquor board appointment. Before the election, we met with all the outstanding liquor people here in the state down at the Town House. There were about twenty-five or thirty of them, the top people in the state, and they met with the governor. Henry Salvatori and I were there. They said, "Governor, all we want . . . we just want to clean up this mess. We're tired of going to Sacramento and having to pay off." The governor said, "I guarantee I'll do it." But the minute he was elected, they started coming up with their own man. Well, we didn't pay any attention to that. Some of them got irritated because we wanted to appoint somebody that was not beholden to anyone. Now, we did the same with the superintendent of banks. Every bank had their vice president they wanted. We didn't do that. We never paid any attention to them. We sought out a man, Jim Hall. He was an attorney. He had some background, since he had done some legal work with banks. Well! I thought they were going to run me out of the state, some of these big bankers saying, "Who in the hell did Holmes . . ." But Jim Hall turned out great. I won't mention any names, but these bankers were big enough to come out about a year later and say, "Holmes, you were right. He made a fine superintendent of banks." They all did a great job, a great job.

E: The finance director was kind of a difficult appointment.

T: Yes. I'll be very honest. We searched and searched. His [Gordon Paul Smith] credentials were just . . . but he got a little ambitious. He got politically ambitious, that's all. As far as I was concerned he did a good job, but he got to where he was in conflict with the

thinking of everybody else. He got politically ambitious, so we had to make that change.

E: I think one of the original candidates was Caspar Weinberger, who later, of course, turned out to be finance director.

T: Well, let me tell you about Caspar. I've known Caspar for all these years, but Caspar had the label--and I hate those labels--of a liberal, which he wasn't. He was like I am. I think, fundamentally, he believed the same things that I did. We would have liked to have had Caspar, but there would have been a lot of hue and cry. I'll never forget it. Caspar worked hard with us after the governor was elected. He worked hard and did anything we wanted him to do, Proposition A and all that. So there wasn't any question who the governor was going to appoint after Smith resigned. It was Caspar. Everybody screamed and hollered, but he turned out to be just (snaps fingers) great, so great that Nixon came around and stole him away from us. But he was great. Caspar's a good friend of mine, and he did a great job for the governor. Now, President Reagan thinks the world of him. He's a loyal and dedicated man.

E: What about some of the policy committees. Were you involved at all in that during the transition?

T: Well, yes, to a certain extent, but we never tried to interfere. We'd talk policy with the governor, you bet your life, like taxes or anything else or any real serious problems. Many times the governor would pick up the phone and he'd call different ones and talk about it. The governor likes to get as much thinking as he possibly can. He doesn't want a bunch of "yes" people around him. He liked for people to speak up, to speak their mind so he can get as much thinking as he possibly can on any decision like that.

E: When Lieutenant Governor Finch went back to head the U. S. Health, Education and Welfare Department at the beginning of 1969, can you recall some of the people that were considered to be appointed lieutenant governor and how that all developed?

T: Oh, sure. Naturally, there was a lot of . . . everybody was vying for that position, you understand, but Ed Reinecke stood out head and shoulders. He was kind of the leader of the congressional delegation from Los Angeles. It wasn't too difficult for the governor because he stood out. So the governor asked him to come back and take the position. He was so outstanding. I know how I felt and everybody else did, because Ed was doing a great job back in Washington. Of course, I'm sure the delegation hated to lose him, but it was such an important position. There wasn't any question in the governor's mind who we would all support when he left office. But, unfortunately, Ed was a victim of circumstances, Ed got . . .

(snap of fingers); he *was* a victim of circumstances. Unfortunately, he never should have run [for governor in 1974]. I tried like a father to talk to him, but Ed, God bless him, he just lost his good judgment. I tried to tell Ed. "You're under indictment," I said. "There was no question who was going to be the candidate for governor, no question, Ed, but you're under indictment for perjury. And this Watergate . . ." At that time, you know, Watergate was so . . . I tried to talk to him like a father, and I think if you went to him today, he would say he made the mistake of his life. We never would have had [Governor "Jerry"] Brown. We never would have had Brown.

Hugh Flournoy ran a good race, but do you realize there were 350,000 Republicans in southern California that never voted? We only lost by 175,000 votes. But you know, the polls showed that Brown was so far ahead; it was hard to raise money. When we took over that campaign, my gosh, Hugh didn't have much money. We all went in debt--I know I went in debt--and signed notes, but we finally came out and paid off. That's one thing about it; anytime we ever asked anybody to sign any notes, we paid them off to the last penny. Dave Packard, Justin Dart, Jacque Hume, Henry Salvatori, all of us, we met and decided that Hugh was our man, and so we went to work. We should have won that thing, but the press kept saying that he was a thousand percentage points behind and so on. Anyhow, the man we should have won with was [Ed Reinecke] . . . but that's water over the dam. If we could have (snap fingers) . . . Brown wouldn't have got to first base.

E: When were your first serious thoughts about Ronald Reagan running for President in 1968?

T: Oh, he was doing such a good job up there. He was doing such a great job. The governor wasn't there, but we were meeting and talking about it. It happened at a meeting in Los Angeles of our group of people. We decided that, well, if we think he's the man that ought to go back to Washington and has the dedication and courage to do the things that need to be done, why don't we start it? That's the way we started. Of course, we ran as a "favorite son," and then we went to Miami and decided to make a serious run. But the way we handled it. I'll be very honest with you, we didn't handle it very intelligently. I don't think that helped him. Anyhow, that's the way it started.

E: You brought F. Clifton White on.

T: We brought Clifton White in to look around and kind of send feelers throughout the country to find out what the sentiment was. Dear old Cliff, I think he overstated the case. I think we thought we were stronger than we were, but you see Nixon had gone around through the states, and he did almost exactly what Reagan did in 1980, last year.

He had these people on the first ballot. Our whole game plan was to try to get by the first ballot, but Nixon had so many promises that we just couldn't. Just like Texas. I'll never forget, we had these people up there in their room and they said, "Well, fine. We're committed to this man for the first ballot, but if he doesn't win on the first ballot, then you've got strong support here in Texas."

E: That was at the Republican National Convention.

T: At the convention. But you just couldn't pry them loose, because Nixon had gone in there and he'd helped these people in the campaigns. So you couldn't pry them loose.

E: I thought you might like to comment on some of the mistakes you made. You said you didn't handle the campaign well.

T: Well, I think we should have just stayed and run as a "favorite son." We were down there only two days when we came out and made headlines that he was definitely running, you understand. I think by that time we pretty well felt that we couldn't make it anyway. Oh, I say mistake. I think if we had it to do over again, we would not have done that, but at that time we thought it was the right thing to do. We were just a little overoptimistic as to what we could do.

E: Was Governor Reagan pretty much in favor of the candidacy from the beginning?

T: No, he wasn't. He said, "I still am governor, and I'll run as a 'favorite son,'" and he didn't take any major part in it. We more or less did it through Tom Reed and Clifton White and ourselves. I made trips around the country and talked to people to know how they felt about Ronald Reagan as a "favorite son." But the governor never really got out and actually made any campaign speeches. He still said, "I'm running on the 'favorite son' basis." But then, when we got down there, the decision was made. I think Cliff gave us a little bad advice. He felt we couldn't convince some of these people unless he was a definite candidate, you understand, instead of being just a "favorite son." I think we were just overoptimistic. These people kept saying, just like in Oklahoma, "Sure, Holmes, but we're committed. We can't do anything about it. On the first ballot we committed ourselves, but after the first ballot we'll talk about it. It's a different ball game."

E: I believe there was a trip that you accompanied the governor on. You left July 19, 1968, and went through some of the southern cities before you went to Miami. Do you recall that trip?

T: Oh, yes.

E: And what happened on it?

T: We were just calling on people to let them know he was going to go to the convention. I never will forget, a lot of people, like in Oklahoma, said, "But is he going to run?" And I said, "Well, look fellows, you're running if you are a 'favorite son.'" But they kept pressing: "Why doesn't he come out and say, 'I'm going to be a candidate?'" But we said, "We're down there as a 'favorite son.' If you're a 'favorite son,' you're running." Well, we were a little premature, I'll put it that way, in 1968. I think we were. But it was a good start. It, at least, gave Governor Reagan some national exposure at that time. They got to know him, and he was a very sought-after speaker for the Republican Party, for fund raisers and so forth. It gave him some national exposure for the future.

E: I'm interested in your opinion, or maybe a comparison of Nixon and Reagan, since you did work for the Nixon campaign in 1960 and 1962, and you have a pretty good vantage point from which to evaluate and compare the two.

T: Well, Nixon is a real hard worker. He's intelligent, smart. He's a real politician. Dick Nixon's a kind of a loner. He doesn't have the warmth that President Reagan has. Well, I'll just put it this way: Dick Nixon is Dick Nixon. He has his own style. Ronald Reagan is Ronald Reagan. Ronald Reagan is intelligent, warm, dedicated. I never like to call Ronald Reagan a politician. I always speak of him as a statesman. Dick Nixon is a politician through and through. He is first, last, and always a politician. He is smart. It was a surprise to me what he did back there, you know, the way they let it get out of hand. I always said, and I still say today, that Dick Nixon is intelligent. He is smart. I just could not believe that he would get himself into a position like that. Up to the last minute I couldn't believe that Dick Nixon was a part of the problem. I just never could believe it until I heard those tapes. However, it's too bad today that we can't use Dick Nixon for foreign affairs. The difference between Ron and Dick Nixon is Ron would surround himself with intelligent, dedicated, honest, sincere people, you understand. Dick Nixon is a loner. He had this little cadre of people there, maybe half a dozen, and that's what got him in trouble. He's always been that way.

E: So when it came down to a situation like in 1968 when you had to choose between Nixon and Reagan, you went with Reagan with no conflict?

T: Oh, there wasn't any problem for me. All the people that knew Governor Reagan, there was no problem for any of us. People like

Justin Dart and Len Firestone, they were all there. We went from delegation to delegation. Len Firestone was right there. He would talk to one, I'd talk to the next one. Justin Dart, Henry Salvatori, Taft Schreiber, Raymond Lee, Lee Kaiser, Jacque Hume, all of us were there. There wasn't any question who we wanted. We knew the kind of governor he had been; we knew what he stood for; we knew that was who we needed back at the White House.

E: In the 1968 U. S. Senate campaign, the primary between [Max] Rafferty and Senator Thomas Kuchel, did you have a role in that campaign?

T: Well, no. I had no role. I had been too busy on the other [campaign]. I had no role in the primary. We tried to do everything we could in the general election. (interruption) You know, Tommy [Kuchel] forgot that he was from California. I know one day, Taft Schreiber and Len and I were up at Taft Schreiber's house, and we tried to get him to come out. He never accepted Ronald Reagan. He would kind of try to stay at a distance from him and he wouldn't come back here and become a part of the party, you understand. He just felt that there was no question that he was going to win. He felt that Ronald Reagan was another Goldwater. He kind of listened to the Eastern establishment so he would never come back. We tried to tell him, "Look, you don't have to put your arms around Ronald Reagan, but come back and be a part of the party. You better be careful. You might not win this election." But you couldn't talk to him. We begged him to go up and have a meeting with Ronald Reagan, to be a part of the party. Well, he didn't do it, so he was defeated. But it's too bad, because he was a good senator and good for California.

The next thing I knew, after they had been in the general election campaign about a month, I got a call from the governor. He said, "Holmes, this campaign of Rafferty's is in terrible shape. I wish you'd take it over." So sure enough, here came Henry and a bunch of them to my home about ten o'clock one night and asked me to take it over. I said, "All right, if I can get Tom Reed and Ed Mills to come down and help me." So I went down and, boy, what a mess. I never got into such a mess. They had no money. Nothing. But I thought we had a chance to win it. I never worked so hard. Of course, they didn't have any money. They were in debt up to their ears. They even had people suing. It looked like all those people were interested in was what they were going to get out of it. So we got rid of them, and Max Rafferty you know, made a statement like he was as popular as a skunk at a picnic or something like that. I said, "Max, cut out that foolishness. Cut out these crazy statements." I put Lyn Nofziger with him, and I said, "Now, if you want me to run this thing, I'm going to run it. I'm going to run it, but you've got to . . . people don't appreciate those kinds of things. You've got to be a statesman. You're running for high office." And, by



Photo courtesy of Robert Finch Papers, Occidental College

The "kitchen cabinet" pushed Reagan's candidacy for president in 1968; they also supported Richard Nixon. Present at the meeting of the Richard Nixon Foundation Board of Trustees held September 3, 1969 at the Western White House, San Clemente are: Nixon (back to camera), Justin Dart (fifth from left), Leonard Firestone, Taft Schreiber, and HEW Secretary Robert Finch (third, fourth, fifth from Nixon's right).

golly, he did. Dick Nixon came out and helped us, and I think if we'd had another three weeks we could have won the election. We had this guy [Alan] Cranston on the run.

E: You mentioned that Kuchel thought that Reagan was another Goldwater . . .

T: Yes. Tom wanted to stay distant, because he felt he had such broad support. Democrats. He didn't want to offend his so-called liberal supporters, you understand. I tried to tell him, "Look. Wait a minute. You've got to win the primary." We sat up there at Taft Schreiber's house--I mean Tommy and just the three or four of us--and tried to get him to come out and be a part of the party. We said, "Come on out here. You're forgetting that you've got to win the primary." That's one mistake that Bill Roberts made. He just thought, "Ah, it's a cinch!" But it wasn't a cinch. He [Kuchel] lost because people got irritated at him. He was kind of standoffish. He didn't want to be a part of it. The Republicans didn't like that, and he ran on the Republican ticket. He had to win the primary. It's too bad. I'll never forget Tommy. He put his arms around me back in Washington and said, "Holmes, if I had listened to you, I'd still be senator." I said, "Yes, but that's over, Tom. You've already lost it." Tom would probably still be back there. But you've just got to be a part of the party, that's all there is to it, if you are going to win the primary in this state. Now, in the olden days Earl Warren was an easy winner because you could cross over, you understand. Now, you can't do that anymore.

E: On the question of the Goldwater and Reagan comparison . . .

T: Well, in the Eastern establishment, every time we'd go back there, like in 1968 and even in 1976 and to start the 1980 campaign, [we'd hear], "Another Goldwater. He's too conservative." You'd try to say, "Wait a minute. Hold everything. This man's not Goldwater. We won in a state where there's three to two against us in party registration, and we won by a million votes. We beat Brown." So you'd try to talk to those people, but he was so closely associated in 1964 that they just kept thinking that. Even some of the so-called--I dislike using these labels--conservative Easterners, you understand, they just kept thinking, "He can't win. He can't win. We don't want to have another debacle like Goldwater. We don't want to have another one of those."

E: To what do you attribute the difference between Goldwater in 1964 and Reagan in 1966?

T: Well, Goldwater's basic philosophy is sound, but he's pretty rigid. You know, he talks gruff, and he just didn't . . . He gave the

impression to people that he would start shooting those atom bombs and that kind of thing, you understand. That's Barry Goldwater, but, gosh, Barry Goldwater's sound as a gold dollar. He's just as sound in his policies. He's the one that first had the courage in 1960 to start speaking up about this trend that we were taking, leading us to where we are now. No question about that. I don't have any apologies for Goldwater. He's Goldwater. Barry's as sound as he can be. He's not the extremist that they think he is either. He's not anywhere near Strom Thurmond or some of those people. He's nowhere near anybody like that.

E: Some of the written sources note or say that there was a drop-off in the "kitchen cabinet" activity after the 1968 campaign. Could you assess the ups and downs of the "kitchen cabinet" involvement over the eight years of Reagan's administration?

T: Oh, no, there wasn't any drop-off. They were still there, you bet your life. The enthusiasm for Governor Reagan was still there all during [the time he was governor], in the 1970 campaign, and anytime any support was needed from them. In fact, when we won the 1970 campaign, we'd have won by another 800,000 [votes] or maybe a million, but if you recall--it started in about the middle of the year--we started having a depression out here and, boy, old "big daddy" Jesse Unruh really bore down on that. But there wasn't any drop-off in enthusiasm. I don't know of anybody that fell out.

E: Well, I didn't mean so much a drop-off in enthusiasm, but perhaps there wasn't as much need for your help as in the campaign or at the beginning of his administration because he had his people in as governor.

T: No, that's right. But he had just as many important issues and the need for all these people from 1970 to 1974. We knew good and well that we were going to be running in 1976. We hoped that we would be running. If it hadn't been for Nixon . . . Don't you think we weren't going to run if Nixon went out of office in 1976. But he didn't. It turned out the other way. But, you know we made plans. We made plans. We were going to run in 1976, don't you worry about that. In fact, another thing is--it shows you the integrity of our President--he [Reagan] tried to set a maximum of two [gubernatorial] terms. He tried to get a bill through. Well, in 1974 the pressure was about three thousand pounds per square inch for the governor to run for a third term. He said, "I can't do that. I can't do that. I'd be a hypocrite. I can't do that." Boy, they tried to get him to run for the third term and he could have won the third term like (snap of fingers), without any question. But he said, "I just can't do it. I can't. I've got to live with myself."

E: Can you give your impression of Jesse Unruh and that campaign in 1970?

T: Yes. Old Jesse is kind of like "Tip" O'Neill. O'Neill is a typical Boston barroom, old type politician. The same with Jesse. With Jesse, it doesn't make any difference what it takes, he'd do anything. I know Jesse. He's a tough, two-fisted politician. He'd almost do anything to get elected, like going up in front of Henry's house [during the 1970 campaign], in front of my house, and in front of my old business and those kinds of things, you understand. But I know Jesse; I know him well. He's a nice guy, a good old boy, but he's just a typical politician. He wanted to be governor, and whatever he could do . . . He tried to discredit everybody, saying all of the "kitchen cabinet" was "a bunch of millionaires, a bunch of wealthy businessmen, who never had any compassion for the poor," all this kind of stuff. He'd say, "I'm the commonman. I'm going to do this for you." That was his style. Same way with old "Tip" O'Neill from Boston. It's always "the poor people." Well, he's doing more damage to the poor people than anybody in the country.

E: Was the campaign in 1970 ever in doubt in your mind?

T: No, no. No, we thought we'd win by a million [votes], but we knew we were losing some support because of the recession. We fought right up to the last minute. We had organization, and we just kept pounding and pounding and beating on doors until the last minute.

E: Let me ask you one question about the 1972 campaign. In the 1972 presidential campaign, of course, Nixon was running for reelection. Were you aware of any particular strategies or aims that Governor Reagan might have had at the 1972 Republican National Convention? What did he want to accomplish?

T: As you know, he was the floor speaker back at the convention. There was no question in our minds at that time--Ed Mills, myself and all the people, I guess you could call them Reagan people--that we were going to run Ron for office in 1976 after Nixon left office. Make no mistake about it, we were all primed. Our whole activity down at the convention in 1972 was to acquire friends and get commitments. We were working hard. Ron worked hard for Nixon. He spoke and raised money; we all did. Mr. Dart and I put on one of the biggest fund raisers in history out here for President Nixon in 1972. But make no mistake about it, we were all ready to go. Don't you think we weren't building for 1976! There was no question about that ever. In fact, there was a great deal of pressure for the governor to run for a third term, but we couldn't convince him. He said, "No, I said I don't believe in a third term. I tried to get a bill through the legislature for a two term limit. I'd make a hypocrite of myself, and I'm not going to do it." We thought maybe it might

hurt his chances [in 1976] by being out of office. He could have won the governorship without any problems. Then when the Watergate thing came out, that kind of threw things into a tizzie, but we still kept working, working hard. Ron made speeches throughout the country. But we worked after 1972. That's why we were down there [at the convention], of course. We felt that President Nixon was going to win and win handily, and we wanted to help. By showing people that we had a great candidate and by helping Nixon, we would get commitments out of a lot of politicians, senators and congressmen throughout the country.

E: Were there any feelers at all for having Reagan appointed vice president when Spiro Agnew had to resign? Do you remember anything of that nature?

T: Oh, yes. Yes, I took quite an active part in that, and I think that President Nixon made a very bad mistake when he didn't appoint him. I did my best, and so did Mr. Dart, to convince Nixon that he should. You bet I did.

E: And you think that Mr. Reagan would have taken it had it been offered?

T: Nobody ever turns it down. I've never heard in history of anybody that ever turned down the vice presidency [of the United States].

E: He seems to have been reluctant in 1976 to accept a nomination for vice president.

T: When?

E: In 1976.

T: He wasn't asked. He would have accepted. No question about it. He was not asked. He was never asked. I have never read of anybody in our history turning down the vice presidency, unless it was because of illness or something like that.

E: One thing that I wanted to ask you about was the 1973 special election for the Reagan Tax Initiative. It was Proposition 1.

T: Proposition 1.

E: I believe that was a unique campaign, because there was a personal phone recording used where Governor Reagan made a campaign appeal over the phone, and that was played to different voters. I think you were involved in that.

T: Well, you bet your life I was involved. I helped raise a lot of money, and I was never so disappointed at some of the people that came out against it at the last minute, some of the business people in the state. I just couldn't believe it. I was never so disappointed in my life. When we first started, it looked like we would win by a big majority. Then the mayor of Los Angeles came out showing pictures of what it was going to do to the old women and all this kind of stuff. I never will forget it. That's the reason I've never had any respect for Tom Bradley. He knew he was lying through his teeth. He knew that. He knew that it was the worst demagoguery that was ever perpetrated on the people. Now, I look at Proposition 13 and what they finally did, but the governor was so far ahead of them, so far ahead. I say now that I'm glad the governor didn't win [the nomination] in 1976 back in Kansas City [at the Republican National Convention], because I don't think the people were really in trouble enough that they would have gone along with him. It had to wait until it got so bad that the people of the United States said, "My God, come get us. Look where we are. We're in trouble. Inflation is going to break us. We're going down the same path as England." I'm kind of glad now, as fate had it, that we didn't win in 1976.

E: Did Ed Mills and Tom Reed or anyone like that work with you on the 1973 Proposition 1 campaign?

T: Oh, Tom didn't so much, but Ed Mills was right in my office. We worked up and down this state. We did everything we could.

E: Whose idea was the phone solicitation? Do you remember?

T: Oh, goodness, I don't know. We did so much, because you know, it looked like in the last two or three weeks that the tide changed, and I just couldn't believe it. So we just poured everything into it. We added a big debate. Economist Milton Friedman came out and talked. Everybody came out and talked, but I just couldn't believe it. I'm not going to mention any names, but I'm surprised at some of the business concerns in this state who came out and opposed it at the last minute. I just couldn't believe it.

E: This is the final question. In 1976 several people, Henry Salvatori and some others that had backed Governor Reagan all the way, did not that year.

T: Well, Henry, God bless him, he's still a big man. Henry just didn't believe that we should oppose the incumbent. He called the governor. He called me, and God bless him, he and some of the others just didn't believe we should oppose the incumbent. It was a question of whether we should or not, but what really changed our minds at the last minute--and the governor had been talking about all the cities being in

bad shape--was what happened in New York. That convinced us. We took a poll throughout this country, and the poll showed us there was *strong* support for what Governor Reagan was talking about. He was the man, so we decided to run. I'll never forget it. The first time we met, we said, "Well, maybe we'll wait for another poll." So we waited three weeks or thirty days, and we took another one. When that happened we met up at the governor's house. (snap fingers) It was go, and we went. But I do want to close with one thing.

E: Certainly.

T: I want to get it straight. Ronald Reagan never turned down the vice presidency. He was not asked.

END OF INTERVIEW

INDEX

INTERVIEWER BIOGRAPHIES

Lawrence B. de Graaf is a Professor of History and Director of the Oral History Program at California State University, Fullerton. He received his B. A. from Occidental College, his M. A. and Ph. D. from University of California, Los Angeles, all in History. One of the original faculty at CSUF, he has served there since 1959. Prior to taking over the Oral History Program in 1979, he was Director of the M. A. Program in Social Sciences.

Specializing in western black history, local history, public history, and recent American history, Dr. de Graaf has been a visiting lecturer at Howard University, 1968; on the Board of Editors of *Pacific Historical Review*, 1971-74; on the Board of Directors, National Council on Public History, 1979- ; and on the Steering Committee of the California Committee for the Promotion of History, 1980- .

He is the author of several articles on western black history and on public history, coeditor of *The Survey of the Historical Profession: Public Historians* and contributing editor to a forthcoming bibliography of public history. In the oral history program, he has directed the Brea Community History Project and exhibition, was project director for the CSUF portion of the Reagan Project, and is currently consulting with the Bowers Museum on a joint Orange County Oral History Project.

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